Problems of COMMUNISM

Coexistence, Communism and Latin America

Henry Pachter
Victor Alba
Robert J. Alexander
Samuel Shapiro
Francis and Laura Randall
George Sherman

A Play with a Secret

Burton Rubin

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The Editors, *Problems of Communism*
United States Information Agency
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Russia, China, and the World: I

EDITORS' NOTE: Looking back upon the history of the Soviet Union over the past seven to eight years—that is, since Stalin's death—one is struck by the spectacular change from what might be termed paranoiac isolationism to bravura-like extroversion. No longer is the Soviet Union churlish about visitors, or brusque and suspicious in dealing with the outside world. No longer is it preoccupied—almost to the point of hysteria—with the defense of its borders against hordes of imperialist spies and provocateurs. No longer, in fact, as Khrushchev not long ago reminded us, is it possible to speak in terms of "capitalist encirclement," for one might rightfully ask: Who is encircling whom? Indeed, what Khrushchev has done in these past few years has been to engage in a bit of the "encirclement game" himself: shrill missives in the Middle East, rocket rattling in Cuba, attempted footholds in the Congo. . . . Still cautious, still ready to spring back into position, the Soviet Union has nevertheless become one of the most active and vociferous protagonists in the international arena—as its recent actions in the United Nations illustrate to the hilt.

Nor has Communist China, for the past several years, limited itself to killing flies, building communes, and "molding the minds" of its multi-million citizenry. Along with the USSR, China has been widening its activities far beyond the borders of its own country—trading with Latin America, supporting the Algerian nationalists, encouraging insurgent forces in Southeast Asia. In this process, her ambitions and strategic proclivities have, it would seem, come into conflict with those of "the first country of socialism," giving rise to heated ideological debates, mysterious conferences, and sundry manifestos.

It is with these subjects—the reemergence of Russia as an active world power, the international proselytism of China, the relations between the two powers, and the interaction of Soviet-Chinese and local Communist activities in various areas of the world—with which this new series will concern itself. In this issue, we start off with an examination of "peaceful coexistence" and its application to Central and South America. Future issues will deal with Sino-Soviet differences on strategy and with Communist activities in other parts of the world.

The Meaning of "Peaceful Coexistence"

By Henry Pachter

THE DOCTRINE OF COEXISTENCE, which the recent "Statement of the Moscow Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers Parties" describes as the basis of Soviet foreign policy, has a long history. Referred to as "parallel existence" in Lenin's early pronouncements, and then implicitly embodied in the New Economic Policy of 1921, it received official recognition in the preamble to the Soviet Constitution of 1923:

Since the foundation of the Soviet Republics, the states of the world have been divided into two camps: the camp of capitalism and the camp of socialism. There, in the camp of capitalism, national hate and inequality, colonial

Mr. Pachter, who teaches European history at the New School for Social Research, New York, is diplomatic correspondent for Die Deutsche Zeitung, *Cologne. The present article is abstracted from a chapter in his forthcoming book* The Terms of Coexistence.

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slavery and exploitation, national oppression and pogroms, imperialist brutality and war prevail. Here, in the socialist camp, there is mutual confidence and peace, national liberty and equality, peaceful coexistence and fraternal collaboration of peoples.

Superficially, this declaration seemed to stress the incompatibility of the two systems, but the policy which it reflected was predicated not on the inevitable clash of the two camps, but on their *separation* and *isolation*. The "camps" are seen as hostile in spirit, but not actually at war. The Soviet Union, it appears, is not the only possible victim of aggression; the contradictions of capitalism might lead to war *within* the imperialist camp itself.

Coexistence, then, was introduced as a great maneuver of disengagement. A truce or a "breathing spell," in Lenin's words, was the aim, and to implement it Lenin went so far as to sign an agreement to stop revolutionary propaganda in the British Empire in exchange for a commercial treaty. What mattered was the survival of the Soviet state, then the only bastion of socialism in the world, which had to be protected against capitalist, counterrevolutionary intervention. Peace was a victory for socialism, because war had been removed from the borders between the two camps and relegated to the interior of the capitalist world.

The concept of the two camps enabled, or even forced, Lenin to view war within the capitalist camp not as a disturbance of peace, but as a weakening of the enemy. He never doubted that "the era of wars and revolutions has just begun." Imperialism and colonialism were in the throes of death, and capitalism could not solve its problems for any length of time. Through the Comintern he exploited class war inside the capitalist nations; by fostering colonial revolutions he struck at their economic resources; and he encouraged the nationalist movements in Germany, Italy, Turkey and elsewhere to undermine the political order which had been erected by the Western powers.

Coexistence thus offered a shelter from which diplomatic and propaganda offensives could be launched, and it held out the promise of a temporary military truce. The defensive and the aggressive components of the idea of coexistence were inseparably intertwined. Coexistence, Lenin admitted with his usual candor, was not an ideal but a statement of fact.

The Defensive Phase

Under Stalin, "Soviet power in one country" became "socialism in one country"; the image of the "two camps" was supplemented by the theory of "relative stabilization," and defensive connotations of "coexistence" began to overlay the aggressive concomitants. The Soviet Union was hermetically sealed off both ways. The Janus head of isolationism assured the capitalists abroad that world revolution had been adjourned *sine die,* and promised the Soviet people that intervention was no longer a threat. At the Fourteenth Congress of the CPSU in 1925, Stalin expounded a theory of "two centers of attraction," England and the Soviet Union, stressing the gulf between them and the contrast between conflicts there and unity in the USSR. In the same spirit, he constantly exhorted the Foreign Commissar, Chicherin, to "exploit the antagonism between our enemies."

It is essential to understand that in the Soviet view the "other camp" is seen as a whole. The Soviet Union does not coexist with each non-Soviet state individually but with the entire capitalist system. In contrast to most Western governments, which deal with each foreign nation as best they can, Soviet diplomacy is always conscious of the repercussions it can generate within the entire concert of powers by acting on one of its members. Such a polarized view has certain propagandistic advantages. Moreover, it gives the Soviet policy-maker a detached view of any temporary ally—no loyalty binds them together permanently—and he retains the superiority of aloofness.

As *tertius gaudens* the USSR always seeks protection in the disunity of her enemies. By giving mild encouragement to disruptive forces abroad, Soviet diplomacy in the 1920's could buy maximum security with a minimum commitment of its own forces. Rejecting the Trotskyite plea for a revolutionary strategy, Stalin asserted that the British Empire would tumble, not through the exertions of the Comintern or the Red Army, but thanks to the stupidity of the Tory Government. Triumphing over the internationalist opposition at the Fifteenth Congress, in December 1927, he gave a canonical definition of coexistence:

We must not forget Lenin's statement that as regards our work of construction very much depends upon whether we succeed in postponing war with the capitalist world, which is inevitable, but which can be postponed either until the moment when the proletarian revolution in Europe matures, or until the moment when the colonial revolutions have fully matured, or lastly, until the moment when the capitalists come to blows over the division of the colonies. Therefore, the maintenance of peaceful relations with the capitalist countries is an obligatory task for us. Our relations with the capitalist countries are based on the assumption that the coexistence of two opposite systems is possible. Practice has fully confirmed this.[1]

[1] J. V. Stalin, *Works,* Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1954, Vol. 10, p. 296.

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In a more practical vein he then recommended "postponing war by buying off (!) certain capitalists," utilizing the antagonisms between the imperialists to "fight the preparations for new imperialist wars" and particularly "England's interventionist tendencies," maintaining peace with the capitalist countries, expanding trade, and effecting a "rapprochement with the so-called weak and unequal states."

These oft-quoted passages reveal to the contemporary reader, who may be either too young or too forgetful, that Khrushchev did not invent coexistence. They also make clear what coexistence means and what it does not mean in the minds of its users. It is a description of a state of affairs—a relationship between states, not a goal. It is a technique of conducting relations with the outside world, not a philosophy. It does not mean that states ought to live together in peace, but that states which are incompatible have nevertheless been coexisting for the last forty years. Lastly, the relationship so described is not necessarily positive or friendly; rather, it is a relationship of subdued hostility and watchful waiting, if not of hoping for the worst.

During the late 1920's and early 1930's, these ground rules of coexistence resulted in a determined disengagement of the Soviet Union from active participation in international politics. The Soviet Union coexisted in virtual isolation; its trade was hedged in by the monopoly of foreign exchange; it refrained from participation in collective security arrangements; its treaties with neighbor countries were bilateral and usually of the nonaggression type, which did not commit the USSR to measures of collective security but protected it from intervention. In short, acquiescence in the *status quo* did not render Moscow coresponsible for its maintenance.

Cooperation and Non-Coexistence

Like the Tsars before them, the Communist leaders after World War I encouraged all "unequal nations" to fight for the revision of existing treaties. As is well known, this policy failed. Instead of merely embarrassing the capitalist camp, fascism eventually threatened to organize the anti-Bolshevik crusade which Soviet politicians had feared so long. As a result, Russian diplomacy had to give up its splendid isolation and seek allies in the West. The term "coexistence" was much too cold to characterize this warmer relationship, and it was carefully avoided in describing Soviet relations with the Popular Front governments. Nor was it used later to describe the Soviet Union's relationship with Nazi Germany during the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact or, in the "democratic" phase of war, with the Western allies.

But in either case, the community of interests was considered transitory; within the rules of "coexistence" the ally was as much a member of the "other" camp as the enemy. That is the reason why the Soviet leaders believed Goebbels' hints of a possible deal between the West and the Nazis. They looked at the wartime alliance as an instance of Lenin's prescription that in need one must cooperate with the devil. And that is also why immediately after the war (Stalin's speech of February 9, 1946) they were able to revert from cooperation with the liberal democracies to hostility.

For several years after the war, the borders between the two camps were fluid and no one spoke of coexistence, except to deplore its absence. The Soviet Army imposed Communist rule on Central and Eastern Europe, and General Zhdanov, under whose political supervision the takeover occurred, also presided over the opening congress of the Cominform. On that occasion, he stressed the "irreconcilable antagonism" between the "two camps," and promised "to enlarge [the Soviet state's] activity on the international scene."

The Soviet advance was contained, to be sure, but it took the Kremlin leaders some time to admit that Western Europe was impervious to revolution. Instead of returning to coexistence directly, Stalin set out to improve and secure the border line separating the two camps. This phase of East-West relations, outwardly characterized by implacable hostility, in reality was devoted to an unavowed attempt to reach a *modus vivendi,* however precarious. This fighting for a stalemate is known as the "cold war." Each side realized (without admitting it openly) that recognition of the *status quo* was the only feasible alternative to a new holocaust. More important, however, was another function of the cold war—it permitted Stalin to declare martial law in his newly acquired empire, as though it were a beleaguered fortress. The cold war imprisoned the satellites, and the "two camps" doctrine held them together like a vise. For a moment it seemed as though Stalin were reverting to the original Leninist conception of a standstill. The essentially protective function of the "two camps" idea was barely hidden under seemingly aggressive mannerisms.

The Second Disengagement

Nor for long, though. By uniting his own camp through the cold war, Stalin had also united the enemy camp. The moment he could afford to relax tensions, he again reversed his line and revived the strategy of coexistence. In his so-called "testament," written for the 19th Party Congress in 1952, he admitted that

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capitalism might survive after all and that socialism again might have to live with it. While he considered the contradictions between the capitalist and the socialist camps "theoretically" more important, "in practice" those between capitalist countries were of greater value, and by exploiting them cleverly, diplomacy might postpone war almost indefinitely. In quoting these disquisitions at the time, an eminent American authority facetiously remarked:

If Stalin believes what he said, he would logically direct Soviet propaganda to forget about Soviet-American conflicts and to give all stress to conflicts within the capitalist world. [He] might even make some minor gestures of conciliation, such as giving Austria back its freedom.[2]

This indeed was the direction in which Stalin's successors developed the new theory. Peace offensives and offers of "disengagement," devised by Stalin himself, were intensified under the face-saving pretext of the "thaw" which his timely death provided. At the 20th Congress (February 1956) Khrushchev proclaimed the sincerity of these offers:

It has been alleged that the Soviet Union advances the principle of peaceful coexistence merely out of tactical consideration, considerations of expediency. Yet it is common knowledge that we have always [!], from the first years of Soviet power, stood with equal firmness for peaceful coexistence. Hence, it is not a tactical move, but a fundamental principle of Soviet foreign policy.[3]

The stress was on "peaceful," *i.e.* recourse to warlike action was repudiated; competition, however, was not thereby ruled out but confirmed, nor was continued antagonism denied. On the contrary, Khrushchev was acutely aware of how little he actually was offering. (In the good old days of diplomatic hypocrisy, no real statesman would have dared to profess less than firm belief in bare coexistence up to the last minute before war "broke out.") Thus while confessing that he merely tolerated the existence of the United States, Khrushchev felt bound to offer more to the Bandung nations: "We believe that countries with different social systems can do more than exist side by side. It is necessary to proceed further, to improve relations, strengthen confidence between countries and cooperate."[4]

It was in this same speech that Khrushchev declared that "war is not fatalistically inevitable." We have often been told that this was a departure from orthodox Leninism. But "fatalism" never was Lenin's meat, and as we have seen, not even Stalin acted on the assumption that war between the Soviet Union and the West was inevitable. He took credit for postponing war from year to year. He organized "peace blocs" and cooperated with non-Communist governments. After his death the question was not whether war was inevitable; the question was which conclusion must be drawn from the insight that in the nuclear age war becomes unthinkable. Malenkov had made the unorthodox remark on March 17, 1954, that "modern instruments of war mean the destruction of world civilization"—putting socialist and capitalist civilization into one basket and implying that the two must not just coexist but cooperate to avoid catastrophe. A year later Malenkov was made to retract his words. The military apparently were thinking of another alternative—"pre-emptive war", which would destroy Western civilization but leave the "socialist camp" in a position to sustain a counterblow. This dangerous theory was taken seriously enough to warrant discussion in Soviet Army magazines.[5] As its political spokesman, Molotov declared that nuclear war would destroy only capitalist civilization.

Khrushchev accepted neither view. He held with Lenin that it is neither necessary to abandon the West to the capitalists nor to visit destruction upon it. In fact, the Soviet Premier has at all times preferred political to administrative and military solutions. In this as in most other respects he has been a true disciple of Stalin, who held the military in utmost contempt: theirs was a "fragmentary, bourgeois" theory of war; they never understood that war is not won with the "knavish devices of weaponry"; all they knew was "transitory"; to win a war, Russia must rely on the "permanently operational factors." The conflict with the West, in Stalin's view, had to be won politically *before* it might be necessary to fight it with guns. Khrushchev only needed to substitute "rockets" for "guns."

It is not difficult to transpose Stalin's military theory into the field of foreign policy. In his search for "permanently operative factors," Khrushchev repeated Lenin's promise that "the final issue of the conflict is assured by the fact that Russia, India and China have the vast majority of the population." When Lenin said that, China was not socialist, and neither was India when Khrushchev repeated it at the 21st Congress of the CPSU. Relying on Lenin's strategy, Khrushchev was able to develop his idea of political warfare, which permitted him to reject both Malenkov's anxiety that all

[2] Philip E. Mosely, *The Kremlin and World Politics*, Vintage Books, New York, 1960, p. 395. Originally in *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1952.

[3] Quoted from Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union*, Random House, New York, 1960, p. 296.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 298.

[5] Quoted by H. S. Dinerstein, *War and the Soviet Union*, and Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age*, both published by Praeger, New York, 1959.

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civilization is threatened alike, and Molotov's callous resignation to the inevitability of war. He could assert that "capitalism will perish, socialism will survive", but also deny that war between the two systems is inevitable.

The Discovery of the Uncommitted

Khrushchev's true invention is not the concept of peaceful coexistence or the revision of Lenin's theory that war is inevitable as long as imperialism exists. His real contribution is the discovery of neutralism, its legitimization and use by Soviet propaganda and diplomacy, its amplification into a new theory of Soviet foreign policy.

Until Khrushchev, Soviet policy had operated mainly on the assumption that "he who is not for me is against me." It demanded confession and submission from those whom it would receive in good grace; it attacked those who would not admit the superiority of Moscow's judgment and cause. In 1955 the new theory burst forth with tremendous success: "All those who do not speak out against me shall be counted for me"—a brilliant application to the foreign field of an assumption which dictators make in domestic elections.

In effect, this new theory says to the uncommitted nations: You don't have to be for us; we don't intend to sovietize you; all we want is to be on friendly terms with you; to obtain this, you simply have to withdraw, or keep away, from alliances which we feel are directed against us. If you don't accept American arms and American bases, you belong in the "camp of peace."

Under this theory, the Kremlin no longer sees a world divided into two rigidly defined camps but a series of concentric zones, beginning with Hell at one pole, and passing through Purgatory to Heaven at the other, like Dante ascending from Inferno to Paradise. At the center of Hell, where once the London City held the place of honor, we now have "American ruling circles," still trying to pull the strings of the visible world. Close to them, a congeries of co-conspirators, retainers, beneficiaries, profiteers and fascists are organized in NATO. It would be futile to try converting them to peace. They are aggressors leading aggressor nations, imperialists who scheme to recapture lost colonies. To break these countries out of the NATO circle, one must threaten them with violence and kindle disaffection in their rear.

Purgatory (to continue the metaphor) consists of two zones: First there is a group of states critical of the Soviet Union in various degrees, but opposed to, or afraid of, the bloc policy of the United States. Together they form a neutral belt running from Sweden via Austria and Yugoslavia to North Africa, through the Arab countries to India and Indonesia. In the United Nations many of them often vote with the Soviet Union, or at least occasionally vote against the United States. They can often be included in the greater "camp of peace." The diplomatic strategy toward these nations consists in creating issues which repeatedly force them into alignment with the USSR. Questions of disarmament, overseas bases, colonialism, and incidents like the U-2 flight are especially suited for this purpose.

In the second zone are countries, notably in South America and Southeast Asia, whose upper classes side with the United States but whose peasant populations are ripe for revolution and often vent their wrath first against foreign influence. In Africa and Asia too, where so many countries have recently risen from colonial status, smoldering resentments can be mobilized against Western policies. Some governments of these countries have learned to blackmail the United States, by inviting Soviet influence; others lean toward the USSR because its diplomacy caters to their national ambitions; some dictator may follow Soviet leads or become dependent upon Soviet friendship in order to maintain his one-party regime; still other countries are geographically so close to the Soviet empire that they cannot afford to antagonize the Kremlin even in their domestic policies.

Finally, we have the environs of Heaven—a ring of People's Democracies forming a protective glacis around the Soviet Union where there was once a hostile *cordon*

How Peaceful Is Coexistence?

The policy of peaceful coexistence is a policy of mobilizing the masses and launching vigorous action against the enemies of peace. Peaceful coexistence of states does not imply renunciation of the class struggle . . . [it] is a form of class struggle between socialism and capitalism.

In conditions of peaceful coexistence favorable opportunities are provided for the development of the class struggle in the capitalist countries and the national-liberation movement of the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries . . .

Peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems does not mean conciliation of the socialist and bourgeois ideologies. On the contrary, it implies intensification of the struggle of the working class, of all the Communist parties, for the triumph of socialist ideas.

—Statement of the Moscow Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers Parties, *New York Times*, December 7, 1960.

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sanitaire. These countries have no foreign policies of their own, but they occasionally are allowed initiatives for which the Kremlin does not wish to take responsibility.

The Post-Stalin Universe

This great variety in the political complexion of the world permits Soviet diplomacy to participate occasionally in majorities at the United Nations and to speak of a large "camp of peaceful states." Instead of a socialist and a capitalist camp, we now see around the Soviet Union a "socialist camp," around the socialist camp an "anti-imperialist camp," and around the anti-imperialist camp a "camp of peace."

The Soviet strategy is to weld the "camp of peace" into a more permanent association, to draw members of the outer ring into the inner rings and to fortify the camp so as to prevent defections. All these aims can be served by maintaining and constantly increasing the pressure on the enemy camp and by leading the uncommitted nations to ever-increasing demands. Soviet initiatives keep before the world burning issues—real or artificial—which prevent the camp followers from falling out with one another or from following interests of national policy which might lead them in different directions.

It is essential for the success of this new Soviet scheme of coexistence that no changes occur in the sheltered "camp of socialism" and that the "capitalist camp" allow its allies to embrace neutralism. States in which Soviet sympathizers rise to political leadership are involved in national revolutions which drive them under Soviet influence; satellites are kept—by party rule or by violence—from turning back in the other direction. Reinforced with periodic threats of nuclear destruction this policy is calculated to enhance further the magnetic powers of the Soviet bloc.

With this new view of the world, the precepts of coexistence have changed in two important respects. The original emphasis on separation of the two camps no longer holds true everywhere. The "sheltering" feature remains operative within the "socialist camp," and anxiety no longer is the motive of Soviet diplomacy. Having broken the encirclement, it ardently engages its forces in the vast opportunities abroad and even aims at isolating the opponent. Khrushchev put it quite succinctly in an interview with the Paris *Figaro* on March 19, 1959:

At present it is not known who encircles whom. The socialist countries cannot be considered as some kind of island in a rough capitalist sea. A billion people are living in the socialist countries, out of a total world population of 2.5 billion. And how many people in other countries hold socialist attitudes? Thus, one cannot speak any more about capitalist encirclement in its former sense.

This development is the result of Stalin's conquests, the progress of weapons technology and the more flexible strategy of "better than coexistence" (see above, note 5). Soviet diplomacy is now out in the open field and has much room for maneuver. It is no longer determined by the purely defensive idea of "parallel existence." Only on its Western frontiers does the Soviet empire wall itself off; there the plea for coexistence is mainly defensive, locking the door against "liberation." In the underdeveloped areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America, however, coexistence has acquired an active, aggressive meaning. All doors here must be kept open for any applicants to the peace camp. To coexist here means: not to resist Communist infiltration, not to lease bases to the Western powers and not to enter into defensive agreements with them. Khrushchev has not conceded any part of this terrain to the West, and Soviet participation in its development no longer is considered absurd.

Coexistence is thus not defensive but aggressive; it is not a protection against war but a substitute for it. In fact, it is the form in which the great struggle for world dominion can be fought under the balance of atomic terror.[6] In this conflict the Soviets are confident that they have justice on their side, and therefore coexistence need not restrain their predictions of doom for the West and their attacks on its possessions.[7] In Soviet propaganda releases to Western nations it may appear as though the notion of coexistence implied recognition of a certain *status quo.* The opposite is true. Coexistence, as it is admitted in propaganda elsewhere, means unimpeded *change* of the *status quo*—and mostly in one direction. One need only recall in this connection Khrushchev's performance at the last United Nations General Assembly. Having found in one of his prepared speeches the assurance that "the Soviet Union does not want to change the social system of any country," he departed during the delivery from the script and honestly inserted the words "by force." And what

[6] The recent "Statement of the Moscow Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers Parties" reaffirms that "peaceful coexistence of states does not imply renunciation of the class struggle. . . . [it] is a form of class struggle between socialism and capitalism." This point is stressed in the statement several times. *New York Times,* December 7, 1960.

[7] It is of interest that in the Moscow Statement referred to above, the formula "we will bury you" is not connected with economic competition but with the possibility of war.

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could be more illustrative of the expansive aims of coexistence than the Soviet demand, expressed at the same General Assembly, to reorganize the UN Secretariat by creating a collegium of three Secretaries General, representing equally the West, the Soviet bloc and the neutrals? What, indeed, could be more disruptive of the historical notion of a concert of powers, which still represents the Western prescription for ensuring orderly evolution within the existing power equilibrium?

Salami Tactics

It is the paradox of current Soviet foreign policy that it offers the West coexistence *because* the existence of the capitalist system, in Moscow's view, cannot be taken for granted much longer. Soviet policymakers believe that they face in the West a tottering group of states which will yield to diplomatic pressure and propaganda attacks. Trying to achieve their aims without risking war, they propose to dismantle the Western position not by force but in a series of relatively painless little operations—slicing away piecemeal one Western position after another in installments small enough not to provoke America's "instant and massive retaliation."

The strategy is not new. Stalin, too, avoided massive military engagements. He withdrew from Iranian Azerbaijan when he saw the West was earnest in protecting Iran's interests. It is true that in 1950 he did start the Korean War, but there is good reason to suspect that this engagement was the result of miscalculation, and what is even more important, he made a determined effort to keep the war localized. Indeed, while many Western observers shuddered at the sight of Russia's formidable armies and predicted war, Soviet diplomacy mounted in the early 1950's a large-scale political offensive under the banner of "peace," countering American efforts to build up the defenses of the Western world.

Militarily, the immediate postwar aim of Soviet strategy was a replica of Lenin's strategy after the upheaval of the First World War: to seal off the Soviet frontier at the Elbe line. This was the objective of Stalin's Berlin blockade, and it still is Khrushchev's objective in raising the Berlin issue again. But it is worth emphasizing that both Soviet dictators have conducted this attack with extreme caution. For all the noise he has made about Berlin during the past two years, Khrushchev has not carried out his hasty threats—though he may when he feels that it is safe to do so. Likewise, his tumultuous performance at the United Nations General Assembly could hardly screen the fact that the Soviet "technicians" did leave Leopoldville. Similarly in the Lebanon crisis, Khrushchev allowed the Eisenhower doctrine to become operative and contented himself with denouncing it. During the Suez affair he did some atom-rattling after the United Nations had taken actions which assured him that he would not have to honor his word. Soviet diplomacy is always ready to rush into the fray and to earn the credit for the progress of anti-colonialist forces, but it is equally ready to back down when faced with determined resistance. The latest example is Khrushchev's reminder to Castro that his offer of military assistance was merely "symbolic."

While coexistence does not rule out brushfire wars [8] and in particular wars by proxy, the strategy is designed to substitute political for military warfare. Experience has shown that a direct showdown or overt aggression tends to unite the enemies, while relaxation of tension between the two camps allows dissensions to come to the surface in the Western camp. The big aim, of course, is to dissolve NATO and to deprive the United States of overseas bases. Soviet propaganda fulminates therefore against "pacts" and "blocs," and tempts the intimidated and perplexed with blandishments of "total disarmament," a "neutralized" status and "safety" from nuclear war. The disarmament strategy, the peace offensives and the coexistence propaganda are thus designed to impair Western defenses, to disrupt unity in the Western camp and to shift the center of political gravity still further to the Soviet end of the scale.

All this of course raises the question of the sincerity of Soviet propaganda. If disarmament, as many believe, is so much to Russia's advantage, why then do Soviet negotiators contribute so little to obtain it? Why, if disarmament is so desirable, do Soviet negotiators resist so obstinately all suggestions to control it?

The Struggle for Dominion

The reasons are inherent in the Communist system as well as in the strategy of coexistence itself. Propaganda-conscious as Soviet diplomacy is, it still would rather keep disarmament as an issue than achieve its substance. More importantly, effective control is incompatible with the closed Soviet system of secrecy, safety and security. But the final difficulty derives from both the system and the Communist idea of coexistence: Soviets do not negotiate under the assumption that mutual concessions must lead to mutual advantage. They

[8] Wars of national liberation were explicitly approved in the Moscow Statement, and even a war of intervention by proxy seems possible now in Africa.

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view negotiation as a probing for the opponent's weakness which must result in unilateral concessions. They gave up Austria when it suited them, without equivalent; they regard "cultural exchanges" as a Soviet victory; they proclaimed Eisenhower's invitation to Khrushchev not as an attempt to break the deadlock but as a victory for themselves. Likewise they patiently wait for the United States to give up obsolete positions on disarmament, then may celebrate their victory by a unilateral concession of their own, real or imaginary.

These observations apply to all Soviet negotiations with the West. Soviet delegations do not assume that a parley will result in compromise; they are not free to offer deals; they aim only for full acceptance of an objective set for them in Moscow. For some time, their Western counterparts felt that perhaps the top man would be able to negotiate in person at a summit meeting. But we have seen that the difficulty does not lie with the position which the Soviet Union has taken *vis-à-vis* the rest of the world. Even Khrushchev cannot be satisfied with a compromise; he must fight for victories under "peaceful competition."

We do not live in the same universe; our clocks show two kinds of time. Coexistence is not a happy relationship among good neighbors; it is not a durable guarantee of mutual security. Rather, it describes the conditions under which the two camps may compete for domination and world power. It is a form of conflict, not of reconciliation. It has become less cooperative and more antagonistic as its protective aspects have yielded to its aggressive potentialities. Its strategy is no longer the shield of a fledgling Communist state, but the weapon of a strong power bent on conquest.

Soviet and Communist Activities in Latin America

By Robert J. Alexander

UNTIL THE ADVENT of the Castro regime in Cuba in 1959, Latin America was not a major field of attention for the Soviet Union. However, it was by no means neglected. The USSR has applied constant pressure in the area since World War II, ever ready to take advantage of any break which the local political situation or Latin American relations with the United States might present for extending Soviet influence and undermining that of its world rival.

Soviet objectives in the area have been varied. Moscow had been anxious to increase the number of countries extending diplomatic recognition to the USSR. Likewise, the Soviet leadership has sought to increase its trade with the countries of the region. It has been interested in undermining the frequent support which the Latin American nations have given the United States in the United Nations. Finally, Soviet longer-run objectives have undoubtedly remained what they have always been: to gain influence over and control of the twenty Latin republics of the hemisphere, in the name of the worldwide Communist revolution.

The Soviet Union has had certain advantages in dealing with Latin America. In the first place, it has been able to use the satellite countries of Eastern Europe in cases in which direct approaches by Moscow might arouse too much resistance (in what follows, the activities of the Soviet Union and those of the satellites will be treated simply as two different aspects of operations of Soviet foreign policy in the area). In the second place, the USSR has had at its command the obedient though sometimes bumbling services of the Communist parties in each of the Latin American republics.

Soviet success in achieving diplomatic recognition has varied considerably over the last four decades. In the

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Mr. Alexander, who teaches at Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey, is the author of Communism in Latin America *(Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, N. J. 1957), and other works on Latin America.*

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1920's Mexico and Uruguay became the first countries to recognize the fledgling Soviet Union; at the time they were used as headquarters for Comintern activities in the Caribbean area and South America respectively. In 1935 Colombia followed suit, but subsequently Mexico and Uruguay severed relations; thus at the outbreak of World War II Colombia was the only Latin American country recognizing the USSR.

The wartime alliance of the Western nations with the Soviet Union led a relatively large number of Latin American countries to extend recognition—Cuba in 1942; Nicaragua, Chile and Costa Rica in 1944; Bolivia, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala and Venezuela in 1945; and Argentina in 1946.[1] With the onset of the cold war, however, this trend was again reversed. Several countries broke off relations with the Soviet Union and the satellite states, some on the charge that Communist diplomatic officials were meddling in the internal politics of the nations to which they were accredited. Such was the circumstance, for example, when the Chilean government of President Gabriel Gonzalez Videl withdrew its recognition of both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in 1947. (As recently as 1959, diplomatic relations between the USSR and both Mexico and Argentina were similarly imperiled, though not severed, when Soviet diplomats were accused of interfering in local strikes.)

By early 1958 there were only nineteen diplomatic missions from the Soviet bloc in the Latin American countries. The USSR itself had embassies in Argentina and Mexico and a legation in Uruguay. Czechoslovakia had legations in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia and Mexico, plus a commercial delegation in Uruguay and a consulate general in Colombia. In all, only seven countries of Latin America were involved in formal relations with the Soviet Union or any of its satellites. There was no Latin American nation which had relations with either Communist China or East Germany.[2]

Since the early part of 1959 the area of Communist diplomatic action has again widened, though not to any great degree. In the case of Cuba, the Castro government has not only recognized the Soviet Union and several of the satellites, but has become the first Latin American country to establish diplomatic relations with Communist China. There have been persistent reports that Brazil might soon reestablish relations with the USSR, severed in 1947. In this connection, it is perhaps significant that Jânio Quadros, who was elected president of Brazil in October 1960, visited both the Soviet Union and Communist China on an extensive trip abroad the year before. Equally persistent reports that Venezuela was about to recognize the Soviet Union have been denied by President Romulo Betancourt, though he affirmed the establishment of informal contacts with the USSR to discuss mutual problems of the oil industry.[3] On the whole the Latin American governments have remained cautious on the question of formal recognition, among other reasons because they fear the effect which the establishment of Soviet and satellite embassies in their midst might have in strengthening local Communist parties and allied groups.

The Tactics of Tourism

The lack of extensive diplomatic representation has not prevented the Soviet Union, the satellites or Communist China from carrying on active propaganda campaigns in Latin America. Political tourism has played an important role in this drive to win friends and to influence the trend of events in the area. Increasingly large numbers of Latin Americans from all walks of life have been taken to the Soviet Union, to the East European nations, and in recent years to China as well, on all-expense junkets. Not infrequently, these trips are linked with attendance at one or another of the "world" congresses (of youth, women, trade unionists, *et cetera*) arranged by the international Communist apparatus.

It is difficult to know just how many such "tourists" visit the Soviet Union, China and the satellites each year, though their number undoubtedly runs into several thousands. Former US Senator William Benton reports an estimate that over $1,000,000 a year is spent by the Soviet Union alone just to provide air tickets to such Latin American travellers to the Iron and Bamboo Curtain countries.[4] A survey made in the middle of 1959 listed the following examples of publicized free tours by groups of Latin Americans to the Communist countries: a thiry-one member troupe of Bolivian folk dancers, who visited Prague, Moscow and Peking; a delegation of twelve Chilean mine union leaders who attended a World Mining Congress in Moscow; a delegation of nineteen Peruvian congressmen and journalists, and separately a group of six leading Peruvian lawyers, who journey to Moscow and Peking; a group of Colom-

[1] William Z. Foster, *Outline History of the Americas*, International Publishers, New York, 1951, p. 375.

[2] Robert Loring Allen, *Soviet Influence in Latin America: The Role of Economic Relations*," Public Affairs Press, Washington, 1959, p. 86.

[3] Romulo Betancourt, "Por Buen Camino Hacia la Recuperacion Economica del Pais," *Imprenta Nacional*, Caracas, Venezuela, 1960, p. 13.

[4] William Benton, "The Communist Threat at Our Back Door," *The New York Times Magazine*, July 17, 1960.

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bian congressmen who went to Czechoslovakia as guests of the Czech parliament and thence to East Germany, to Moscow where they were received by Khrushchev, and to Peking where they talked with Mao Tse-tung. The same survey reported that in Argentina a number of lucrative scholarships for study in Moscow had been made available to people without knowledge of Russian, but conversant in English, French or German.[5]

It is important to note that most of this political "tourism" is kept more or less separate from the operations of the Communist parties in the Latin American countries. The great majority of people making such conducted excursions are not Communists. While many of them are favorably disposed towards the Soviet Union, others are not. The latter make the trip out of curiosity, wanderlust, the desire for adventure, or in furtherance of other personal interests, rather than out of political sympathy for the USSR.

It is difficult to assess the total effect of the visits of these thousands of influential Latin Americans annually to the Communist countries. Some of the travellers come back hostile, others with mixed impressions; those politically inclined toward communism in the first place usually return more so. It is possible that many who might tend to be critical have been influenced by Latin American ideas of courtesy which militate against criticism by a guest of his hosts.

In addition to their touristic efforts, the Soviet Union and its satellites conduct intensive propaganda campaigns in the Latin American countries themselves. Important among the outlets for such propaganda are the "cultural and social societies" operated by the bloc countries. It has been reported that the number of such organizations operated by the USSR in the Latin American countries increased from 40 in 1957 to 84 in 1958.[6] The survey referred to above noted the existence of 22 such centers in Argentina alone in 1959.[7]

These centers carry on a wide range of activities. They conduct classes in the Russian language or on cultural subjects, as well as providing political orientation and indoctrination. They frequently act as the agents to recruit political "tourists," to keep track of returned visitors, and to use them where possible for propagandistic purposes. Although the hard-core Communist membership is undoubtedly active in the "cultural societies" and "friendship associations"—in fact, paid posts in them serve as a kind of patronage for local members—the centers also seek to recruit known figures on the local cultural and political scene who have no obvious connection with the Soviet Union. In this they are to a considerable degree successful, such leaders joining for a wide variety of purposes ranging from scholarly curiosity or genuine cultural interest through political considerations or pro-Communist inclinations.

[5] Speech by John D. J. Moore at the Stanford University Conference on Latin America, October 10, 1959, reporting findings of a survey conducted by W. R. Grace & Co.

[6] Arthur Whitaker, "Our Reaction to Communist Infiltration in Latin America," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, July 1960.

[7] Moore speech, *op cit.*

Themes and Slogans

A variety of appeals—both negative and positive—have been stressed by the Soviet bloc countries in their Latin American propaganda. There is no doubt that general onslaughts on the United States' so-called "imperialism" and "warmongering," such as those made by Khrushchev during the 1960 session of the United Nations General Assembly, are intended for Latin American ears, along with others. Khrushchev's frequent rattling of the H-bomb is also designed to have its effect on the Latin American countries—as was very graphically brought home in the summer of 1960 when he threatened to use the bomb in connection with the current situation in Cuba.

The Communists' positive appeals, however, are probably much more important in creating favorable public opinion towards the Soviet Union. The USSR has been using with growing insistence the argument that its own method of achieving rapid economic growth is an example for the Latin Americans to follow. An example of this kind of appeal is found in Anastas Mikoyan's speeches during his visit to Mexico in November 1959, to open the Soviet trade exhibition there. He is quoted as saying:

> **We the Soviet people, the Communists, have delivered a challenge. We have stated that we are catching up with and overtaking the United States in industrial production—a bold challenge. Once they laughed at us. . . . But when they saw that we had built rockets, satellites, atomic power stations, the first civilian atomic ship . . . several special sessions were held in the US Congress . . . and the question of the USSR's rate of development was discussed . . . In this matter we possess many advantages over capitalism. In the United States . . . the main stimulus is profit . . . even in the best years the capacity for producing 20-25 million tons (of steel) remains inactive. . . . It is improbable that this would happen to us.**[8]

Another basic argument used by the Soviet Union concerns the alleged advantages which might be gained by the Latin American nations from increased trade with the Communist bloc. There is little doubt that one

[8] Whitaker, *op. cit.*

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of the principal objectives of Soviet policy has been to increase its trade, and that of the satellites, with the Latin American countries. However, until the Castro regime in Cuba turned its policy in a definitely pro-Soviet direction late in 1959, the Communist countries had only modest success in this endeavor. (See the article by Professor Samuel Shapiro in this issue of *Problems of Communism*.)

It is worth noting that occasionally the Soviet Union has followed trade policies which have clashed with the interests of one or another of the Latin American countries. Such was the case in 1958 when the USSR dumped upon the world market a sizable amount of tin, with disastrous results insofar as the world price was concerned. The Bolivian government protested bitterly against this action.

At the present time, the Venezuelans are worried about the operations of the Soviet Union in the international petroleum market. President Romulo Betancourt, in a report to the nation on September 13, 1960, commented thus about the situation:

> **What we want to discuss with the Soviet Union is the fact that the four or five hundred thousand barrels a day petroleum which Russia has available, after meeting its own internal needs . . . the needs of China, and the needs of Central Europe, are being offered to India, Ceylon and other countries below the world market price. . . .**[9]

Communist propaganda also holds out the enticement of the help the Soviet bloc might be able to give to Latin America in its aspirations for rapid economic growth. Typical of the kind of appeal which Soviet spokesmen make is the following statement by Mikoyan during his 1959 visit to Mexico:

> **It goes without saying that the rate of development of underdeveloped countries would increase—and that would be just—if the colonial powers which robbed these countries returned to them what they had robbed, even without interest. . . . Although many of the countries which had rid themselves of the colonial yoke have become independent states, economically they still depend on capitalist monopolies. In six Arab countries, US and British oil monopolies make monstrous profits. . . . During the past nine years these Arab countries have lost over 6.5 billion dollars worth of oil profits. . . . We ask for an annual interest of 2.5 percent for our loans. . . . We are not looking for profits. . . . Apart from this, we give the underdeveloped countries, free of charge, licenses for the production of machinery and other articles on our blueprints. . . .**[10]

The mixing of positive with negative appeals as in this statement, is of course, standard procedure. The Soviet Union and other Communist countries almost always accompany their talk of what they can do for the Latin American nations with violent attacks on the United States. Such attacks are made in official and unofficial Soviet propaganda materials as well as by the local Communist parties.

The events in Cuba during 1959-60 represent the type of situation which the Soviet Union stands ready to exploit in the Western hemisphere. There the USSR has brought to bear all of its various arguments herein noted. The Cuban leaders at the end of 1959 turned towards the Soviet Union not only for economic aid, but for political and even military support. The USSR responded with limited economic aid, plus a rash statement by Premier Khrushchev that in case of a US attack on Cuba—which he knew very well was unlikely—his country would unleash the hydrogen bomb on the United States.

However, this situation is not devoid of problems insofar as the Soviet Union is concerned. *The New York Times* noted on November 19, 1960, that the Soviet leaders appeared to be having second thoughts about the responsibilities they had assumed with regard to Cuba. They were reported as trying to convince Premier Fidel Castro to moderate his violent attacks upon the United States, and in particular to stop rattling the Soviet hydrogen bomb. As the present article is written, moreover, there is no indication that the Soviet Union gives high enough priority to its stake in Cuba to be willing to buy the more than 3,000,000 tons of Cuban sugar which the United States has given notice it does not intend to buy in 1961.

Indigenous Party Activity

In addition to the direct activities of the Soviet Union and its satellites in the Latin American area, the USSR continues to pursue its objectives through the Communist parties of the area. In former days, Moscow's control over party activity was vaunted openly. Periodic meetings of the Communist International, and after World War II of the Communist Information Bureau, were the scene of long discussions of the problems of the various national Communist parties, including those of Latin America. Reports of these discussions and of the orders issued to the national parties were published in the Communist press in Latin America and in other areas of the world.

However, since the elimination of the Cominform some years ago, the methods of controlling the Communist parties of the hemisphere have become somewhat less obvious. Various pretexts have been used, such as the Soviet Communist Party's 20th and 21st Congresses

[9] Betancourt, *op. cit.*, p. 13.
[10] Whitaker, *op. cit.*

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in 1956 and 1959, to gather together "fraternal delegates" from all countries for the purpose of elaborating the world Communist line as well as regional objectives. The latest such meeting took place during the celebration in Moscow of the 43rd anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in November-December 1960.

From the beginning, the Communist parties of Latin America have been subordinated to Moscow. Occasionally this has been patently clear, as when in the early 1950's the two existing Communist groups of Guatemala were merged after the return of the leader of one of them, Victor Manuel Gutierrez, from Moscow, without benefit of a party congress or even of a party executive committee meeting of either group. Usually, Soviet control is less apparent.

Communist leaders from Latin America are trained and given refresher indoctrination courses behind the Iron Curtain. An American correspondent Daniel James, has described one of the principal centers of such indoctrination as follows:

> **. . . in Prague, Czechoslovakia. . . . there exists the so-called Institute for the Study of Latin American Relations. This Institute, which is part of the Faculty of International Relations of the State College for Political and Economic Sciences, trains agitators, spies and saboteurs for work in Latin America. The Institute has an enrollment of 750 students, some 15 percent of them enrolled in the School of International Relations. . . . The purpose in having Communists from Latin America and Europe study together is to train them as teams. Upon graduation, the Latin Americans return to their native countries and are later joined by European graduates, who may be former classmates. . . .**[11]

From the 1920's on, the Latin American Communist parties, together with those in other parts of the world, have made it clear that their fundamental purpose is to "defend the Soviet Union." They used to say so openly, and frequently. An outstanding instance was the declaration in 1946 of Luiz Carlos Prestes, boss of the Brazilian CP, that if his country should become involved in war with the Soviet Union, the party would support the Soviet Union. Every other Latin American Communist Party followed suit. Although in the postwar era the Communists have tended to be more reticent about their loyalty, they have never ceased in their eulogies of the Soviet Union, their constant support of its every policy, and their unremitting abuse of its adversaries, particularly the United States.

At the same time, an important change has come about in the Latin American Communists' line on the Soviet Union during the last decade. Although they still continue to laud the USSR as the "revolutionary fatherland" —which was their principal form of praise before World War II—they now lay much more stress on the Soviet Union's role as an exceedingly successful example of an underdeveloped nation which has expanded its economy with great rapidity. The conclusion drawn is, of course, that only the Latin American Communists can direct and achieve a similar rapid economic growth in their own nations.

There is some indication that the Latin American parties are becoming involved in the apparently growing controversy between the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties concerning appropriate tactics to be followed by the world Communist movement.

Should this trend develop further in the future, it is hard to tell what effect it would have on relations between the Communist parties and the Soviet Union, or upon the whole role of the USSR in the Latin American area. The apparent lineup of the Latin American parties with the "violent" elements in the international Communist movement takes on added significance in the light of events which have occurred since the advent of the Castro regime in Cuba, especially the latter's seeming attempts to "export" its type of revolution to the rest of Latin America. Throughout 1960 rumors were rife that large shipments of arms were reaching Cuba from the Communist countries, beyond the likely need of the island's own defense. A possible use of these arms was indicated by the short-lived insurrection attempt against the Venezuelan government in December 1960, which President Betancourt charged was instigated by Communists and supporters of Fidel Castro.

There now exists a Communist Party in every Latin American country. As of the present moment they are a potential rather than an actual menace to democratic development of their respective countries, with the possible exception of the Cuban party. However, they are a weapon which the Soviet Union always has at its command.

One of the principal activities of the local Communist parties is the organization of a wide variety of front groups. These include organizations of youth, women, professional people, trade unionists as well as "peace" organizations, and so on. These national groups are all affiliated with their international counterparts, which constitute an integral part of the world-wide Communist "apparatus."

The Communists have been very successful in winning the cooperation of non-Communist Latin Americans in these front organizations. Leading political figures, such as Mexican ex-President Lazaro Cardenas, well-known

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[11] Daniel James, *Red Design for the Americas: Guatemalan Prelude*, John Day Co., New York, 1954, p. 203.

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intellectuals in numerous countries, as well as labor leaders and even businessmen have been recruited into these groups.

A Boost to the Cause

The arguments of the indigenous Communists and those of the Soviet Union itself have received strong reinforcement during the last two years. The rise of Fidel Castro as the chief political figure of Cuba has provided a rallying point for a group in Latin American political life which, though not Communist, is willing to work with the Communists and aid their struggle to gain control of the nations of Latin America.

This element we may call the Jacobin Left. They are exceedingly anxious to bring about a revolutionary change in the economic, social and political structure of their respective countries. They are very insistent on the necessity of increasing the "economic independence" of their countries by diversifying the partners with whom they trade.

At the same time, there are elements of the Jacobin Left who have no faith in the efficacy of democracy. They argue that such fundamentals of the democratic system as checks and balances and the protection of dissident opinion are merely "traps" set by the defenders of the *status quo* to mislead the masses of the people. Furthermore, not believing in political democracy, they have no ideological opposition to the Communists, and are perfectly willing to work with them within their nations and in the broader international field.

The Jacobin Left is not a new phenomenon in Latin America. A decade ago, President Juan Peron of Argentina attempted to rally this group around himself. He failed for a variety of reasons to gain sufficient support to become a hemispheric leader. Fidel Castro does not face most of the disadvantages which hampered Peron. Coming to power a decade later than Peron, he is able to take advantage of the impatience in some quarters over the difficulties which have confronted a number of the recently established democratic regimes on the continent.

The advent of the Jacobins in Latin American politics makes it possible for the Communists to develop a protective coloration which has been difficult for them to achieve hitherto. Behind the screen of an "indigenous Latin American revolution" ostensibly led by the Jacobins, the Communists are attempting to become an ally or even an integral part of a movement for fundamental change in Latin American countries. Whether or not they succeed in this attempt largely depends—in the opinion of this author—on the abilities of parties of the Democratic Left, such as the Venezuelan Accion Democratica, the Bolivian MNR, the Peruvian Apristas and others, which are either in power or on the brink of power, to carry out necessary revolutionary changes in Latin American economic and social life in a gradual and democratic manner. If such reforms are effected, the Communists will reassume their traditional role in Latin American politics—that of an essentially alien group, directed by, and serving the interests of a foreign imperialist power.

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What, then, is the balance sheet of Soviet policy toward Latin America since World War II? Certain conclusions can be drawn. First of all, the area has not by any means had top priority for the Soviets during most of this period, though they have stood ready to take advantage of any favorable development. Second, until 1960 they had had only very modest success in their attempts at economic penetration of the area. The turn of events in Cuba has given them an unexpected opportunity to extend Soviet influence, but it is not entirely clear that they want to assume the responsibilities—either economic or political—pushed upon them by these events.

Finally, it is clear that the Soviet Union continues to give inspiration and direction to the Communist movement in the twenty Latin American republics. Although the Communist parties are for the most part of relatively minor importance in their respective countries, with the possible exception of Cuba, they represent a hard core of blind and fanatical supporters which the Soviet leadership can use as suits its purpose.

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Selling Oil and Influencing People

By Samuel Shapiro

WHEN THE KOREAN WAR ended in 1953, a dozen Latin American nations, from Cuba down to the Argentine Republic, were ruled by dictators. Public life in these countries centered mainly around political issues, since the attention of opposition elements was concentrated on achieving or restoring some form of democratic regime. On the economic side, any real progress was impossible under the dictatorial regimes, which stole or wasted staggering amounts of their nations' assets through exploitative practices (not the least of which was the building up of personal nest-eggs in foreign banks). Nevertheless, high commodity prices resulting from wartime demand made for a certain appearance of prosperity. Despite their continued underdevelopment and overspecialization in one or two commodities for export, most Latin nations appeared to be doing better than ever before.

Now, eight years later, there has been a remarkable change in the problems and perspectives of all these countries. Dictators have been eliminated at the rate of one a year: Argentina's Juan D. Peron in 1955, Peru's Manuel Odria in 1956, Colombia's Rojas Pinilla in 1957, Venezuela's Perez Jimenez in 1958, and finally Cuba's Fulgencio Batista early in 1959. The *caudillo* regimes of General Stroessner in Paraguay and Generalissimo Trujillo in the Dominican Republic have been visibly shaken. Ironically enough, however, while the political situation has taken this encouraging turn, a prolonged decline in the price of Latin American commodity exports has brought a continent-wide economic crisis to the newly-established democratic regimes. The price of sugar, for example, has fallen from 5 cents a pound in 1956 to a little over 3 cents today; during the same period copper has declined from 41 cents to 30 cents and lead from 15 cents to 11 cents. In 1958 alone the aggregate value of all Latin American exports fell by nearly $700 million—yet the cost of the manufactured goods and machinery that these nations must import hardly decreased at all.

Even more serious to the Latin American countries than price declines was the increased competition they faced in commodity exports, particularly from the emergent African nations, as well as the shutting off of many markets by tariff barriers, quotas, and such sanitary regulations as the American embargo on Argentine beef. Uruguayan wool, much of the coffee crop in Guatemala, Colombia, and Brazil, Bolivian tin, Chilean copper, Venezuelan oil, Argentine wheat and hides, Peruvian cotton—all were suddenly in surplus, and unsalable even at reduced prices. The results were extremely serious for all these nations, since they depend heavily upon exports of one or two major commodities (see the table on the page facing).

Communist Inroads

In the last few years the Soviet Union has been taking advantage of this troublesome situation with increasing vigor and success. Prewar Soviet trade with Latin America was negligible, and in the immediate postwar period the USSR was too busy rebuilding its shattered economy to do much overseas trading. But Soviet production has now increased to a point where some exportable surpluses (particularly of oil) are available and where the growing civilian economy can make good use of such "non-essential" foodstuffs as sugar, coffee, bananas and beef. Soviet determination to obtain a share of the Latin American market for the Communist bloc was stepped up after the end of the Korean War and signalled by then Premier Nikolai Bulganin's much publicized 1956 offer of technical assistance, "mutually

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Assistant Professor at Michigan State University, Rochester, Michigan. Mr. Shapiro has long specialized in Latin American affairs. He has taught at the Universities of Tucuman and Buenos Aires, Argentina, and has contributed articles to The Economist *(London),* The World Today *(London).* The New Republic *(Washington, D. C.), and other publications.*

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beneficial" trade relations and diplomatic ties. Bulganin, aware of Latin American suspicions of his country, specifically promised noninterference in the internal affairs of any nations.[1]

As the ruble has as yet no value in international commerce, the Soviet Union's trade offensive has been carried on in various indirect ways. Where necessary, for instance in the purchase of 762,000 tons of sugar from Cuba in 1955, the USSR has paid in dollars.[2] But the preferred system is the interchange of products carried on through government-to-government barter arrangements. Examples include: the exchange in 1958 of 20,000 tons of copper wire from Chile for crude oil and machinery, the Soviet bloc's purchase of 46 percent of the Uruguayan wool clip in 1959 in return for oil, farming equipment, and machinery; the Soviet deal with Brazil to buy 333 thousand sacks of coffee in 1960, 480 thousand sacks in 1961, and 666 thousand sacks in 1962, to be paid for with machinery, wheat, and petroleum (Communist China also has encouraged the Brazilian Coffee Institute to think that it might want to try the new beverage); finally, the series of barter deals by which the entire Cuban economy has become dependent on the Soviet bloc for markets and for essential supplies like oil, tractors and electrical equipment. The USSR has also offered long-term loans at attractive rates of interest; *e.g.*, it has loaned $100 million to Cuba for 12 years at 2.5 percent, and has proposed a $60 million oil equipment loan to the Bolivian government oil monopoly (YPFB), with repayment in 40 years at 2 percent. More recently Communist China has offered a $60 million loan to Cuba with no interest charges at all.

Such arrangements have enabled the Communist bloc to increase its trade with Latin America at the rate of 12 percent a year since 1955, for a total of $1.2 billion in exports over the five-year period. This rate of growth is figured from a very low base, of course, and the value of all exchanges with the bloc still constitutes only a small portion of total Latin American trade. Even with the huge increase in commerce with Cuba during 1960, the Soviet bloc's share of Latin American imports and exports is only about two percent of the area's total trade, as against 47 percent for the United States and 29 percent for Western Europe. Nevertheless, the pace at which the Communist trade offensive has proceeded is not to be ignored.

The Gains, Economic and Political

The advantage to the Communists of this rapidly growing trade is readily apparent. To begin with, most of the barter arrangements made so far are understandable from a purely business point of view. The Soviet Union, for example, as a result of large increases in production in the Caspian area and the Bashkiri fields of the Volga-Ural region, has a great and growing surplus of crude oil. Proved reserves have risen to 60 trillion barrels, almost double those of the US, and equal to about 20 percent of the world's total. Current output of about 2.5 million barrels a day is scheduled to grow to nearly twice that by 1956, and consumption, due to the shortage of Soviet automobiles, will remain comparatively low. The world surplus of tanker tonnage makes it possible to ship oil abroad very cheaply, and thus it is quite logical for the Soviet Union to look for foreign markets —not only in Latin America but in Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Italy, West Germany, Ceylon, India, and Pakistan as well. Between January 1959 and March 1960, Soviet shipments from the Black Sea accounted for 22 percent of all charter tankers of less than 22,000 tons; the USSR's petroleum exports have nearly doubled in the last two years, and oil is now the regime's largest earner of foreign exchange.[3]

[1] See *Guatemala: A Case History of Communist Penetration*. US Department of State Publication No. 6465, Washington, 1957, pp. 4-5.

[2] I. P. Pflaum, *American Universities Field Staff Reports Service* (Mexico and the Caribbean), Washington, August 1960, Vol. V, No. 4, p. 42.

[3] See the financial sections of *The New York Times* for September 20, October 18, 28, November 14, 16, 1960. For a Latin American analysis of the Soviet drive for oil markets see "Rusia y la Crisis Petrolera," *Vision* (Mexico City), September 23, 1960, pp. 49-53.

Concentration of Commodity Exports in Latin America

Country	*Principal Exports*	*% of Total Exports, 1957*
Bolivia	Tin	60
Brazil	Coffee	61
Chile	Copper, Nitrates	77
Colombia	Coffee, Petroleum	89
Costa Rica	Coffee, Bananas	88
Cuba	Sugar	81
El Salvador	Coffee, Cotton	90
Guatemala	Coffee, Bananas	85
Haiti	Coffee, Sisal	85
Mexico	Cotton, Coffee	38
Nicaragua	Cotton, Coffee	78
Uruguay	Wool, Meat	71

SOURCE: *International Financial Statistics* (Washington, D. C.), 1959, Vol XII, No. 4, pp. 26-30.

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In return for such items as oil, trucks, tractors, and drilling equipment, the Soviet Union has been getting some consumer goods that have been in short supply for more than forty years. A prime example is sugar, still an expensive semi-luxury in the USSR although production has substantially increased in recent years. John Scott, *Time* magazine's Soviet affairs editor, has decribed how, on a rail journey through the Ukraine last year, he saw farmers come aboard the train at every stop trying to buy sugar from the official in charge of the dining car—and this in the heart of the sugar-beet producing area of the country.[4] When Foreign Minister Mikoyan visited Havana in February 1960, he made arrangements to buy a million tons of sugar at the rock-bottom price of 3 cents a pound, only one-fifth of it to be paid for in cash. This barter arrangement was triply advantageous for the Kremlin leaders: they showed their friendship for Castro and increased their influence in the Caribbean, they were able to go a little further toward satisfying the sweet tooth of their own people—and they made a tidy financial profit on the deal. Not all the sugar purchased has been devoted to home consumption, however: it was recently reported that small amounts have been disposed of to Jordan at a price of 2.6 cents a pound, as compared with the world price of 3.25 cents.[5] The difference in price may be covered by charging more for barter goods supplied to Cuba, or simply absorbed as a political expense.

The USSR, in line with Khrushchev's theme of "victory over capitalism in peaceful competition," has shown itself surprisingly amenable to the profit motive in a number of recent instances; for example, the Kremlin has agreed to abide by the World Tin Council decisions, and to market diamonds through the De Beers Group at going market prices. Prosaic questions of profit and loss are, however, accompanied by or subordinated to political considerations. When the Soviet Union or its satellites accept local currencies in trading activities, these are usually turned over to diplomatic officials or to Communist-oriented groups in each country to finance political campaigns and infiltration of the universities and the labor movement, to pay for espionage, propaganda, and free visits to the bloc countries, and to organize such demonstrations as the attacks on former US Vice-President Richard Nixon in Lima and Caracas in 1958. The Soviet bloc distributes or finances over 400 Spanish-language publications in Latin America, ranging from slick-paper illustrated general magazines to serious journals aimed at university students and professional men. These operations, centered in Mexico City, Buenos Aires, Montevideo, and since 1959 also Havana, cost over $100 million a year, and are financed in part by bloc sales in Latin America.[6]

In addition, Communist trade is in itself propaganda, contributing to the image of a friendly and powerful Soviet Union. It is noteworthy that the USSR always strives to obtain the utmost publicity for its commercial activities, and it is helped in this effort by the comparative novelty of such ventures. The above-mentioned barter arrangement for Brazilian coffee, for example, was on the front pages of Rio de Janeiro newspapers for weeks at a time, with every detail chronicled at great length. Meanwhile, an American company's cash purchase, in a single order, of many times as much coffee as the USSR was to take in three years was buried on the back pages as a routine commercial transaction. Again in a patently deliberate tactic, the first Soviet oil tanker to tie up in Havana (in July 1960) was anchored, not near the storage tanks at the lower end of the bay, but out beneath the Morro Castle, where it could be seen by all the city—even though this involved considerable expense and inconvenience in unloading the cargo. The Soviet Union makes the point, in its arguments for more trade, that it has never been a colonial power in Latin America and that it has never had and does not seek to make direct investments there. From a propaganda point of view the USSR does indeed have an advantage in not possessing any conspicuous (and vulnerable) investments in local mines, ranches or plantations.

In several instances the establishment of commercial ties with the Soviet bloc has been followed by an improvement in political relations. After signing a trade treaty with the USSR in 1959, for example, Brazil's President Kubitschek immediately released over fifty local Communist Party leaders from custody. The head of the Brazilian Coffee Institute visited Moscow, and a Soviet trade delegation was invited to Rio de Janeiro. Not to be outdone, opposition party leader Jânio Quadros went to visit both Khrushchev in Moscow and Fidel Castro in Havana—and won a landslide victory in last October's presidential election. Argentina, anxious for markets for her agricultural products, has allowed the 200-man Soviet delegation in Buenos Aires to act with great freedom, although four diplomats were ex-

[4] Related by Mr. Scott in a lecture attended by this writer in November 1960.

[5] *The New York Times,* Nov. 25, 1960.

[6] United States Senate report, *Soviet Bloc Latin American Activities and Their Implications for US Foreign Policy,* Government Printing Office, Washington, 1960, *passim.* See also Robert J. Alexander, *Communism in Latin American,* Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, N.J., 1957, p. 42; and Harry Schwartz, "K-Day in the Propaganda War," *The New York Times,* Sept. 18, 1960, pp. 15, 102-104.

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pelled last April for attempting to stir up trouble in one of the country's nineteen leftist labor unions.[7] Soviet bloc nations now have a total of nearly thirty trade delegations and commercial missions active in Latin America, many of them in nations where the USSR has no formal diplomatic status.

Continental Dilemmas

Given these political overtones, many Latin American officials are understandably concerned about the ultimate purpose of the Soviet Union's growing trade with the nations of this hemisphere. Latin American countries, with their Catholic, individualistic traditions and fierce hemispheric pride, have in the past been unreceptive targets for Communist propaganda. After decades of recruitment, Communist parties number only a few hundred thousand members—less than are to be found in single cities like Paris and Milan.[8] South American nations have, indeed, been more consistently wary of the Soviet Union than the United States has been. At the start of World War II only one country (Colombia) had diplomatic relations with USSR; it took a great deal of pressure to persuade nations like Brazil to send an ambassador to Moscow even during the war, and most of them broke relations again shortly afterward. At the present time only four of the twenty republics (Mexico, Argentina, Uruguay and, since April 1960, Cuba) have formal relations with the Soviet Union; only Cuba recognizes Communist China.

Communist activity in trade and aid may, however, make it possible to break down this natural barrier against ideological and political penetration. Several current trends in world commerce make it seem likely that opportunities for commercial negotiations will continue and even increase over the near future. Despite the world's booming population growth there is no sign of a significant increase in the effective demand for any of Latin America's major exports. The discovery of alternative sources of supply, the use of substitutes (plastics in place of tin and copper, soluble coffee made largely from African beans, synthetic textile fabrics), and the more efficient utilization of raw materials, have all held down the market for Latin American products. Such commodities as sugar, oil, coffee, tin, copper and wool seem certain to remain in surplus, with depressed prices, for a considerable time to come.

Another grave difficulty Latin America faces has been the growing strength of protectionist sentiment in the United States, which now takes almost half her exports. In the past few years domestic pressures have caused the US to adopt a number of measures that have inevitably injured the Latin American economies, including the establishment of quotas on lead, zinc, crude oil and long-staple cotton, and increased tariffs on copper, wool, fish, dairy products and linseed oil. Sanitation regulations have also led to a ban on Argentine beef. At the same time the US policy of selling certain surplus agricultural commodities abroad at subsidized prices (*e.g.*, tobacco, wheat, corn and cotton) has often disrupted traditional markets.

A third problem facing Latin American exporters will arise out of the evolving plans of the European Common Market and the Free Trade Zone. Various African dependencies of the European Six are direct competitors of Latin America, particularly in minerals and tropical food products; once behind the Common Market tariff wall, they may drive such countries as Uruguay and Argentina out of traditional markets in Western Europe. In a few years, for example, Latin American cocoa will be subject to a new 9 percent duty in Germany and Italy, while cocoa from the French Ivory Coast will be admitted free. The establishment of the Free Trade Zone is expected to lead to substantial increases in production of sugar, coffee, cotton, tin, nickel, manganese, copper, and bananas all of them major Latin American exports. And if, as expected, French petroleum production in the Sahara rises to 500,000 barrels a day in 1961, the entire economic outlook of a country like Venezuela could be altered for the worse. Should no steps be taken to counteract these developments, Latin America would be forced to depend more and more on the only markets open to her, the Soviet bloc countries.

The Dangers of Trade Ties

To some extent, of course, this opening of new markets is a healthy phenomenon, since it reduces Latin America's vulnerability to restrictive trade practices and

[7] Altogether some thirty Soviet bloc diplomats and members of trade missions have been expelled from Latin America for espionage, interference in internal politics, or other improper activities. In the Argentine case, the Counselor and the First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, along with two members of a Soviet commercial mission, were asked to leave Argentina in April 1959 because they had encouraged and taken part in a strike of the nation's oil workers. During the same month two Soviet Embassy officials in Mexico were declared *persona non grata* for their part in a railroad strike. See *The New York Times*, April 7, 8 and 9, 1959.

[8] In the US Senate report, *loc. cit.*, p. 25, total CP membership in Latin America at the end of 1958 was estimated at 209-229,000 on the basis of government intelligence reports and other available evidence. According to the report, Soviet official sources have claimed the total is 360,000.

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depressions elsewhere. And most Soviet purchases have been of non-strategic materials—certainly nobody can be worried by the fact that Soviet citizens are now drinking more Brazilian coffee with Cuban sugar in it. If Latin America's economic and political structure were otherwise strong, increased trade with the Soviet bloc would be no more menacing than the similarly enlarged trade of Canada and Great Britain with the USSR: it could indeed be argued that such trade would strengthen the Latin economies and raise the standard of living—desirable goals in themselves and also the best long-run antidotes to Communist blandishments.

But the danger of Soviet subversion is clearly evident today in Fidel Castro's Cuba, where the originally nationalist, non-Communist 26th of July Movement has been pushed steadily toward the Soviet camp. When Castro came to power in January 1959, he and his men had a good deal of hard feeling against the local Communist Party (PSP), which had cooperated with the Batista dictatorship and had actually broken a general strike called by Castro in April 1958. Moreover, the Soviet Union had shown no particular compunction about dealing with the Batista dictatorship, buying well over a million tons of sugar for cash between 1955 and 1958. But within a few months the USSR had made its peace with the new regime, and was sending Soviet intelligence officers to Havana as members of a trade mission.[9] The barter agreement concluded by Mikoyan in February 1960 (described above) initially seemed as advantageous to Cuba as to the USSR. Castro got rid of a vast quantity of surplus sugar that could not be sold in the United States or on the world market because of existing quotas, and in return was to receive 6 million barrels of crude oil a year, one-fourth of Cuba's requirements. Such an exchange seemed sensible enough, especially as the agreed-upon price for the oil was $1.70 a barrel, considerably below the posted price for the Venezuelan crude oil Cuba was then buying. But the subsequent deterioration of relations between Cuba and the United States, arising in part out of this oil-sugar arrangement, has resulted in a catastrophic change in the Cuban economy. American investments of $1.5 billion on the island, about one-eighth of total US investment in Latin America, have been expropriated (with only the vaguest of promises to pay). US exports to Cuba have dropped from $600 million in 1958 to $125 million in 1960, and will be still lower in 1961. The Cuban economy is now greatly dependent on the USSR —without those tankers tied up in Havana harbor, life on the island would be disrupted in a week. Further agreements arranged by Castro's economic adviser Ernesto Guevara on a trip to Moscow and Peking in November have fastened the Cuban regime still more firmly to the Communist chariot.

The political consequences of this economic penetration have been numerous and extreme. Castro has recognized Communist China, denounced the 1952 Mutual Defense treaty with the United States, and flamboyantly announced his acceptance of Khrushchev's offer to defend Cuba with rockets if the island is attacked. Havana has now become an assembly point for Soviet agents and sundry pro-Soviet revolutionaries, and Castro's *Prensa Latina* news service is the source of a flood of propaganda against "Yanqui imperialism." The Cuban example is a disturbing element in the very tense atmosphere of the Caribbean, as the recent uprisings in Guatemala, Nicaragua and Venezuela show.

Future Prospects

While the Cuban situation must give any thoughtful observer pause, it does not seem likely that the Soviet Union is about to achieve similar conquests elsewhere in Latin America. For one thing, the course of the Cuban revolution itself has alerted officials in both South and North America to the very real menace of Soviet intrusion into this hemisphere. The agreements at San Jose and at Bogota were at least a beginning toward more effective inter-American cooperation; if properly followed up with measures designed to strengthen shaky economies, they may do much to prevent the spread of *fidelismo*. Prospective measures for reduced tariffs and increased trade among the South American seven (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay) and the Central American five (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua) are also hopeful signs, although these plans are not now being promoted with the urgency and vigor that the existing state of the Latin American economies seems to require. In 1958 these countries exported to each other only 11 percent as much as they shipped overseas; if this intracontinental trade could be stepped up, the need for dependence on Soviet bloc purchases would be greatly lowered. Given the proximity as well as the cultural and historical ties of the Latin American countries, such rapidly industrializing states as Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil ought to be excellent customers for raw materials and suppliers of manufactured goods to the rest of the continent. Finally, while it is true that many developments in Cuba over the past year point in the direction of a new rise of totalitarianism, the fact that so many military dictatorships elsewhere in the area have disap-

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 22.

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peared without giving way to pro-Soviet dictatorships is in itself an encouraging sign.

Over the longer range, too, it seems likely that there are built-in limits to the extent of Communist trade penetration. The government-to-government commodity deals favored by the Communist bloc have so far been successful for the handling of large-scale shipments of standard commodities—oil, sugar, copper, wheat. But as Latin America becomes economically mature it will consume more of its raw materials at home, and will want increasingly sophisticated imports—specialized tools, automobiles, and a variety of consumer goods. These can certainly be supplied more effectively by advanced industrial nations like the US, Britain, Japan and West Germany, than by the still consumer-goods-poor Soviet economy.

A considerable amount of dissatisfaction with Communist trade practices has already been expressed. At recent meeting of the Rio de Janeiro Chamber of Commerce, for example, businessmen complained that some of the Soviet machinery received in 1960 had arrived without a sufficient number of spare parts, and that almost all of it was twenty to thirty years out of date in terms of design and style.[10] Private businessmen dislike the USSR's insistence on trading only with governments, and assert that a barter agreement with the USSR or its satellites is a perilous gamble upon quality, delivery dates and price inflation. In the case of Castro's agreement to exchange sugar for "complete factories" from China, a certain skepticism is in order until the arrival of such units and a demonstration of exactly what they are and how well they function. In any case Cuban factory managers, accustomed to getting replacement parts overnight by a telephone call to the US mainland, will find that Peking and Moscow are a lot farther away.

While the United States and Western Europe therefore face rising competition in their traditional Latin American markets, they retain a number of advantages —greater proximity, more flexible commercial arrangements, convertible currencies, more sophisticated economies, and existing patterns of friendship and trade. Soviet trade with Latin America, for reasons outlined above, seems certain to continue to grow considerably over the immediate future. But if the economies and political structures of Latin American nations are otherwise solid and healthy, the Communist trade offensive will make little headway insofar as its political aims are concerned.

[10] For a general discussion of the difficulties of doing business with the USSR—especially the fluctuation and uncertainty of Soviet offers to buy and sell—see H. Heymann, Jr., "Soviet Foreign Aid as a Problem for US Policy," *World Politics*, July 1960, p. 537.

Friends of the Communists: Some Curious Examples

By Victor Alba

THE PHENOMENON of a worldwide Communist movement which in the course of forty years has pursued a kaleidoscopic succession of seemingly contradictory tactical lines, yet has managed to retain—and even enhance—its strength, is one that has never ceased to bemuse political observers. In the last four decades, local Communist parties everywhere first shifted from "bolshevization" to "united front" with social democracy in 1921, back to sectarian struggle against "social fascism" in 1928, to the Popular Front in 1935, the "anti-imperialist war" policy in 1939, the "People's War" line in 1941, cold war tactics in 1947, and finally the current line of "peaceful coexistence". Still, many local parties have adjusted to these sudden, frequently

Mr. Alba, a noted Mexican authority on Latin America, is author of Historia del Communismo en América Latina *(Ediciones Occidentales, Mexico, 1954) and other works. His last contribution to this journal was "Communism and Nationalism in Latin America" (No. 5, 1958).*

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embarrassing switches and have managed to continue their political activities without disruption.

It is perhaps in Latin America more than anywhere else that one finds the most striking illustrations of this peculiar phenomenon. This is primarily because, in the particular context of Latin American politics, the practical effect of the successive tactical lines imposed by Moscow has been to place the Communists, almost invariably, in the role of adversaries of the indigenous democratic and revolutionary movements, and allies—sometimes overt, but most of the time disguised—of the forces of reactionary dictatorship. These tactics of simultaneous collaboration with and criticism of right-wing dictators—often pursued, as will be seen later, through the medium of *two* Communist parties—are best described as the tactics of "critical support"—or, as the author has elsewhere dubbed them, of "political concubinage." [1] They have been followed repeatedly since before the era of the Popular Front, but most of all during the period of the cold war.

The relatively small size of the Latin American Communist parties compared to the massive Communist organizations in some European countries has favored their ability to pursue such policies, as well as to adjust to sudden shifts in the general tactical line ordained by Moscow. Their smallness has made them more bureaucratized and disciplined, and this has contributed towards a readier acceptance of tactical changes by leaders and party militants alike. Moreover, in the course of time, the militants within the party organizations—and even pro-Communist sympathizers outside—have grown so accustomed to the persistent pattern of connivance with local dictatorships that they have come to see in the party a sort of super-Machiavellian organization which derives advantage from such alliances. The party member's faith in the final Communist objective does not diminish, and he blindly accepts the tactical policy of the moment because the experiences of past shifts—no matter how disconcerting they may have been at the time—tells him that they *did* produce profitable results for the party. It is this pragmatic attitude, supported by a schematic dogmatism, that explains the remarkable facility with which sudden changes of party policy have been accepted by the Communist movements of Latin America—albeit the same explanation undoubtedly holds true, if less obviously, for such movements in countries of more advanced political organization.

[1] For a more detailed study of these tactics, see Robert J. Alexander, *Communism in Latin America*, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 1957; and Victor Alba, *Historia del frente popular*, Mexico City, 1959, and *Esquema histórico del communismo en Ibero-américa*, Mexico City, 1960 (3rd ed.).

In view of current political developments in Latin America, it may be of particular interest to examine in some detail the Communist tactics of "critical support." The present article will therefore endeavor to trace how the system of alliance between the Communists and reactionary forces has manifested itself in the course of Latin American political history over the past four decades.

Early Opportunism

Communist parties in Latin America have almost always arisen out of schisms in the weak Socialist parties. Once established, they swiftly maneuvered to split the local labor movements and create their own so-called "unitarian" trade unions which, in 1929, joined in forming the *Confederación Sindical Latino—americano* (Latin American Federation of Trade Unions), or CSLA. But the Communist movements generally did not prosper. There were other parties—especially those of a "populist" or "revolutionary-nationalist" character—which had greater attraction for the masses, while the Communists were able to take advantage only of the impact of the Russian Revolution on the minds of students and intellectuals.

When Moscow, in 1928, ordered a resumption of all-out war against social democracy, which it now denounced as "social fascism," the Latin American Communists of course fell in line. Their assault, however, was extended to the leftist or populist parties as well as the "anarcho-syndicalists" (who were labelled "anarcho-fascists" in the Stalinist terminology adopted in Spain, Argentina, Peru and other countires where such groups existed in some strength). The Communists' principal target of attack was then—and still is—the *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance), or APRA, originally formed in Mexico in 1924 by the Peruvian popular leader, Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, and later organized as the "People's Party" in Peru in 1930. Alexander Lossovsky, then head of the Red International of Labor Unions, said of APRA in 1928, "I do not believe that Haya's alliance is particularly revolutionary, popular, or even American." [2]

The Communists had their reasons for opposing APRA. At the Moscow-sponsored Brussels Congress of February 1927, which formally established the League Against Imperialism, Haya de la Torre had vigorously opposed the resolution of the Congress concerning Latin America, as well as a proposal to establish

[2] Alba, *Esquema* . . ., p. 62.

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national branches of the League. The anti-imperialist struggle in Latin America, he argued, should be waged not by a party representing a single class, but by parties uniting several classes; and these parties, instead of resorting to the tactics used by the Communists in industrial countries, should treat imperialism as an ambivalent economic phenomenon containing elements of both progress and danger. In industrial countries, said Haya, imperialism might indeed be the final (or highest) stage of capitalism as Lenin had maintained, but in Latin America it represented the *first* stage of capitalism. The Aprista delegation was the only one which took exception to the resolutions adopted by the Brussels Congress, and when the next congress of the League was held in Frankfurt in 1930, Haya did not attend. A move to "excommunicate" APRA was launched at the Frankfurt meeting but was blocked by a delegate representing the Nicaraguan guerrilla leader, Cesar Augusto Sandino, then conducting an insurrection against the government and against the presence of United States marines in Nicaragua.[3]

All this did not prevent the Comintern from subsequently ordering the Latin American Communists to seek an alliance with APRA, by then much stronger, as Moscow began shifting its tactics in the direction of the Popular Front. The Aprista leaders, however, continued to reject collaboration with the Communists.[4] During this entire period, APRA underwent very severe government persecution, shared in general by the other populist and socialist parties which the Communists were combatting. There was at this time no explicit alliance between the Communists and the government dictatorship, but their attacks were generally directed at the same targets.

Naturally, with the full-fledged switch to Popular Front tactics, the Communists ceased all such attacks. They nevertheless continued to distrust the populist and socialist movements, and only in Chile and—to a lesser extent and in other forms—in Mexico and Brazil were there transitory alliances between the Communists and these movements. In order to avoid antagonizing their political allies of the moment and the governments in the democratic camp, the Communists endeavored to curb labor agitation and strikes. This policy, which earned them the nickname of "firemen," was carried to such an extreme that, in Mexico for example, it led the Communists to take a position opposed, at least implicitly, to the nationalization of the petroleum industry. The story of this revealing but little-known episode is worth recalling.

In March 1937, the Mexican oil workers' union launched a strike which threatened to paralyze the petroleum industry. When the walkout reached its peak, the *Confederación de Trabajadores de México* (Mexican Federation of Labor), under the leadership of Vicente Lombardo Toledano, intervened in an effort to persuade the union to call off the strike.[5] At the same time, the Mexican Communist Party proposed that production in a government-owned petroleum enterprise be stepped up to ease the effects of the strike, and that "in the event the movement should be prolonged," the government take over temporary control of the companies affected by the strike; but the proposal carefully avoided any mention of "nationalization."[6] Thus, the party put aside one of its cardinal demands for the obvious reason that to press for nationalization might have prejudiced Moscow's diplomacy aimed at cultivating friendship with the democratic powers.

From One Dictator to Another

During the interlude of the Nazi-Soviet alliance, the Latin American Communists followed the general party line denouncing the armed struggle against Hitler as an "imperialist war." At the 13th Congress of the Uruguayan Communist Party, Secretary-General Eugenio Gómez appealed for "a single front of all progressive and peace-loving forces to struggle against the imperialist war, in defense of the Soviet Union, the socialist fatherland." Blas Roca, Secretary-General of the Cuban Communist Party, likewise asserted the necessity of keeping Cuba out of the conflict. And since there were no Nazi occupation forces at hand to cooperate with, the Communists satisfied themselves with the formula of "socialist neutrality" for Latin America.[7]

This slogan was promptly scrapped with Hitler's attack on the USSR. What the Communists had till then denounced as an "imperialist war" they now vigorously supported as a "people's war." Domestically, the change of line manifested itself chiefly in a tenacious effort to help preserve the political status quo. This came about because many democratic political leaders in the Latin American countries, then predominantly ruled by dictatorial regimes, felt that the Western Allies' need for Latin American raw materials and moral support in

[3] Ibid., p. 81 ff.
[4] V. R. Haya de la Torre, "Sobre la historia del comunismo en America y una rectificacion," *Cuadernos Americanos,* Mexico City, 1955.
[5] Rodolfo Pina Soria, "Viaje por suscripcion popular," *Acción Social* (Mexico City), March 15, 1943.
[6] *El Machete* (Mexico City), July 6, 1937.
[7] *La Correspondencia Internacional,* March and August 1940.

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the war against the Axis created propitious conditions for revolutionary action to overthrow the dictatorships. The Communists, however, viewed revolutionary change as inimical to Soviet interests and therefore aligned themselves with the existing regimes.

The Communist attitude became evident when the Mexican labor leader Lombardo Toledano, who now held the influential position of Secretary-General of the Labor Federation of Latin America (CTAL, formed in 1938),[8] made a tour of Latin American capitals and, upon his return, gave a public report on December 29, 1942. In this report, Lombardo heaped praise upon several dictators. He called President Carlos Arroyo del Rio of Ecuador "friend"; three months later, Arroyo launched a severe campaign of repression against labor and Socialist leaders who were trying to form a central labor organization. He eulogized President Manuel Prado of Peru as a "native Stalin" and also spoke in laudatory terms of General Enrique Peñaranda of Bolivia, under whose government a terrible slaughter of miners occurred at Catavi; of General Jorge Ubico of Guatemala; and of General Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua. Of the latter, Lombardo said: "General Somoza is an intelligent and reliable man who, in his way, does good for his people—who, let us say, is a paternal dictator for the people." [9] Two years later, when extensive popular demonstrations took place in Nicaragua demanding Somoza's withdrawal from the presidency, the Communists opposed the demonstrations and were rewarded by the appointment of one of the party's leaders as a vice-minister in Somoza's government.

Lombardo had more words of friendship for General Peñaranda when the Bolivian dictator visited Mexico in 1943. In a cordial message of welcome on behalf of the CTAL, he declared.

Through you, I take the liberty of greeting the noble and valiant Bolivian people who, by declaring war on the Axis nations, have strengthened the American bloc against Hitler and have placed their natural and human resources in the service of the great cause of saving mankind from Nazi-Fascist barbarism. Your visit to Mexico has a value that no anti-Fascist democrat can overlook: it is a great contribution to better understanding between our peoples and to the strengthening of their ties of solidarity in the common endeavor to achieve progress in the Americas and the liberation of the world.[10]

(At this time, the slaughter of Bolivian miners at Catavi was still being denounced in the United States by the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations, as well as by the Socialist Party.)

Unprincipled Principles

The general Communist policy in Latin America during this period was clearly defined in the principles enunciated by Lombardo for the labor movement: (1) no agitation for wage increases; (2) no provocation of strikes; and (3) positive efforts to maintain the status quo in all aspects of Central and South American affairs.[11] This general position was again expressed by Lombardo at the 1944 CTAL Congress held at Cali, in Colombia:

We have come a very long way from those romantic, sterile attitudes that prompted us to utter impassioned cries against imperialism. . . . During the war against the Nazi-Fascist Axis, the working class should not employ the strike as a regular weapon of struggle.[12]

In Uruguay, the Communist "People's war" line manifested itself in a declaration by Party Secretary-General Eugenio Gómez calling for "a national democratic front . . . to provide tangible, effective aid to the USSR, England, and their allies . . . and to support the government of General Baldomir." [13] In Venezuela, the Communists supported the dictatorship of General Isaías Medina Angarita from 1941 until 1945 when Medina was finally overthrown by an army-supported popular rising. The Communists fought to the last to keep him in power.[14]

But the most revealing case was Cuba, where the Communists continued and strengthened their alliance with former dictator Fulgencio Batista. This relationship went back to early 1934, when Batista, having jumped from sergeant to colonel and Army chief-of-staff in the turbulent interval after the overthrow (August 1933) of the Gerardo Machado dictatorship, used his control of the Army to depose the newly-established revolutionary government of President Ramón Grau San Martín and install the first of a series of puppet governments under his own control. The Communists had unsuccessfully tried to stave off Machado's downfall

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[8] Most of the unions throughout Latin America are affiliated with the CTAL, which in turn is affiliated with the communist-sponsored World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU).

[9] Rodrigo García Treviño, *La ingerencia rusa en México,* Mexico City, 1959, p. 138 ff.

[10] *Acción Social,* May 15, 1943.

[11] Luis Chávez Orozco, "Porque renuncié al cargo de secretario general del Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Educación," *Acción Social,* September 15, 1945.

[12] Quoted in the author's *Esquema histórico del movimiento obrero en América Latina,* Mexico City, 1957, p. 102.

[13] *Bajo la Bandera de Artigas,* Montevideo, n.d.

[14] *AD* (Caracas), October 15, 1960.

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and then had opposed Grau's revolutionary regime.[15] Batista promptly sought their support. In 1937, he permitted the organization of a disguised Communist party, the *Unión Revolucionaria,* under the leadership of Juan Marinello, and in 1938 authorized the start of the Communist newspaper, *Hoy.* The party Central Committee reciprocated in the summer of 1938 by resolving that "a more positive attitude should be adopted toward Colonel Batista," who was no longer "the converging point of reaction, but the defender of democracy." Soon thereafter, Batista allowed the formation of a legal Communist Party, and in January 1939 the *Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba* (CTC) was established as the party's labor arm. In 1940, the Communists helped elect Batista to the presidency, themselves winning ten parliamentary seats and more than 100 municipal council posts.

The USSR's entry into the war was followed by a further cementing of the Communist alliance with Batista. With the appointment of two Communists—Juan Marinello and Carlos Rafael Rodríguez—to ministerial posts in March 1943, Batista became the first Lain American chief of state to take Communists into his cabinet. He also turned over a radio station to the party for its own use. In the 1944 elections, the Communists again formed part of the coalition supporting Batista's candidate for the presidency, but the victory went to the democratic forces backing Grau San Martín.[16] This setback, however, did not end Communist collaboration with Batista.

The Postwar Period

After the end of World War II, there was a short period of Communist ministerial participation in, or cooperation with, some Latin American governments, paralleling similar developments in France, Italy and other European countries. (It should be noted that, after the 1943 dissolution of the Comintern, several Latin American Communist Parties had changed their names, *e.g.,* to *Vanguardia Popular* in Haiti and Costa Rica, and *Partido Socialista Popular* in Cuba and Colombia.)

One example of this was Chile, where three Communists briefly held ministerial portfolios in the "popular front" government of Gabriel González Videla. After only five months, however, their appointments were terminated by President González Videla because the other cabinet members refused to collaborate with the Communist ministers.[17] During this same period, the Dominican government of Generalissimo Rafael Leonidas Trujillo took positive steps to encourage the formation of a local Popular Socialist (Communist) Party. A personal emissary of Trujillo went to Cuba and persuaded exiled Dominican Communist leaders to return home, where they proceeded to establish the party and to organize labor unions in which the Communists and Trujillists worked together (these unions affiliated with the CTAL). After the May 1947 elections, however, Trujillo again declared the Communist organization illegal.[18]

On the other hand, in the countries which had freed themselves from dictatorship (*i.e.,* Brazil, Peru, Venezuela, Guatemala and Cuba), the Communists, discredited by their collaboration with the former dictators, were excluded from any governmental collaboration. In general, during the period up to the start of the cold war, the Communist parties in Latin America (as in Europe) refrained from fomenting disturbances in line with Moscow's current tactics of restraint towards the Western powers. Lombardo Toledano had already foreshadowed this policy in 1944:

The postwar era is not the time for socialism, for we are interested only in unfolding and developing, and working to achieve, yesterday's ideas, enriched by new methods and forms of application.[19]

Again, in a statement regarding a labor-management pact concluded in April 1945 between the Mexican Federation of Labor (CTM) and the Processing Industry Association (*Cámara de la Industria de la Transformación*), Lombardo declared:

We propose to respect vested interests because we respect private property—note this well—because we are supporters of private property in this historic period through which Mexico is passing.[20]

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[15] In the spring of 1933, a general strike was declared against the Machado government, and the dictator appealed to the Communists for assistance in return for legal recognition of the party. The party Central Committee then published a manifesto calling upon the workers to terminate the strike, but the intervention failed to save the dictatorship from collapse. The Central Committee's action was justified on the ground that "the armed struggle against Machado would lead directly to imperialist intervention" (*La Correspondencia Internacional,* May 4, 1933).

[16] Sacha Volman, "El General Batista y la revolución 'comunista'," *Combate* (San José, Costa Rica), July-August 1958.

[17] Alexander, *op. cit.,* p. 194 ff.

[18] Nicolas Silfa, *El Boicot á Trujillo respaldado por 57 millones de trabjadores del mundo,* New York, 1960.

[19] Vicente Lombardo Toledano, *El nuevo porgrama del sector revolucionario de México,* Mexico City, 1944, p. 15.

[20] Quoted by A. López Aparicio, *El movimiento obrero en México,* Mexico City, 1952, p. 234.

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These statements by Lombardo were extremely significant because, throughout the entire period from 1938 to 1948, he was the outstanding figure in the Latin American Communist movement as a whole, in spite of his insistence that he was not a formal party member.

Refinement and Crystallization

Up to this point the Communists' support of Latin American dictators, tantamount in many instances to outright alliance, had been essentially a matter of pragmatic adaptation to local political developments and conditions. In the period of the cold war, however, it emerged as a full-blown, regularly employed system of Communist tactics.

Two conditions are essential for the effective employment of these tactics of "critical support" or "political concubinage": first, local and international circumstances must favor their application; and second, there must be a means of inducing public forgetfulness of the party's resort to these tactics when the dictator eventually falls, dies, or resigns.

The first of these conditions was almost constantly present in various Latin American countries during the decade 1948-58, which saw the emergence of new dictatorships in Argentina, Venezuela, Peru, Cuba, Haiti, and Colombia, and the continuation of the already existing ones in Nicaragua, Paraguay and the Dominican Republic. The second condition was satisfied by the Communist parties themselves, which found the answer in dividing themselves, individually, into two or more parts, each with its own distinct mission. This device, which is peculiar (though not exclusively so) to Latin America, probably arose spontaneously at first, but then came to be regularly and consciously practiced to achieve the specific objective referred to above.

There are numerous examples of dual or multiple party organization. Mexico has three: an official Communist Party which adheres to orthodox positions; a Workers' and Peasants' Party headed by Valentin Campa; and the Popular Socialist Party, headed by Lombardo Toledano, which pretends to be independent of Communist control, yet follows all Moscow's directives to the international Communist movement. In Venezuela, the two Communist groups are the so-called "Red" Communists, who opposed the dictatorships of the 1948-58 period, and the "Black" party which supported them; Quintero, the leader of the camouflaged second party, attends meetings of the WFTU, and the labor unions under "Black" control during this period were affiliated with the CTAL. Argentina has a Communist Party, headed by Vittorio Codovila and Rodolfe Ghioldi, and a Communist League, headed by Lombardo's friend Isaac Liebenson and R. Puiggrós. Bolivia has at times had two and even three Communist parties under different names, such as the Revolutionary Leftist Party and the Unified Leftist Party. Peru has only one Communist party organization, but this is divided into two groups, one headed by Carnero Checa and Jorge del Prado, and the other by Juan P. Luna and Victor Parra.

With the exception of Mexico, all these countries have experienced dictatorial rule in the course of the past twelve years. In each of them, the camouflaged Communist party has openly collaborated with the dictator and hence been allowed to function legally, while the avowed party organization has operated underground or in exile, concentrating its efforts chiefly on infiltration of the likewise illegal and persecuted democratic parties. In every case, also, one of the two organizations—but not necessarily always the illegal party—has maintained official relations with Moscow, while the other has had only unofficial, covert contacts. Neither, however, has ever received the classic treatment which Moscow reserves for heretics, and it is quite obvious that the only difference between the two party organizations or groups has been their support of, or opposition to, the dictator: in international matters, they both have followed the same line—that is, the line prescribed by Soviet diplomacy. The Communist-dominated labor unions in countries under the rule of dictators were most frequently affiliated with Lombardo's CTAL.[21]

In Argentina, for example, Perón always had the advice of Puiggrós and the support of the latter's Communist League and its youth groups. In the labor unions, it was the Communists who cooperated most closely with the Peronist leaders in purging Socialist and anarcho-syndicalist elements. Even the regular Communist Party under Codovila and Ghioldi was not very aggressive in its opposition to Perón, and few Communists were jailed, nor did the government ever refuse passports to Communists who wished to attend party-organized international congresses abroad. Despite the final collapse of the dictatorship and Perón's flight from the country in September 1955, the Peronists and Communists have since continued to work closely together in attempts to sabotage subsequent democratic regimes, and it now appears that "Castroism" has joined this alliance.

In Paraguay, where there has been a series of dictators, the Communists have supported some and opposed others. Notably, they supported General Morinigo, who permitted the establishment of a Labor

[21] Alba, *Esquema histórico del comunismo* . . . p. 148 ff.

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Council under Communist direction; and in 1947 they backed another dictator, who seized power from a short-lived progressive coalition government, and were rewarded by the appointment of a Communist as police chief of Asunción. In Colombia, the legal Popular Socialist (Communist) Party followed a line of benevolent neutrality toward reactionary postwar governments, including that of dictator Rojas Pinilla.[22]

In Cuba, after opposing the governments of Presidents Grau San Martín and Prío Socarras, the Popular Socialist (Communist) Party again won a position of influence with General Batista's return to power in 1952. Five leading members of the party—Julian Sotolongo, Gilberto Galán, Mercedes Chirino, Guillermo Pérez Lamy, and Arsenio González (Undersecretary of Labor)—were given high governmental posts, ostensibly separating themselves from the Popular Socialists to join Batista's Progressive Action Party. Meanwhile, the regular Communist Party continued to have the status of an illegal but tolerated party, and there were occasional evidences of its own pro-Batista leanings. In April 1958, when Fidel Castro called for a general strike, a circular disseminated by the party leadership and couched in terms favorable to Batista declared that the strike was bound to fail. In August, however, the party moved to break openly with the Batista regime by proposing a coalition of all opposition groups—a proposal which Castro's July 26th Movement flatly rejected at the time.[23]

In Venezuela, the "Black" Communists cooperated with the military junta which overthrew Rómulo Gallegos and the Democratic Action Government in 1948, and subsequently with the dictatorship of Colonel Pérez Jiménez. Meanwhile, their "Red" colleagues worked in exile or underground. Both, however, were alike in their severe attacks on the most active forces opposing the dictatorship—the Democratic Action and the Social Christian Party (COPEI)—and both had their militants in command of the labor unions, from which they had, in cooperation with the government, purged all democratic elements. But despite the identity of policy, the existence of dual party organizations proved definitely advantageous; for when Pérez Jiménez fell in January 1958, the "Red" Communists took over from the discredited "Blacks" and were given posts on all kinds of public committees and accepted as a legitimate political party. Although they did not succeed in retaining full control of the labor unions, they remained sufficiently strong to prevent their adherence to the Inter-American Regional Workers' Organization (ORITI), which is affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).

In Peru, the Communist group led by Luna, then a member of the Senate, actively collaborated with the dictatorship of General Odria, succeeding—with the aid of the government police—in taking over the leadership of some labor unions from APRA. Even after Odria's withdrawal in 1956 and the advent of a democratic government under President Manuel Prado, the Communists managed to retain control of some unions, especially in southern Peru. They have opposed the Prado government, fomenting a number of strikes, not for economic objectives, but to create favorable conditions for a military coup and the establishment of a new dictatorship.

In Brazil, the Communists supported Getulio Vargas, in spite of the fact that he had severely persecuted them during his previous administration. They thereby succeeded in infiltrating the Army to some extent, and also in maintaining their electorial influence. However, in the October 1958 elections, the Communists allied themselves with two parties of a strongly demagogic stamp—the "Trabalhista" (Labor) and Social Progressive Parties. The Communist Party chief, Luiz Carlos Prestes, proclaimed the alliance to be lasting and unconditional, but it nevertheless proved a fiasco, costing the Communists a heavy loss of votes.[24]

Finally, in Costa Rica, during the presidency of the democratic political leader José Figueres, the Communists collaborated in 1955 with their old ally, Calderón Guardia, and other reactionary elements in an abortive armed invasion of the country from Nicaragua, this attempt was actively supported by both the Nicaraguan and Venezuelan dictators, General Somoza and Colonel Pérez Jiménez.[25]

Mutual Advantages

The primary objective of the dictators in entering into these alliances with the Communists is simply to maintain themselves in power. To do this, they must silence the democratic opposition, and alliance with the Communists, whether tacit or openly acknowledged, serves this purpose. The Communists, often with the help of the dictator's police, proceed to eliminate the demo-

[22] Antonio Ricaurte, "Breve storia del comunismo colombiano," *Corrispondenza Socialista* (Rome), February 8, 1959.

[23] "Les communistes de Cuba entre Batista et Fidel Castro," *Est et Ouest* (Paris), January 16-31, 1959; also Volman, *loc. cit.*

[24] *Mundo del Trabajo Libre,* (Mexico City), October-November 1958, p. 25.

[25] Victor Alba, "El Caso de Costa Rica," *Resaca* (Mexico City), February 1955.

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cratic leadership of the labor unions and to keep the unions under the dictator's control: there have been almost no strikes where such alliances existed. At the same time, allowing the Communists to function as a party furnishes the dictator with a pretext for claiming that there is no political persecution, and the Communists frequently provide him with advisers of unquestioned political ability, who are particularly needed in cases where the dictator is a military man without political experience. Finally, the Communists may also serve him as a useful means of exerting diplomatic pressure on Washington.

From the standpoint of the Communists, such alliances allow them to make use of the dictator's strength for the purpose of destroying their democratic adversaries, and to build up a political and labor union organization which, even if the dictator's fall renders the Communist group which supported him ineffective, can still be used as a base by the alternate party organization re-emerging from underground illegality or political exile. But perhaps the most important Communist objective is to use the party's support as a bargaining weapon to induce the dictators to adopt external policies favorable to Soviet objectives and to the development of closer economic and cultural ties with the USSR and the Communist bloc.

The collapse of several Latin American dictatorships in recent years has provided practical tests of the efficacy of the Communist tactics of political concubinage—and has not found them wanting. Since the downfall of Perón in Argentina, the former dictatorial regimes in Peru, Colombia, Venezuela and Cuba have been removed from the scene, although dictatorship continues to prevail in some of the smaller Latin American countries. In all these four countries, the Communists, thanks to their dual organizational set-up, have been able to participate in the revived democratic political life. In some cases the legal Communist organization which had collaborated with the ousted dictator vanished with him from the political scene, and the less tainted underground branch of the party asserted its claim to recognition as a legitimate political force on a par with the democratic parties. In Peru, however, even the collaborator Communists have managed to keep on working in the open, seeking to create difficulties for the democratic regime.

But it is not the device of dual party organizations alone that has contributed to the Communists' success. This has been effectively combined with tactics that might be described as "the utilization of the inexperienced": in other words, taking advantage of the political immaturity of the victorious democratic opposition forces in an effort to bring them under Communist influence and eventual domination. In the last analysis, these tactics are but a different application of the tactics of alliance with dictators, and if they are successful, they must perforce lead to the restoration of dictatorship, whether of elements dominated by the Communists, of Praetorian demagogues, or of hand-picked military figureheads. The utilization of the inexperienced and unwary also is the psychological basis of the whole Communist front technique. Employed by the Communists in Chile as far back as the era of the Popular Front,[26] it was most effectively applied in Guatemala in the period preceding and during the presidency of Colonel Jacobo Arbenz (1951-54).[27] Since the tactics tested in Guatemala are now being reapplied in Cuba and doubtless would be repeated wherever similar circumstances present themselves, it may be useful to recapitulate the essential features of the Guatemalan experience.

The Communist plan of action in Guatemala sought to achieve the following specific objectives: (1) to acquire the capability of maneuvering the masses as a political bargaining weapon; (2) for this purpose, to organize a network of peripheral mass movements and enlist the participation of prominent persons of other parties so as to give these movements a non-Communist appearance; (3) to obtain government subsidization of the movements; (4) to use the political bargaining power acquired through them to pressure the government into adopting certain attitudes desired by the Communists; and (5) above all, to exploit every opportunity for pushing the government into actions calculated to provoke US diplomatic counteraction and thus provide a basis for anti-US propaganda. In connection with point (4), it may be noted that the Guatemalan Communist leader J. M. Fortuny openly boasted in a speech in May 1954 that the position taken by Guatemala at the Inter-American Conference at Caracas had not been decided by the government according to normal cabinet procedures, but had been fixed at a meeting between President Arbenz and representatives of the Democratic Front, which the Communists dominated through their mass organizations.

The essential elements of the Communists' infiltration tactics, as exemplified in Guatemala, are thus: (a) disguising themselves as non-Communist revolutionaries in order to enter and utilize the democratic parties; (b) obtaining government posts by this means, especially in

[26] Alexander, op. cit., pp. 22-23; Ravines, *The Yenan Way*, New York, 1951, *passim*.

[27] V. Blanc, "Triunfo comunista en Guatemala," *Resica*, November 1954.

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such vital areas as education, propaganda, labor and agriculture; (c) acquiring control of labor unions, teachers' organizations, and other popular bodies so as to translate their support into increased political influence; and (d) seizing all favorable opportunities to press for pro-Soviet or provocatory anti-US policies when such action suits the current needs of Soviet diplomacy.

These tactics are naturally most effective in conditions where the leaders of the democratic parties and the masses in general are lacking in political judgment and experience, and where there exist reactionary forces whose actions unconsciously create conditions which the Communists can exploit. These conditions typically arise in countries which have only just or recently emerged from protracted periods of repressive dictatorship. They were present in Guatemala and now are present in Cuba and still other Latin American countries.

Cuba, indeed, presents an illuminating case study in this respect. The young people who embraced Castro's revolutionary movement had no political education whatever—outside, perhaps, of the literature of the Popular Front era, to which the stirring events of Castro's struggle lent a new aura of romanticism. Their lack of political experience blinded them to the real dangers of "frontism" as practiced by the Communists, just as it blinded them to the Communists' long collaboration with Batista—if, indeed, they knew of it.

Thus, when Castro triumphed, many of his followers adopted "frontist" positions in the sincere belief that it was a matter of democratic principles. This immediately opened the way for the Communists to bring into action their full arsenal of persuasive techniques—dazzling some, flattering others, and threatening still others. And little by little, ensnared in a web of new vested interests, of fanaticism fired by the flames of incessant propaganda, and of arrogant refusal to admit having erred or having been misled, those who were not Communists to begin with ended up by thinking like Communists without any need of formally joining the party; and they collaborated with the Communists in regimenting the masses and applying policies which can have no other objective than to use Cuba as a means of provoking the United States and all the rest of Latin America. It is most significant that those of Castro's original followers who have now broken with him are precisely those with the most political experience. In the final analysis, the blame for the lack of such experience must be laid at the door of the reactionary elements which blindly supported the dictatorship and thus denied the Cuban people the chance to learn democratic political processes through practice. The end result has been to open the door to Communist infiltration.

Conditions like those in Cuba obviously do not obtain everywhere, and in other Latin American countries the Communists are employing variations of these tactics adapted to the local situations. In both the Venezuelan elections of 1958 and the Brazilian elections of 1960, for example, the Communists supported for the presidency military men of slight political experience (Rear Admiral Larrazabal in Venezuela, and Marshal Lott in Brazil). Elsewhere they have supported the newer and less experienced parties, *e.g.*, the Social Christian Party in Peru, in the 1956 elections. In still other cases, as in Argentina, they have allied themselves with the defeated demagogic forces and maneuvered to bring them under Communist control; or else, as is now happening in Venezuela, they are supporting pro-Castro elements which have broken away from the democratic movements.

Though assuming all these various forms, the Communist tactics nevertheless are always basically the same: that is, they aim at taking advantage of the political inexperience or unwariness of a party or a candidate, at using them, mortgaging them, and whenever advisable hiding behind them. Sometimes, in order to create difficulties for the democratic regimes and sustain popular discontent, or to cater to their inexperienced, conservative allies, the Communists oppose measures of social reform. For example, they are not actively supporting agrarian reform legislation in any country where it is under consideration. And in Peru, where the government introduced legislation in 1960 for the "gradual nationalization of oil deposits," the opposition to it came from the extreme Right and the Communists.[28]

The unrest thus created not only gives rise to problems for United States diplomacy in Latin America, but also jeopardizes the new democratic regimes by fostering propitious conditions for attempted military coups "to establish order." In this manner, the present tactics of the Communists are making them the prospective allies of possible future dictators.

[28] United Press International report from Lima, October 12, 1960.

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Communism in the High Andes

By Francis and Laura Randall

SOME TEN YEARS AGO, Communist strategists evinced little interest in the republics of Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia. When they did think about the area, however, they saw hopeful prospects for future successes. In the view of the Kremlin, the three Andean countries seemed to present conditions much like those in the areas of East and South Asia where the Communists had found such golden opportunities in the wake of World War II.

Rising from the Pacific shore and the Amazon basin to peaks over four miles high, the stupendous cordillera of the Andes dominates all three countries, its highlands making life possible for millions of people in a region that would otherwise be largely empty desert, savannah, and rain forest. In what the Communists delight in calling a "contradiction," this astonishing geographic "foundation," while providing a substantial agricultural "base," has condemned the majority of the population to a hard life of subsistence farming.

In 1950, the most striking feature of the social "superstructure" in the three republics was the dominance of small minorities, chiefly European in origin and way of life, over indigenous masses that were largely Indian—ethnically, linguistically and sociologically. For the Communists, the landed estates owned by members of the local aristocracy represented "survivals of feudalism," and they were equally unanimous in viewing the rich mines and big coastal plantations, developed in many cases by North American or European entrepreneurs and capital, as examples of "capitalist-imperialist" exploitation. They noted the conspicuous position in the local economies of such North American enterprises as the Cerro de Pasco Corporation, whose complex of silver, lead, zinc and vanadium mines makes it the largest economic entity in Peru aside from the government itself. And they further noted the precarious dependence of the Andean economies on foreign markets for exports of metal and tropical crops, and hence their vulnerability to tariff changes, import restrictions, and price fluctuations.

In view of the freakish basis of Andean society, it is surprising how "normal" the political situations in the three republics were ten years ago. General Odria in Peru and General Ballivián in Bolivia both headed authoritarian regimes which defended the existing order and collaborated with foreign interests. Only Ecuador was ruled by a progressive civilian government under President Galo Plaza Lasso, whose admiration for the political democracy and economic productivity of the United States certainly did not endear him to the Communists.

Despite the different situation in Ecuador, the Communists viewed the three Andean countries as basically alike: all three were poor; all three were looked upon as suffering from the political repression, social cleavages, and economic "contradictions" characteristic of "semi-colonial" countries ruled by "feudalistic" regimes subservient to foreign "capitalist imperialism"—and all three were in the United States' backyard. Consequently, when the advent of the pro-Communist regime of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1951 led Moscow to take a more immediate interest in Latin America, the Andean countries were regarded by Soviet strategists as offering fertile ground for Communist activity.[1]

The Key to Communist Failure

After ten eventful years, it is apparent that the Communists' rather simple views and hopes of the early 1950's were largely illusory. Developments in the

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Mr. Randall teaches Russian history at Columbia University, New York. Together with his wife, whose field is Latin American economic history, he spent part of last year in the Andean countries, studying the Communist movement there. This is the authors' first appearance in Problems of Communism.

[1] A convenient summary of Soviet Communist views on Latin America in the early 1950's is contained in an article published in *Pravda,* March 8, 1951, p. 4.

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Andean republics have been strikingly dissimilar, but in none of them have the Communists made substantial gains. The reason is not that the Communists were proven wrong in their expectations of social and political turmoil in the area. Nor can the Communists ascribe their lack of success—as they did the 1954 defeat of their plans in Guatemala—to massive United States intervention: US programs of financial and economic aid to the Andean republics, except Bolivia, have been relatively minor in size and effect. Nor was Moscow to blame for imposing mistaken "left-adventurist" tactics on the Andean Communist Parties: the latter were consistently allowed to pursue "right-opportunist" internal lines, which in Andean conditions probably represented the most effective course.[2]

What, then, explains the Communists' failure? The present writers share the view, more common in Latin America than in the United States, that the success of the Communist movement in individual Latin American countries has been inversely proportional to the strength and success of indigenous, independent, non-Communist (but not necessarily anti-Communist) revolutionary movements.[3] The records of the Andean Communist Parties during the last ten years provide three tests of this hypothesis. (The term "revolutionary" is used above in preference to "democratic," partly to avoid semantic debate, but chiefly because it is the term preferred by the Latin American political Left, for whom it has a much broader emotional appeal.)

It should be born in mind that the Latin American republics, however "underdeveloped" economically, are not "new countries." In nearly 150 years of Latin American independence, every movement in the political spectrum, from clerical absolutism to anarchism, has found a following somewhere in Latin America. The area has known 19th-century liberal political revolutions and 20th-century social revolutions, conspiratorial cliques and mass parties, parliamentary governments and military juntas. Even the late-coming Communists have been on the scene for forty years. Thus, in the Latin America of the 1950's, the Communists were competing in a politically sophisticated environment.

The Andean Revolutionary Movements

In the Andes, the intellectual hearth of revolution has been Peru. One of its prominent revolutionary thinkers, José Carlos Mariátegui, who died in 1930, is still claimed by the Communists as one of their own because he never decisively broke with them; yet his agrarian program, which called for the transformation of the Indian village-communes into socialist cooperatives, had more in common with the ideas of the Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries than with those of Lenin.[4] Another, Raúl Victor Haya de la Torre, broke openly with the Communists: he started from the premise that in Latin America "imperialism" represented not the last stage of capitalism, but the first.[5] Since 1924, Haya has led the *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* (APRA), which has become the mass revolutionary, Indianist party of Peru and which has the further aim of inspiring the masses throughout the Americas.

From the start, APRA's peculiar ideological mixture of European socialism and syndicalism plus elements of indigenous Peruvian and Mexican revolutionary thought excited the contempt of the Peruvian Communists. Nevertheless, APRA's success in winning broad support among both the intellectuals and the masses of Peru drove the Communists, as early as 1931, to acknowledge it as their No. 1 domestic enemy, and ever since they have supported most of Peru's military dictators in the hope of encompassing APRA's destruction. Still, in the period of freedom just after World War II, the Communists lost control of most of their trade unions to APRA. As the 1950's opened, the Peruvian Communist Party was split, with one wing outlawed and the other supporting the new military dictatorship of General Odria, established in 1948.[6] In the struggle for the future, APRA—though outlawed itself since 1948—was far in the lead.

In Bolivia, the national revolutionary party of the masses has been the *Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario* (MNR). Formed in the latter 1930's during

[2] The articulated content of the "right-opportunist" lines of the Andean CP's has chiefly been negative: *e.g.*, rejection of agrarian uprisings on the model of Yenan and Andhra; refusal to attempt urban insurrections in the manner of the Javanese Communists (1948) or of the Bolivian Falangists (1950's); and refusal to launch waves of openly political strikes such as those staged by adherents of the French and Italian Communist movements in 1947.

[3] This view, supported by a mass of evidence, emerges from Victor Alba's *Historia del comunismo en América Latina*, Ediciones Occidentales, Mexico City, 1954. Its most explicit exposition in English is found in Robert J. Alexander, *Communism in Latin America*, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 1957.

[4] The core of Mariátegui's thought can be found in his *Siete ensayos de interpretación de la realidad peruana*, Biblioteca "Amauta," Lima, (3rd ed.) 1952.

[5] Haya de la Torre's differences with the Communists are discussed in *El antiimperialismo y el Apra*, Ediciones Ercilla, Santiago de Chile, 2nd ed., 1936.

[6] The early decades of Peruvian communism are discussed in Alexander, *op. cit.*, pp. 220-34.

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the period of social stress following Bolivia's loss of the Chaco War, the MNR, under the leadership of Victor Paz Estenssorro, came forward with its own eclectic program combining elements of European socialism and syndicalism with the Indian nationalism of Peru and Mexico. Its left-wing nationalist viewpoint led it, in its early years, to cooperate with two regimes led by army officers who were influenced by the "left" nazism of the Strasser brothers, as filtered into Latin America via the Argentine elements that later supported Peron.[7] During the regime (1943-46) of General Villaroel, who was somewhat less than fanatically devoted to the Allied cause in World War II, the MNR assumed the role of a government party and consolidated its organizational base and mass following, while the Communists were forced into impotent opposition, thanks in part to Stalin's insistence that they stick to an all-out anti-Nazi position which was impolitic in the wartime Bolivian setting. The Communist position deteriorated further between 1946 and 1950 as a result of the party's support of unpopular rightist dictatorships. In fact, the only important Leninist group in Bolivia in those years were the Trotskyites, who often used their strong position in the trade unions to support the MNR against the Communists. Thus, in Bolivia as in Peru, the beginning of the 1950's found the Communists losing the battle for the future to a national revolutionary movement.[8]

The Upsurge of the Left

Bolivia was the first to erupt into revolution. This is not the place to retell the story of the MNR's seizure of power in April 1952 and its subsequent program of revolutionary social transformation—the abolition of the army in its old form, the nationalization of the three great tin combines, the redistribution of agricultural land among the Indian tenant farmers, and the expansion of education.[9] What is important is that for the Communists the revolution was a disaster, for they had not made it and all the credit went to the MNR. Communist hopes in the mid-1950's that President Paz would prove to be a Bolivian Kerensky went unfulfilled. In spite of serious economic problems and internal political splits, the MNR has given Bolivia the most stable government in its history as an independent nation.

Even so, the Bolivian Communists have made some small gains. The revulsion inspired by the party's past connivance with dictatorships has waned with time. "De-Stalinization" in the Soviet Union has moderated the hostility between Bolivian Communists and Trotskyites; some of the latter, after 1956, were wooed into cooperating with the party organization, if not into joining it. By then, however, the local Trotskyite movement was hardly worth capturing since it had disintegrated into four pieces in 1954, with most of its popular following going over to the MNR. By and large, Communist gains on these two counts have remained slight.

The Communists have been particularly galled by the MNR's moderation toward the United States. The tin magnates who symbolized capitalism in the eyes of the general public were native Bolivians. When the big Patiño mining interests were nationalized in 1952, the action was publicized primarily as a blow at domestic capitalism rather than at North American "imperialism," although a 28-percent share in the Patiño enterprises was held in the United States. Washington was equally restrained in its response. In fact, before the end of the Truman administration, the United States began supporting the Bolivian government with grants averaging over $20,000,000 annually, to be used for currency stabilization, road building, and agricultural development. The Communists would have found it suicidal to denounce the MNR as a "lackey of imperialism" for accepting this aid, and they have failed to persuade many Bolivians that acceptance is unwise.

Peru has also moved significantly toward the Left. In 1956, General Odria's rightist government staged elections which were so honestly conducted that his own nominee for the presidential succession was defeated by the liberal-moderate candidate, Manuel Prado Ugarteche. The new president owed his electoral victory to the support thrown to him late in the campaign by the still illegal APRA, and one of his first acts upon taking office was to restore its legal status. APRA has since been in the anomalous position of a legitimate party presumably enjoying the support of a majority of the electorate, but which has been without direct representation in either the Peruvian congress or the government. Nevertheless, its powerful indirect influence, coupled with the example set by revolutionary

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[7] Otto and Gregor Strasser's attempts to take the socialism in National Socialism seriously proved abortive, and Gregor Strasser was purged by Hitler in 1934. Their "left" nationalist militarism, brought back from Germany by South American students, especially military cadets, percolated into South America via the Argentine. The Strasser influence stimulated South American anti-Semitism, long a political property of the Left, as evidenced in the attacks by Bolivian leftists against Hochschild, the Jewish tin magnate of Bolvia.

[8] For the MNR's early struggles with communism, see Alexander, op. cit., pp. 212-20; also the same author's *The Bolivian National Revolution,* Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 1958, Chs. 1-4.

[9] See Alexander, *The Bolivian National Revolution.*

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Bolivia, was instrumental in bringing about the passage in October 1960 of legislative bills instituting a moderate land reform program and providing for eventual expropriation of the Peruvian subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey.

Meanwhile, Peruvian Communists were paying the price of internal disunity and their past connivance with dictatorships. The legal party organization, after supporting Odria's candidate in the 1956 elections, largely disintegrated. The illegal wing of the party had supported a third candidate—also non-Communist—Fernando Belaunde Terry, leader of the leftist group, Acción Popular. It thereby made slight gains, chiefly in Belaunde's home base, the city of Arequipa.

Even more conspicuously than in Bolivia, the Communists in Peru have failed to alienate the government from Washington. They have been unsuccessful in provoking crises with the big North American business interests in Peru, some of which—notably the Grace Steamship Line—have taken steps in the 1950's to "Peruvianize" themselves.[10] It was easy for the Communists to swell the demonstrations of 1958 against the imposition of import quota restrictions on Peruvian lead and zinc by the United States, but they could hardly pose as the unique, or even the major, spokesmen for Peruvian resentment of those measures. The Communists also had a prominent part in instigating the demonstration against Vice-President Nixon at San Marcos University in Lima in 1958, but the party must have had the feeling of plowing water when, some weeks later, the same students cheered another group of visitors from the United States—Leonard Bernstein and his orchestra.

Ecuador's Substitute for a Mass Party

In contrast to Peru and Bolivia, Ecuador has produced no mass revolutionary party. More prosperous than its southern neighbors thanks to a prolonged boom in banana exports, Ecuador has enjoyed a peaceful succession of constitutional governments since 1948. With few mines and little industry, it also has only a small organized labor movement. In the absence of a mass party on the order of APRA and the MNR, the Communist group in Ecuador has usually been able, in uneasy alliance with the small Socialist Party, to dominate most of the labor unions, with the result that the Ecuadorian unions, alone in Latin America, have affiliated themselves with the Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions.[11]

The fact that the Communists of Ecuador have been unable to extend their successes in the labor movement into the political arena is chiefly due to the commanding personal position of President José Maria Velasco Ibarra, who has occupied that office four separate times in the last generation.[12] Velasco seems to perform, by himself, a function akin to that of mass revolutionary parties elsewhere. He has built up an immense following among the Ecuadorian masses, who look to him as the embodiment of their own nationalist, populist, Indianist sentiments, and who—though essentially devoted to him personally—have evidently been satisfied with the moderate to leftist, but consistently nationalist, policies of his four governments. He has not, however, won the intellectual following that both APRA and the MNR can claim; hence Communist appeals encounter somewhat less resistance among intellectuals in Ecuador than in Peru and Bolivia. His party, the *Velasquistas,* is built around his own person rather than a clearly defined political program, and it has nothing like the MNR's or APRA's supporting network of mass organizations. When Velasco abandons his party as he did in the elections of 1956, it is helpless at the polls. In *Velasquismo,* therefore, Ecuador has only a partial and temporary equivalent of a mass revolutionary party as a barrier against the Communists.

Soviet Objectives in the Andes

In spite of the persistently ineffectual records of the Communist movements in Peru and Bolivia, and the trifling degree of success in Ecuador, Moscow has refrained from any substantial intervention in the affairs of the Andean Communist Parties. In Guatemala, where there was more to be gained, Stalin did intervene in 1951 to force a unification of the two rival Communist factions. In contrast, there is no evidence that Moscow exerted any similar pressure on the two Communist splinter groups in Peru—which seems to indicate the low priority assigned the Andean area by the Kremlin. Although each of the Andean Communist Parties went through its own local crisis over "de-Stalinization,"

[10] For the early stage of this process, see Eugene W. Burgess and Frederick H. Garbison, *Casa Grace in Peru,* National Planning Association, Washington D.C., 1954.

[11] For the earlier phases of Ecuadorian communism, see Alexander, *Communism in Latin America,* pp. 234-42.

[12] Velasco served his third presidential term from 1952 to 1956, succeeding Plaza. He did not run in the 1956 election, which resulted in a victory for the Conservative Camillo Ponce Enriquez, largely because Velasco switched his election support from the *Velasquistas'* own candidate to Ponce. Eligible to run again in 1960, Velasco won his fourth term last June.

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Moscow likewise appears to have spent little energy on enforcing their compliance with the CPSU's post-20th Congress line relative to the interpretation of developments in the Soviet Union.

Moscow has thus shown no great interest in the progress of the Andean parties within their own countries. In spite of talk, now of a "united front from below" in Peru (by attempting to wrest APRA's following from it), now of a "united front from above" in Bolivia (by securing recognition as an ally from the MNR), the Communists in each of the Andean countries have pursued uniformly "rightist" internal policies, *i.e.,* characterized by an opportunist willingness to ally themselves with, and exploit, any likely group—all this with Moscow's negligent blessing.

Clearly, what the Soviet leaders have wanted from the Communist Parties of Latin America in the last decade (except perhaps in Guatemala and Cuba) has been not so much the promotion of local revolutions as the incitement of concerted campaigns against the "imperialistic" United States. This amounts to a shunting aside of the long-range domestic goals of the Latin American Communist movements in the interest of short-term foreign policy objectives of the Soviet Union, although the Communists claim that only North American "imperialism" shores up the "semi-feudal" regimes of Latin America.

When the pretext for agitation against the United States has been something remote from Latin American concerns, as in the case of the rallies of 1952 against alleged US "germ warfare" in Korea, the results of the Communist campaigns have been minimal. When the occasion has been a development closer to home—*e.g.,* the overthrow of the Arbenz government in Guatemala in 1954—large numbers of people have been willing to join Communist-organized protest demonstrations in front of US embassies and consulates. The Communists, however, had no monopoly on the claim that Arbenz, in the last analysis, was overthrown by the United Fruit Company operating through various branches of the US government. In agitating to this effect, the Communists were preaching largely to the converted, and their efforts, if anything, strengthened mass support of the non-Communist nationalist parties.

Local Communist efforts to turn the Andean governments against the United States have been handicapped by the fact that Soviet power is of relatively little effect in that area. The USSR is too far away to be a real or a psychological threat militarily; and the spreading tide of its economic offensive has washed only feebly against the Andes. In October 1960, Khrushchev did offer to build a tin smelter for Bolivia, but he has not bothered to accept the government's invitation to visit that country. Nor could the Bolivians or Peruvians think that the Soviet Union might intercede effectively with Washington to obtain a change in the United States' restrictions on imports of Peruvian lead and zinc, or purchases of Bolivian tin.

Communist Anti-US Agitation

The ups and downs of Khrushchev's relations with Washington have been reflected not by shifts from "right" to "left" strategies on the part of the Andean Communist parties, but by periods of less or more intense anti-North American agitation. The waves of Communist agitation, however, are not always coincidental with the peaks of local antipathy toward the United States. These telltale conflicts of phase are Moscow's chief disservice to the cause of communism in Latin America—apart from the fundamental dictatorial and anti-peasant character of the Soviet regime which is so repulsive to many Latin American leftists.

During 1959 and early 1960, the Andean Communist Parties generally followed Khrushchev's mild line as he toured the United States and prepared for the summit meeting in Paris. In March 1959, when *Time* credited an official of the United States Embassy in La Paz with the statement that Bolivia was a failure and ought to be divided up among its neighbors, bloody anti-North American riots broke out in the capital, apparently led by left-wing oppositionists within the ruling MNR. The Communists felt obliged to join the riots, but did so only with some delay and slight enthusiasm. During this mild period, the Andean Communist Parties also were laggard in exploiting the anti-North American potentialities of Castro's first year of rule in Cuba, which aroused immense popular—and especially radical—enthusiasm throughout Latin America.

With Khrushchev's switch to a stiffer line toward Washington a month or so before the summit, the Andean Communists promptly entered a new phase of extreme anti-North American belligerence. In Peru, the Communist students of San Marcos University, who are relatively influential because of their curious alliance with the Christian-Democratic Party, were partially successful in turning an anniversary celebration in honor of Mariátegui and a series of strikes against the government's university reforms into a prolonged pro-Castro and anti US demonstration. In Bolivia, where the Communists had been reduced to endorsing the MNR's presidential candidate in the elections of June 1960

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while failing to elect any of their own congressional slate, the party was able to capture public attention with screaming headlines in its La Paz newspaper, *El Pueblo,* proclaiming "New USA Aggression Against Cuba" and the like. When the United States government suspended the import quota for Cuban sugar in July, Communists played a leading part in rallies at which thousands of Bolivian miners were impelled to shout their eagerness to go to Cuba and help defend it against invasion by US marines.

Similar Communist attempts to stir up support for the Congolese as "fellow victims of imperialism" backfired, however, since neither the intellectuals nor most Indian citizens of the Andean countries thought that there was much in common between their countries and the Congo. Nevertheless, the persistent Communist agitations are believed to have been partly responsible for the relatively inconspicuous support given by the Andean governments to the United States' stand toward Castro at the August 1960 conference of the Organization of American States, and toward the Communist bloc at the autumn UN sessions.

THE COMMUNISTS WERE RIGHT ten years ago when they judged the Andean countries ripe for social revolution. But their ideology blinded them to the possibility that social revolutions might be brought about by other groups which shared some of the goals and techniques of the Communists, but not their rigid and somewhat disabling subservience to Soviet doctrine and policies. Even when faced by the accomplished fact of the MNR's successful revolution in Bolivia, the Communists fell back on dogmatic assertions that the revolution was improperly managed and incomplete. One might well conclude that it was not what the Communists did in the 1950's that was responsible for their lack of success, so much as it was their earlier failure to outclass their rivals in the struggle for mass support.

The immediate future is not bright for communism in the Andean countries. In Ecuador, the Communists can look forward to little advance until the final retirement of Velasco. In Peru, the elections of 1962 will be crucially important: APRA, as the presumed majority party, is the natural favorite to win, but General Odria will again be in the field. The Communists probably will support Belaunde Terry as in 1956, but even his election would not gain them very much. In Bolivia, the Communists must hope against hope for a total collapse of the MNR.

The three Andean republics thus provide convincing evidence that economic poverty, social cleavage, and the presence of foreign capitalist interests do not make Communist success inevitable. Their experiences in the last decade seem to support the hypothesis that the most effective barrier to communism is the alternative of an indigenous, mass revolutionary party—the alternative of a strong non-Communist Left.

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The Soviet Economy in Transition

By Francis Seton

ONE DOES NOT HAVE TO BE a Marxist to believe that national policy needs to be linked in some way to the economic resources at a country's disposal. This is not to say that policies cannot be freely chosen or abandoned, but merely that the range of alternatives is effectively limited by economic conditions, and that a significant change in these conditions will often make old policies futile and new ones attractive. There is little doubt that such a change has occurred in the Soviet Union since the last war, and that it has leapt into the consciousness of the party, government and people with particular abruptness owing to the shift in leadership with which it was roughly coincident.

The change has been noted by many observers and has received a variety of names: The German economist Dr. Erik Boettcher calls it the transition from the extensive to the intensive phase of economic development. Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders refer to it somewhat more cryptically as the beginning of "the period of laying the material foundations of full communism," which, presumably, they would contrast with its equally long-winded predecessor—"the period of the completion of the consolidation of socialism." This author would prefer to characterize it more loosely, though less pregnantly, as a structural shift in the economy making the *efficiency* of productive effort more telling than its mere volume. But whatever the terms used, the change is a product of the discovery that improvements in method can be more important than the continued accumulation of factory buildings and machines. In economic terms, the virtues of technical progress and innovation have come to outshine those of capital investment.

Mr. Seton, an Official Fellow of Nuffield College, Oxford, has published numerous articles in British and American learned journals dealing with the Soviet economy.

At first blush this does not sound like a very profound metamorphosis—hardly more, perhaps, than a change in economic fashion or climate; but in reality it goes to the very foundations on which a country's economic system may be built. It parallels in encapsuled form one of the basic transformations which most developed countries may have undergone at one time or another.

The academic economist has perhaps blinded himself to these transformations by the professional habit of looking on economic systems mainly as institutional contrivances which absorb scarce resources (labor, land, and machines) and work them up into a flow of final goods for the satisfaction of consumers. He is not always aware that this conception is only relevant to one corner of space and time: Northwestern Europe and North America since the middle of the 19th century. Previously and elsewhere the chief concern may not have been the best utilization of existing land, labor, and capital, but the best remedy for the crying deficiencies of any or all of them. How can capital be *created* where it is dolefully inadequate; how can one type of labor be turned into another, or one type of capital into another? It is this *transformation* of productive resources and not their optimum *combination* which is the stuff of economic history: Whether we think of nomadic tribes undergoing a "population explosion" which sacrifices grazing land for military supremacy, or of 18th century England depleting her forests to make charcoal for ironworks, or of Tsarist Russia taxing her peasants to attract foreign capital—it is always the story of transforming land into manpower, land into capital, or labor into capital, and of doing so because the predominant skill or knowledge requires for its proper exercise more of the second than is available, and because this can be secured only by sacrificing the first, of which there is a superfluity.

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I do not think it would be fanciful to describe the economic history of Stalin's Russia as the story of a transformation of peasant labor into industrial labor, and of both into capital. It was this, far more than any proximate conversion of productive resources into consumer satisfaction, which determined its course, and it would be idle, therefore, to expect it to have followed the precepts of modern allocative economics. Nevertheless, the diagnosis of the initial condition which was to be remedied seems well in accord with what is now an integral part of economic teaching: there was a superfluity of peasant labor in relation to the land and capital resources available to Soviet agriculture. It was possible in principle, therefore, to abstract labor from agriculture without lowering agricultural output, and to continue to feed this labor while it was producing industrial goods in the towns.

The Problem of Industrialization

Normally the transfer of a peasant laborer to industry might be expected to result in the loss of food output (the "marginal productivity of agricultural labor") which in the absence of foreign trade or aid can only be made good by the return from industry of sufficient equipment or fertilizer to replace the departed laborer on the land. In fact, industry must somehow bear the technical "replacement cost" of agricultural labor. Now, it is true that in conditions of rural over-population, such as had prevailed in Russia for several decades, the marginal productivity of agricultural labor, and therefore its "replacement cost," was very close to zero. But even the drafters of the First Five-Year Plan realized that this was not the whole story. It would not be enough to keep agricultural output unchanged while labor was shifted to the towns; the transfer of each peasant would also have to be accompanied by a well-defined increment in food production. This was so, firstly, because he could only be lured away from his traditional pursuits by the offer of a better living standard than he had previously enjoyed; secondly, because the remaining peasants could not be prevented from consuming more per head once an unproductive mouth had left their farms; and thirdly, because the "work-spreading" habits to which the peasants were inured (inter-stripping of land, fragmentation, etc.) would dissipate some of the productivity gains which the departure of surplus labor would otherwise have brought about.

For all these reasons it is clear that industry must not merely replace the departed worker on the land in a technical sense, but must, over and above this, bear an "institutional surcharge" in order to equip agriculture for the production of the incremental output which his departure has necessitated. It will be convenient to refer to the "replacement cost" and the "surcharge" together as the "release price" of agricultural labor, as this is evidently the *sum total of the industrial output which each peasant recruit has to produce in order to pay for his own release from agriculture.* Depending on conditions, this output may take the form of agricultural machinery, fertilizer, or even industrial consumer goods (to increase peasant productivity through incentives); but in the absence of peasant coercion it is an inescapable charge on industry, and any economist or planner pursuing industrialization in a particular country might do well to start by gauging its level and gearing his program accordingly.

Normally, as industrialization proceeds, one would expect the release price of labor to be subject to conflicting pulls. A number of factors will tend to make for its *decline:* it is likely, for instance, that the general increase in economic discipline and efficiency will spill over into agriculture and raise the productivity of capital on the land. At the same time the monetization and commercialization of agriculture will probably increase its responsiveness to incentives in the form of industrial consumer goods. This responsiveness may be very low in the initial stages, when peasants are near subsistence level and accustomed to making most of their household goods themselves, but it is likely to increase fairly rapidly as the new habits of specialization and exchange induce a growing dependence on purchases from the towns. On the other hand, the gradual inroads made into the rural surplus population will bring about a situation where each additional peasant transferred to industry will have to be replaced, or partly replaced, by progressively greater capital investment in agriculture, and this makes for a countervailing *increase* in the release price as industrialization proceeds.

The *actual* movement of the release price will of course depend on which of these factors is the stronger. If it is the first—the increase in rural capital productivity or responsiveness to incentives—there is no reason why industrialization should not proceed under its own momentum far beyond the point where the whole rural surplus population is absorbed. In that case a situation will eventually be reached where the labor-capital ratio in agriculture is no longer any less appropriate to current technological knowledge than it is in industry. At that point, with capital no longer "scarcer" than labor in either of the two sectors, the historic transformation of one type of resource into the other is

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completed, and the release price of labor ceases to be the main constraint on the progress of the economy along its chosen path. It is only then that the center of attention shifts to the classical problem: What are the marginal adjustments in the employment of land, labor, or capital throughout the economy which will best serve the community, given its tastes and preferences? This brings us into the mature economy of the Northwest European or North American type.

Soviet Agriculture under Stalin

Is Soviet Russia now approaching this stage? Though many observers think so, there are indications that she may still be some considerable distance from it. With a total labor force little more than 25 percent above that of the United States, the Soviet Union still has 4.5 times as many people employed in agriculture—about three times as many per acre of crop land, and nearly 20 times as many per tractor (though Soviet tractors are bigger). Obviously there is still a good deal of leeway to be made up. It does seem, however, that the stage may now have been reached when the "replacement" component of the release price is rising quite sharply. There are no really adequate statistics to prove this, but a rough impression of the trend may be obtained by comparing the four-year periods 1935-38 and 1949-52, both of which were characterized by a substitution of rural capital for labor, leaving agricultural output virtually unchanged. During the earlier period the government was able to recruit nearly 10 million land workers for (temporary or permanent) employment elsewhere, "replacing" them by tractors to the tune of 3.9 million horsepower units. During the later period only 3.1 million peasants could be recruited in this way, even though the corresponding "replacement" was of the order of 5.3 million horsepower units—and this in spite of the fact that the collective farms' own investments were running at over three times the level of the earlier period. These are partial and inadequate data, but most of the correctives which common knowledge could supply would tend to make the contrast even sharper.

Normally, as we have seen, the process of industrialization produces countervailing forces which bring the release price down; but it seems abundantly clear that the Stalinist system prevented them from operating. The hallmark of that system was the attempt to express the last ounce of manpower which agriculture could be made to yield (short of a catastrophic fall in food output) and to "finance" its release price by ruthlessly enforced, and sometimes murderous, inroads into the consumption standards of the remaining peasants. Suffice it to say that during the period 1928-40, when the grain harvest fluctuated around an almost stationary level, the proportion exacted by the state rose from under 25 to over 40 percent. Of the total value of food products sold by government and allied organizations, mainly to the towns, agricultural producers received less than one fifth—and probably only 70-90 percent of that accrued to individual peasants in the form of direct sales income, or "labor-day" dividends from the collectives. In the years immediately preceding Stalin's death the proportion returned to agriculture in this way appears to have fallen even further, possibly to 12-15 percent.

But starving geese lay fewer and fewer eggs. The very fact that the whiphand of Stanlinism shifted the whole burden of the release price from industry to agriculture prevented the rural economy from developing the technological and social responses which could have offset the rising replacement cost of peasant labor. While this helped to spark the industrialization process and drove it forward at unprecedented speed, it prevented the extension of the new efficiency from industry to agriculture, and delayed the monetization and full integration of rural life into the exchange economy, which alone could have increased its responsiveness to capital investment and incentive goods from industry. By 1952-53 Soviet agriculture was sucked dry of the power to stimulate, or be stimulated by, the progress of other branches of the economy. If industrialization was to proceed at anything like its previous rate, the government had to choose between a further turn of the screw of peasant coercion and an entirely new policy of partial atonement for past sins, reorienting agriculture towards the stimuli which could help to bring the release price down.

The New Agricultural Policy

After Stalin's death, it became clear that his successors chose the second alternative. The comprehensive reforms from 1953 to the present day are obviously designed to raise the responsiveness of agriculture to both *capital investment* and *labor incentives,* and it is this that explains the apparent vacillation between measures for more *intensive* and more *extensive* working of the land which seems to have confused a number of observers.

The situation is made somewhat more complicated by the judicious mixing of stimuli in such a way as to help the long-term struggle against the collective farmer's private plot, without compromising those types of farm work in which the private plot still has an edge over the

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collective in terms of efficiency (mainly livestock and vegetable production). The abrupt raising of state delivery prices by anything from 200 to 500 percent, coupled with the lowering of delivery norms and cancellation of arrears (1953, 1954, and 1956), and finally the total abolition of these virtual levies in favor of a system of planned state purchases (1957 and 1958) were all measures clearly designed to stimulate production on both collective farms and private plots.

On the other hand, the gradual monetization of collective farm labor dividends, their prompter payment in advance of the harvest, and the lowering of collective farm income taxes were evidently aimed at making collective farm production more attractive compared with the private plot. This policy was given teeth by special measures designed to bring the permitted size of an individual's plot into direct dependence on his labor contribution in the collectivized fields (1956). Yet from the very outset of the reforms the state was careful to warn local authorities against infringing private interests in matters of livestock breeding (1953), and in 1956 it instructed its procurement organs to pay urban market prices for all fruit and berries purchased from private orchards—surely the only instance where the Soviet government bound itself voluntarily to the verdict of a free market in matters of internal price formation. Meanwhile, however, Khrushchev launched his relentless campaign for the planting of feed grain, aimed at creating a cheap and stable fodder base for collectivized livestock, eventually render the private plot dispensable even in a field where at present it is more productive. The powers that be will evidently tread warily where the private plot is concerned, but their final aim of doing away with it can hardly be in doubt. In their eyes it is both an obstacle to the fullest use of capital on the land and a stronghold of the near-subsistence economy whose responsiveness to commercial incentives is so undeveloped.

But the regime is not merely backing the collective farms against the private plot. It also wants to promote state farming against the traditional collectives, and presumably for the same sort of reasons. The virgin lands campaign, quite apart from its desired effects on physical output, fits admirably into the settled policy of raising the importance of the state sector in agriculture. It is in fact a gigantic operation to prepare the ground for a more extensive use of capital on the land without committing it to an organizational form which falls short of the regime's ideals. There is, in addition, a movement afoot to change the collective farms from *within*, and bring them into closer conformity with state farms in the normal running of their affairs. The "strengthening



—How have you been able to get building materials for the roofs?
—I can't tell you in a couple of words. I'd have to talk a whole day about it.

—From Krokodil (Moscow), June 10, 1960.

of collective farm cadres" with party specialists, and the wholesale transfer of equipment from the state-run Machine-Tractor Stations into the hands of collective farm management are obvious steps in this direction. So is the current overhaul of labor compensation which is increasingly taking the form of money rather than produce, piece rates rather than time rates, and guaranteed minima rather than collective dividends.

The question of making effective a system of differential rent charges, depreciation allowances, and unified sales prices is at present hotly debated, and a move to bring these prices into line with those received by state farms was recently foreshadowed. With both income and outlay increasingly molded by well-defined monetary standards, the collective farms should gradually find their way into full cost accounting with ordinary balance sheets and profit-and-loss accounts subject to the kind of controls and incentives familiar in state farms and industry. Last, but not least, there have been amalgamations and federations of collective farms for specific purposes (road construction, power supply, provision of schools and hospitals, and so on)—a movement which goes by the name of inter-farm collaboration, but has sometimes culminated in the total transformation of collectives into state farms, and is in any case likely to reduce the difference between them.

The Manpower Situation

The problem of providing a continued flow of manpower for industry is aggravated at the present time by the population deficit caused by war and its aftermath.

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The cataclysm of the 1940's may have deprived the Soviet economy of as many as 25 million people who could still be at work now, and of the normal reinforcement of another 7-10 millions who would be entering the labor force in the present decade if normal birth rates had prevailed between 1940 and 1947.

This spectacular and much discussed problem has advisedly been put here in a subordinate place, because it seems to be less decisive, and certainly less permanent, than the gradual depletion of the rural surplus. Given high fertility rates and lowered mortality, the Soviet population can quickly make good these once-for-all losses, and the present slackening of manpower inflows may well be followed by a limited period of acceleration within the next ten or fifteen years.

The drive to bring women to the work benches is of particular interest, as it helps to explain a number of recent welfare measures which would normally be expected to have a disincentive effect. Among these is the raising of minimum wages, the gradual abolition of income taxes, and the new wage regulations in general. They are designed, among other things, to bring up the relative level of the lowest brackets (in which women are often employed), and to tone down the most highly-geared piece-rate incentives in favor of time rates and guaranteed minima. Some of this is undoubtedly dictated by the progress of mechanization or automation and the consequent weakening of the link between output flow and individual work performance, but it will also help to recruit more womanpower. There is, in addition, the general shortening of the working day and the increased provision of canteens, laundries, kindergartens and similar conveniences. Many of these measures may be genuine bids for popularity and may betoken some concern for higher living standards, but they also fit in well with the need to coax into the labor force badly-needed reinforcements which could in principle elect to stay outside it.

Additional manpower-tapping measures are the recent educational reforms (which amount to a partial lowering of the school-leaving age), the cutting down of the armed forces, and the small, but persistently recurring campaigns to transfer government and administrative personnel to production jobs.

Soviet Industry under Stalin

Many of the great policy changes of the recent years will impose a new and unaccustomed burden on industry. Indeed, the stepping-up of incentives in agriculture and on the labor front is merely the obverse of the fact that henceforth industry will have to pay at least a portion of the release price of labor, and can no longer be harnessed exclusively to the production of capital for its own use. This, however, was its be-all and end-all under Stalin, and the total repudiation of this concept, along with so much that followed from it, is the true measure of the break which has occurred.

In a very real sense the Stalinist economy was a single integrated factory, with agriculture supplying manpower as the raw material of industry, and industry producing capital goods as the final output and (within the horizon of the plans) the *ultima ratio* of the system. A process of this sort lends itself most easily to administrative control from the center, since the basic criteria of success are pre-established, simple, and unconditional. Planners were judged by the degree to which their targets favored "growth levers" (machines rather than ordinary goods, machine-making machines rather than ordinary machines, etc.), with scant regard to balance in assortment, space, or time. Factory managers were judged by the extent to which they fulfilled their output targets, with scant regard to the cost at which this was achieved. In terms of industrial output the system produced spectacular results—and this remains so even when the official claim of a 15-fold expansion between 1928 and 1952 is scaled down to the lower indices suggested by Western students (Nutter and Kaplan-Moorsteen—4.2-4.4, Hodgman—7.9, Seton—9.1).* But it was increasingly realized that this output was bought not merely at the cost of keeping agriculture virtually stagnant and isolated, but also at the price of reducing the serviceability and

*For more detail see Norman N. Kaplan and Richard H. Moorsteen, "An Index of Soviet Industrial Output," *American Economic Review*, June 1960, p. 301.



Полумеханизация на полном ходу.

***Upper left:* Side by side with modern technology on railroads, manual labor is often employed.**
***Below:* Half-mechanization—full steam ahead.**

From **Krokodil *(Moscow), Sept. 30, 1960.***

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economic effectiveness of the industrial products which were being turned out by the factories in such relentless profusion.

The trouble with the total-command economy of the Stalinist type is that it invariably deprives itself of the economic knowledge and rationality on which its commands are supposed to be based. A price system artificially devised to favor investment and facilitate administrative control cannot at the same time be a true reflection of relative scarcities in the economy. If it is used by administrators as an aid in judging the performance of executives, it will generate incentives pulling in the wrong direction. If it is used by planners as an aid to target-selling, it will cause misallocation of resources even *by the standards of the planners' own objectives.* There is ample evidence that the Stalinist system suffered badly from both these disabilities, and that it still does so wherever it continues to exist.

The Problem of Incentives

The story of distorted incentives is a familiar one. We know that Soviet production managers often reacted to aggregative output targets (in value terms) by concentrating on material-intensive lines of production, because these helped to boost their output indices with minimum calls on their own labor and resources. The resulting general inflation of the weight, bulk, and transport costs of commodities and the hypertrophy of basic-metal production and inventories produced "flatulent," intractable economies, choking with indigestible hardware and in constant need of "galvanizing" campaigns. We also know that the rigid target system drove managers to distort the rhythm of their output. They would often empty the pipelines of production in an effort to fulfill a *finished-output* target (if this was at a premium), or block them up with stocks of semi-finished goods if *gross*-production targets carried greater weight. The resulting "syncopation" in the flow of output aggravated the supply situation and led to frequent switches in the definition of performance criteria ("gross" output, "commodity" output, sales, and so on).

There was also the familiar tendency on the part of managers to understate production capacities in order to secure lower targets, and thereby greater scope for earning over-fulfilment premiums. For the same reasons labor and materials requirements would tend to be overstated. If the superior organs reacted by applying automatic correctives to the figures so reported, the managers would merely be put on notice to "cook" their returns even more thoroughly in the future. Last but not least, the target system motivated managers to resist strenuously anything that jeopardized the smooth flow of target-chasing production, including such upheavals as modernization, innovation, and the introduction of new products. This produced a vested interest in established methods and a bias against adventure and risk-taking in the lower echelons of the system.

In all these ways, and in many more, the hard-pressed executives of the Stalin era dodged and evaded the relentless impositions of the target system and, while submitting to the letter of its laws, often frustrated its real aims. Typically enough, the centralist-minded bureaucrats could offer only two remedies: a *toughening* of targets with all their sanctions and controls, or a *proliferation* of targets in an effort to stop up the loopholes in central control. Both were tried and both failed in their objective. The policy of greater stringency merely stimulated the defensive reflexes in managerial behavior. It sent subordinate organs on a desperate search for protection and self-sufficiency, and helped to dissect the economy into the notorious ministerial empires that reached everywhere from major factories to far-flung sources of fuel and raw materials, and that were able to offer ever subtler and more effective resistance to central policy.

The proliferation of targets, on the other hand, produced a situation in which the number of instructions circulating through the system became too large to be effectively coordinated by a single authority. Production managers were often faced with orders issuing from different sources, which on closer examination turned out to be incompatible, or could be made out to be so in self-defence. This opened up a new and welcome area of choice, as managers were able to select from the instructions received those which it was worth their while to fulfill and those which they could safely disregard. Thus, whichever way the center tried to reassert itself—whether through increased stringency or through proliferation of targets—it merely succeeded in accelerating the process by which control was slipping from its hands.

The basic fact of life which the centralists had insufficiently grasped was the technical impossibility of directing a total-command economy from a single point. No human mind—or committee of minds—is capacious enough to survey all the manifold detail of a national economy or to weigh simultaneously all the implications of alternative choices. The decision makers must therefore formulate and enforce their will with the aid of partial prescriptions, aimed at selected points in the economy and covering only selected aspects of economic performance. But those who are under pressure to ful-

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fill these orders will try—being only human—to find relief in the inevitable loopholes; they will crowd into these interstices and seek to enlarge them, stretching and fraying the surrounding fiber until the whole fabric is threatened with loss of shape and function.

The most vigorous reaction of the leadership in recent years was the complete recasting of the organizational structure of industry and construction which took place in 1957. Almost overnight the ministries in charge of separate branches of industry were swept away and replaced by territorial Economic Councils responsible for *all* branches within their regions. These now form the highest tier of executive organs to whom the center issues direct commands. This reform, however, is anything but a move towards decentralization as the term is commonly understood in the West. Far from sharing out its ultimate sovereignty among local organs, the center has merely staged a deliberate withdrawal from positions which were becoming untenable, in order to enforce its will more effectively from better placed strongholds.

Resource Allocation

Apart from these efforts to recapture the control of incentives, the Soviet leaders have recently made determined moves to remedy the outstanding failures in resource allocation inherited from the past. Most of these sprang from the longstanding obsession with the quantitative accumulation of capital which hamstrung the full exploitation of the qualitative improvements offered by the accelerated flow of innovations in the last 20 to 30 years To the extent that technical progress did come into its own, there was a distinct bias for *labor*-saving innovations and a frequent disregard of the *capital*-saving trends characterizing so much of recent development in the West.

Among the important technological revolutions that were bypassed in this way was the shift from coal to petroleum and gas as sources of energy. In the early 1950's, when the world at large consumed over 40 percent of its energy in the form of non-solid fuels, the corresponding Soviet proportion was barely 20 percent, even though petroleum and gas absorb less labor and capital per calorie unit than any other major fuel. The Soviets' excessive reliance on coal deposits (which are relatively dispersed throughout the country) was no doubt motivated by the desire to save transport. But the resulting lag in the development of liquid-fuels production delayed the switch from steam to diesel propulsion and the associated reduction in the cost of transport per ton-mile carried.

Another "bad habit" was rampant in the field of power generation, where over-concentration on hydroelectric schemes led to the habitual freezing of capital resources during long gestation periods, and curtailed the building of thermal power stations which could have yielded their smaller returns more quickly. This was part and parcel of the chronic disease of "gigantomania," and led to a rapid increase in the proportion of annual investment locked up in unfinished projects—no doubt an important factor in the diminishing effectiveness of investment (in terms of output) that could be observed in so many fields.

The technological revolution in the field of fuel and power was not, however, the only one which the Soviets had largely overlooked. They also neglected the important trends in the use of tools and instruments of production which had yielded substantial returns in the West. This was manifested in their habitual concentration and over-concentration on the mechanization of basic processes—blast-furnace operations, open-hearth smelting, and the like—while allowing auxiliary operations, such as repair, transport, or materials-handling, to be carried out manually. It has been calculated that for every ton of steel produced, the Soviet Union employs nearly three times as many auxiliary workers as the United States, even though the open-hearth furnaces themselves are said to be more highly mechanized. The fact that expensive and powerful equipment often had to stand idle while waiting to be repaired or fed with fuel and materials by slow and inefficient methods is illustrative of how wasteful such procedure can be.

The Spirit of Reform

As we know, determined moves are now being made to remedy these defects. The effort under the present Seven-Year Plan is largely concentrated on the shift of emphasis from coal to gas and petroleum, from partial to complete mechanization, from ferrous metals to plastics, and so forth. In general there is a distinct and very conscious move from growth by accumulation to growth by technical progress, and from exclusively labor-saving to capital-saving techniques. The industrial reorganization or "territorialization" of 1957 was only one of the measures designed to alert the top executive organs—traditionally preoccupied with physical output targets to the exclusion of all else—to the need for economic thinking. At the same time the economic incentives to the lower echelons are being overhauled with similar ends in view: Since 1959 managerial premia are beginning to be based on cost reduction rather than output in a number of important industries, and the system of

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bonus payments to engineers and technicians is undergoing a process of thorough rationalization.

There is also much stirring in the field of economic theory and planning practice. The present discussions on the price system are untrammelled by the dictates of Marxian orthodoxy and address themselves to long-neglected problems. There is talk of introducing interest charges on fixed capital, raising the importance of profits, using differential rent and obsolescence—in fact of re-admitting a host of demons from the capitalist underworld. Mathematical methods in social accounting and programming are enjoying a new respectability and may soon produce a serious impact on resource allocation. Finally, there is evidence of a general toning-down of overambitious output and investment targets, and an end is being put to the breakneck pacesetting which has generated such irrational pressures in the past. It may well be that this will result in better fulfillment of the reduced targets, and therefore a faster pace of advance, than could otherwise have been achieved.

Should the Soviet Union succeed in removing the economic and administrative hurdles which the Stalinist system has put in its way, it could progress towards a mature economy at a very fast pace. The day could thus draw nearer when neither capital nor labor would appear to be in such relative scarcity as to encourage the leadership to continue the process of converting one into the other. Peasant labor would then cease to figure as an "intermediate good" in anybody's calculation, and the economy *could* settle down to the relatively civilized business of making marginal adjustments in response to consumer demand or social policy. All this, however, is still a long way off, and much may happen in the sphere of politics to deflect the leadership from such a course; it is impossible to gauge the built-in resistances within the Communist system to far-reaching economic and administrative change. But enough has been said to show that the *economic* reforms of the last few years are at least not incompatible with the long-term pursuit of economic rationality.

IN FUTURE ISSUES

Sino-Soviet Competition in Underdeveloped Countries.....*Donald S. Zagoria*
The "Separate Paths" of Poland and Yugoslavia...*A. Bromke, M. Drachkovitch*
Eastern Europe: The Price of Corruption.....*Paul Landy*
The Morals and Morality of Soviet Youth.....*Peter Juviler*
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Communism in Greece.....*Efthimios A. Papageorgiou*

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Is Cuba Communist?

Listen, Yankee!
by C. Wright Mills.
McGraw Hill, New York, 1960.

Red Star Over Cuba,
by Nathaniel Weyl.
Devin Adair, New York, 1960.

Reviewed by George Sherman

IS CUBA COMMUNIST? Mr. C. Wright Mills, implacable liberal, gives an emphatic NO. Mr. Nathaniel Weyl, intrepid anti-Communist, just as emphatically says YES. Neither man's answer is particularly surprising. In juxtaposition they represent the two most extreme views today on that controversial island.

In the foreword to *Listen Yankee,* Mr. Mills says: " . . . I have thought the expression of my own views much less important than the statement of the Cuban revolutionaries' case." That case is derived from long sessions with Cuban leaders (including three 18-hour days with Fidel Castro) and "hard travels" throughout the island last summer. Mr. Mills is trying to offer a corrective, he says, to the "coordinated" American press which does not understand a "real revolution" and does not give "sound information" about Cuba.

In this one objective Mr. Mills succeeds admirably. The explosive "other side" comes across with all the impact of a verbal bombshell. The series of sizzling letters from a fictional Cuban revolutionary to John Q. Public, USA, faithfully portrays the mood and arguments of the *fidelistas.* And the strident voice is as important as what it says. It screeches with pent-up resentment and with pride in newly-won independence. Under Mr. Mill's pen, the word "Yankee" becomes the hated ephithet chanted by the Cuban mobs.

But Mr. Mills does not stop with good reportage of an unpopular viewpoint. In his final "Note to the Reader" he no longer resorts to the fictitious letter writer, revealing, instead, his own deep involvement in the Cuban revolution. He finds the Castro argument "on the whole compelling." "My loyalties," he says unequivocally, "are conditional upon my own convictions and my own values." Were he a Cuban "acting in the Cuban revolution today," he would make the same identification between "anti-communism" and "counter-revolution." All of which, of course, makes for little distinction between the author and the fictional Cuban revolutionary he depicts.

In *Red Star Over Cuba,* Mr. Weyl takes another tack and arrives at diametrically opposite conclusions. His is the 'scholarly" approach. He has not been to Cuba—or if he has, he makes no mention of it in his book. He relies on copious footnotes and a detailed index to "prove"—among other things—that Fidel Castro was a Soviet agent "at least as early as 1948."

"He was a psychopath, devoid of any morality or honor, dedicated to nihilism and to naked power"—that sentence typifies the tone of the book. The Cuban revolution becomes a sinister Communist plot hatched by mysterious "Soviet apparatuses" (complete with esoteric Russian initials) scattered around the Caribbean.

The jacket of the book assures the reader that Mr. Weyl "knows his Latin America." He speaks Spanish. "A former Communist, he belonged to the same cell as Alger Hiss during the 1930's and devoted his time to Latin American affairs while in the party." *Red Star Over Cuba* reads like a "detective story," the blurb continues. For this reader, at least, the methods and sources used make that story highly questionable.

MR. WEYL SEEMS TO THINK that meticulous use of quotation marks and reference notes adds authenticity to exaggerated allegations. The fast or lazy reader may not even pause over the galaxy of page references to unknown or obscure publications. More often than not these footnotes refer to suspect sources like *Carib* —mouthpiece of the Trujillo dictatorship in the Dominican Republic—or to a secret report prepared by General Batista's Bureau for the Repression of Communist Activities (BRAC), or to an unpublished Cuban police dossier on Fidel Castro to which the author inexplicably

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Mr. Sherman, a young American correspondent of the London Observer, *has covered Eastern and Central Europe for that newspaper, and recently visited and published several articles on Cuba.*

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had access. In short, the documentation turns out to be as biased as the book.

By the time Mr. Weyl finishes, Fidel Castro appears more monster than man. A "sensational" report in a Caracas newspaper by unidentified "Colombian Detective No. 6" supports "massive circumstantial evidence" showing how Fidel Castro, the Soviet Embassy, and an assortment of Latin American Communists carried out the assassination and riots in Bogota in April 1948. Hearsay evidence by Fidel Castro's former brother-in-law before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee is used to implicate Mr. Castro in two political murders while he was a law student at Havana University. The secret police dossier completes the case. The title of this chapter is "Apprenticeship in Murder"; the subheading is a choice quotation from the Marquis de Sade.

Mr. Weyl also has a penchant for basing his own emotion-packed interpretation on dubious statements of fact. For instance, Fidel Castro is described as a "mediocre" student who finished the Jesuit Colegio Belen High School in Havana in three instead of the usual four years "by bribing or threatening his professors and by getting those who were Communists or Communist sympathizers to give him passing grades gratis." Mr. Weyl offers no proof for that startling observation.

In another place many of the natives of the mountainous Sierra Maestra region who suported the small Castro band are said to have been involved in narcotics, criminal frauds and various other offenses." The source for that accusation remains a mystery. In still another section, Mr. Weyl quotes for four pages from a Mr. Miguel Sanchez—known as "el Coreano" (the Korean) because he fought in the American paratroops during the Korean War—about how he barely escaped death and Communist indoctrination while training the Castro expeditionary force in Mexico. But who is this "el Coreano," why did he accept the mission in the first place, and where does Mr. Weyl get his testimony? The reader is never told either in a footnote or in the text.

SO MUCH FOR the respective approaches of Messrs. Mills and Weyl: Both reflect highly emotional commitments to opposing sides of the so-called "Cuban Question." The substance of each side breaks down into three main issues: 1) Communism in Cuba; 2) US responsibility; 3) Lessons derived for the future.

First, communism in Cuba. Mr. C. Wright Mills attacks Castro's critics for being "imprecise" about what they mean by communism. " 'Communism' in the world today is neither homogeneous nor unchanging," he says. He challenges such detractors as Mr. A. A. Berle Jr., who wrote an article in the October 1960 issue of *Foreign Affairs* discussing whether Cuba resembles Stalinism, or Bolshevism of the 1920 variety, or Yugoslavia in 1950, or Mao's China. Clearly, if no explicit similarity can be shown, the charge of "communism" must automatically be ruled out. As for Mr. Mills' own conclusion, it is summed up in this passage:

The Cuban revolutionary *is* a new and distinct type of left-wing thinker and actor. He is neither capitalist nor Communist. He is socialist in a manner, I believe, both practical and humane. And if Cuba is let alone, I believe that Cubans have a good chance to keep the socialist society they are building practical and humane.

To back this conviction, *Listen Yankee* assembles the usual pro-Castro arguments purporting to "prove" that communism is no issue in Cuba, *viz.*: that the US Central Intelligence Agency issued a report on November 5, 1959, in which it stated that neither Castro nor his "26th of July" movement was Communist; that Cubans who are Communists are in a tiny minority and have participated very little in the conquest of power; that reforms of the revolution are always "ahead" of the Communists, so young Cubans do not have to join the party for reasons of protest; finally, that the economic revolution—particularly agrarian reform—is not "Stalinist," since the countryside and light industry have been given priority over cities and forced industrialization.

But Mr. Mills is too filled with revolutionary romanticism to be very precise himself. He dallies over definitions of communism and avoids the only real question: How *totalitarian* is Cuba? Most Cubans are too busy building their new society, he says, to worry much whether their present "moment of truth" will turn into an "epoch of lies." He has reservations about the virtually absolute power possessed by one man, but assures his readers that Mr. Castro also realizes the dangers inherent in his position.

MR. MILLS DOES NOT MENTION the growing role of the Castro secret police and the numbers of political prisoners now languishing in Cuba's jails. He ignores the shackled press but notes the sins of newspapers under the Batista tyranny. He passes off totalitarian social organizations with the assurance that everyone is "enormously happy" under this "phase" of the "revolutionary dictatorship of workers and peasants." And he becomes positively mystic when he discusses transition from that dictatorship to some "fixed political system." Evidently Mr. Mills does not consider that a dictatorship is a political system and one eminently capable of perpetuating itself at that. According to him, the revolution is creating its own institutions, which will

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provide "new kinds of freedom" for the Cubans. What that system will be or when it will come, no one knows. But the *fidelistas* will feel it "in the air" when the time comes. "This is a government very close to the people" —that is Mr. Mills' abiding article of faith.

Mr. Weyl does not take us much further in *Red Star Over Cuba.* His book does not deal with the broad social spectrum or the vast changes that have occurred in the two years since Castro came to power. His main preoccupation is with Communist intrigues, Communist plots, the "Communist conspiracy."

The principal thesis of *Red Star Over Cuba* is that under Batista the surface Cuban Communist Party was deliberately kept weak, while secret Communist agents infiltrated the security agencies and fed information to Fidel Castro and other "Soviet agents," thus making it possible for them to mount a frontal assault free of the "Communist taint."

Mr. Weyl dismisses the "Castro myth" about overwhelming poverty causing the revolution. He shows that Cuba ranked fourth among the twenty Latin American republics in per capita income in 1957. That income was $361 annually compared with $409 in Argentina, $281 in Brazil, $88 in Paraguay and $2,097 in the United States—which, to a less biased viewer, seems more an exercise in relative poverty than relative wealth!

Furthermore, Mr. Weyl shows a distinct ambivalence toward General Batista. He admits that Batista himself usurped power twice—once in 1940 and again in 1952 —yet constantly condemns Castro's treason in attacking the "established" government. He admits Batista "stole tens of millions of dollars," yet implies that this was not too iniquitous in that Batista "stole and built" whereas his predecessors "stole and wrecked." His comparison between Batista and Castro is disarmingly simplistic: "Where Batista was merely avid for applause, greedy and corrupt, Castro had far more terrible vices." And these vices were all, of course, Communist ones. The revolution was successful simply because it had at its disposal "almost unlimited supplies of money" and Czechoslovak and Soviet arms, and because it was proficient in such "standard Communist techniques" as terrorism, dossiers on followers, "sleeper cells," "cut-outs," and "mail drops."

Unfortunately, Mr. Weyl does not include a glossary to tell the lay reader what some of these esoteric terms mean, let alone how they were all applied.

American responsibility for what is happening in Cuba is a topic that excites both authors, albeit in different ways. Mr. Mills believes the only threat of counterrevolution comes from the United States. Political subversion and economic retaliation having failed, the only course that the US presumably entertains is that of military invasion. In this, it apparently has the support of Cuban counterrevolutionaries, characterized as ex-Batista men or one-time Castro supporters who will not sacrifice money and position for the revolution. In effect, then anyone who is "for" the revolution must *ipso facto* support everything Fidel Castro does. (Mr. Mills seems unaware that one of the most popular Cuban revolutionary leaders and Castro lieutenants, Major Hubert Matos, is imprisoned on the Isle of Pines for disputing Castro's love affair with the Communists.

Mr. Mills turns the Castro persecution mania about the United States into an excuse for major excesses. American truculence has thrown Cuba into Soviet arms. Cuban acceptance of Soviet rocket protection would be irrelevant if the United States were not actually planning to attack. The more American hostility, the less freedom of expression is possible in Cuba. Yankee influences in Cuba are against the revolution, the Communists are for it, and since the Soviets and Americans are engaged in an international cold war, anti-communism in Cuba equals counterrevolution.

Mr. Mills' logic is not only weird, it also conflicts with the portrait of a dynamic principled leader so carefully painted throughout the book. Just what *are* Dr. Castro's values? Does he have any ideas of his own? Most of his policies turn out to be responses to what the Americans have done or are about to do.

Mr. Weyl levels his attack at a more select group of Americans: "slack and imcompetent" journalists and "ultra-liberals" and "leftwingers" in the Latin American division of the State Department. The first group romanticized the Castro movement in the press and the second group sapped the morale of the Batista Army by refusing to sell them arms. The *New York Times* correspondent Herbert Matthews, whose articles brought Fidel Castro out of obscurity, turns out to be the "single American" most responsible for the "Cuban tragedy." On the other hand, the advice of former US ambassadors to Cuba, Arthur Gardner and Earl E. T. Smith, was bypassed in the State Department, and both men became targets of "smear campaigns" in the United States. The fact, of course, is that Mr. Weyl's political predilections again distort his judgment: were he not so quick to see virtue in any type of anti-communism—even tyrannical dictatorship—he would be more tolerant of the ambassadors' critics, whether they were Castro's early supporters or those who detested Batista's dictatorship more than they doubted Castro's aims.

The third point to which both authors address themselves — the lessons of the Cuban revolution for the rest of the Americas and for the United States in par-

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ticular—again receives the kind of doctrinaire treatment (on both sides) that we could expect. Speaking in third person (as the fictitious revolutionary), Mr. Mills exhorts Americans to "smash Yankee imperialism from inside the United States." When using the first person, he is less bloodthirsty, merely advising the United States to keep its hands off Cuba politically, and give cultural aid wherever possible—all on the assumption and in the hope that the island will drift toward a thoroughly independent and neutralist position in world affairs. Mr. Weyl, on the other hand, urges "unstinted" military aid to the Latin nations "threatened by Communist aggression." For the issue, he states, is not simply that of "democracy" *vs.* "dictatorship" in Latin America—that is frequently a "smokescreen" used by "philo-Communists." Too often democracy turns out to be "people's democracy," which is "considerably more savage, inhuman and totalitarian than the old-fashioned *caudillo* dictatorship . . . "

In many ways the conclusions of both authors cancel each other out. Both are so prejudiced that neither offers a sober guide to calm understanding or practical policy. Mr. Mills is too much a doctrinaire socialist to evaluate realistically the growth of Communist totalitarianism in Cuba; Mr. Weyl is too obsessed with the conspiratorial side of communism to appreciate the profound social forces which brought Dr. Castro to power.

All of which brings us back to the original question: Is Cuba Communist? From this reviewer's experiences in both Eastern Europe and Cuba, it would not seem as if Cuba fits neatly into the pattern of Soviet satellites. The government is certainly popularly based, although the situation is still fluid. The revolutionary sentiment that Mr. Mills describes is quite genuine, and resentment of the USA—whether justified in *toto,* in part, or not at all—is nevertheless a real factor in foreign policy.

On the other hand, the Castro regime has used its power steadily for two years to develop a totalitarian system on the Communist model. The name is not so important as the substance. Instead of bolstering an independent-minded nationalist movement, Castro has presided over the establishment of a network of mass organizations—trade unions, student federations, workers' and peasants' civilian militia—which neatly fit the Communist conception of social control.

For all his power and popularity with the masses, Dr. Castro has little interest in day-to-day political organization. His own "26th of July" movement is dying of atrophy. The Communist Party fills the breach admirably, not in numbers, but in key talent essential to the functioning of the system. The Communists may be achieving power through the backdoor, but the door is open, and those who would block it are being slowly and methodically removed.

New French Books on the USSR

Les Conventions collectives de travail en Union soviétique,
by Louis Greyfié de Bellecombe.
Mouton & Co., Paris and The Hague, 1958.

La Nouvelle économie soviétique,
by Robert Bordaz.
Grasset, Paris, 1960.

Le Pouvoir sôviétique, introduction à l' étude de ses institutions,
by Henri Chambre.
Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, Paris, 1959.

Reviewed by Bernard Cazes

OF THE THREE WORKS, which together offer new proof of the vigor of French sovietology, the first, by Greyfié de Bellecombe, is as much a result of scholarship in the traditional sense of the word as of personal study and observation. The author, who wrote the book after a year of research in Moscow, deals—in the words of René David, the French jurist and author of the preface to the volume—with the question of how "in the entirely new political and economic milieu created by the Bolshevik revolution and state planning, the concept of collective bargaining, like most other legal

Mr. Cazes, an economist working for the French Government, has contributed numerous studies on Soviet and East European economics to French journals.

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concepts, has been completely transformed and used for new purposes." It is, indeed, the great merit of the juridical work that it offers an extremely stimulating account of the history of social relations in the USSR.

Collective bargaining was virtually unknown in Russia before 1917. It came into its own only after the February (March) Revolution when the Provisional Government proclaimed freedom of trade union activity and employers became exposed to powerful inflationary pressures. The trade unions' freedom was further enhanced by the Bolsheviks who at first supported all union wage demands in order to break the economic power of the capitalist employers. It did not take long, however, for the Bolshevik rulers to become disturbed over the disastrous economic consequences of haphazard wage increases; in a sudden reversal of policy, they began criticizing early in 1918 all wage demands made without consideration of the financial resources of enterprises (by now largely state-controlled) as a Menshevik-inspired "trade unionist" deviation. At the First Trade Union Congress (January 1918), the Bolshevik majority adopted a resolution to this effect, and Soviet labor legislation promptly assumed an authoritarian character, which the changeover to War Communism merely accentuated. The decree of June 17, 1920, establishing the principle of state control over all wages, marked the virtual disappearance of collective bargaining in the Soviet Union.

With the advent of the New Economic Policy (1921-28), when the abolition of compulsory labor reestablished a labor market, the trade unions recovered temporarily a measure of bargaining freedom. But before long (particularly after 1925), as the contradictions between the gradually emerging system of total economic control and the traditional concepts of trade unionism intensified, their position began deteriorating once again. This was the result—in the opinion of this reviewer—not of a fundamental incompatibility between the growth of state planning and labor union freedom, but of the insistence of the Communist Party on assuming total and exclusive responsibility for governing, which required the elimination of every group openly or potentially hostile to the regime.[1] After the suppression of the Workers' Opposition in 1921, the trade unions remained the only organized force capable of competing with the party.

The final decline of free unionism in the USSR came during the First Five-Year Plan. After June 1929 the collective agreement was to "cease serving the immediate interests of the wage earners and become an instrument of rapid industrialization" (p. 87). Moreover, in becoming increasingly subject to state regulation, the unions began, in fact, duplicating it. With increasing persistency the local organizations would regard the campaigns for the proper implementation of collective agreements not as opportunities for spurring workers to greater zeal, but for pointing out breaches on the part of the management.

After 1934, even though never officially abolished, collective agreements were no longer drawn up or renewed. The practice, however, was revived again, without any obvious political or economic justification, and in an equally discreet manner, in February 1947. The Soviet leaders had apparently hoped that their self-serving concept of collective bargaining (and trade unionism) would meet with more success after the war. Actually, the employee obligations written into the collective agreements carried no explicit sanctions, except for what the author very aptly terms "that complex system of pressures and inducements of a political-social nature under which, in Soviet society, the distinction between the optional and the compulsory is sometimes blurred" (p. 131). On the other hand, the obligations of management with respect to the material and cultural living conditions of the workers were regularly disregarded (particularly in the matter of housing).

After the 20th Congress of the CPSU (February 1956) an effort was made to broaden the responsibilities of the labor unions. Commenting on the decree of January 31, 1957, which assigned the unions new duties in the settlement of labor disputes, M. Greyfié states:

> **This was the first time the [Soviet] legislator felt that he could entrust local trade union organizations with the responsibility of seeking a balance between individual interests and the general interests, without fearing any manifestations of particularist tendencies or traces of "shop mentality." (p. 142).**

The decree of July 15, 1958 enlarged the scope of union responsibility even further by authorizing the local (enterprise) organizations to participate in the formulation of enterprise plans. This innovation could change the role of collective bargaining in the USSR, particularly if individual enterprises are granted a measure of autonomy. Any step in the direction of decentralized planning (particularly with respect to wages) can only extend the importance of collective agreements.

IT IS INTERESTING to introduce, in this connection, the central conclusion of the second work under review. In the opinion of its author, Robert Bordaz, a former

[1] For a detailed elaboration of this interpretation see this reviewer's article "Les Syndicats soviétiques et la planification," *Critique* (Paris), July, 1960.

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Commercial Councillor of the French Embassy in Moscow, the USSR will have to employ much more subtle and decentralized methods of state planning in order to satisfy its consumer needs, which as a result of economic progress will become increasingly diversified.[2] What is more, however, Marxist doctrine can offer no solution for any of the problems which the Soviet Government will face; "whether it be a question of planning techniques, price formation, or methods of decentralization, neither Marx nor Lenin will have anything to offer" (p. 253).

In the first, historical part of this popular but penetrating study, M. Bordaz deals in turn with Soviet economic policy and external relations between 1953 and 1956, the grave crisis of 1956 (that compelled the Soviet Government to declare in April 1957 "a twenty-year moratorium on the servicing of state loans, which in fact is tantamount to bankruptcy"), the industrial reorganization of 1957, the agricultural and educational reforms, and the Seven-Year Plan. But the real value of the book lies in its second part, devoted to "Basic Economic Problems" (employment and productivity, value and prices, development models, aid to underdeveloped countries), for it is here that the non-specialist is intelligently introduced to the often complex debates that periodically take place in the Soviet Union.

It is true, unfortunately, that the discussion of the developmental models is rather brief, but this deficiency is well offset by the chapter on aid to underdeveloped countries, which examines with much subtlety the nature of Soviet methods in this field. Referring to the relatively limited scope of Soviet economic and technical aid, Bordaz concludes that "the political and economic prestige of the Communist world in the underdeveloped countries is out of all proportion to the actual sacrifices it makes" (p. 231). He then goes on to explain the effectiveness of Soviet aid by pointing to the close coordination and very simple nature (compared to Western aid) of Soviet economic operations in Asia and Africa. Moreover, Communist activities are carried out by means of clearings and at steady prices, which enables the recipient countries to plan several years ahead. In most of these respects, and in some others, the West is at a disadvantage; its most serious drawback is that it has not yet succeeded in effectively stabilizing the prices of raw materials (except on a bilateral basis with equalization funds in the franc and sterling areas), and that it often favors free enterprise institutions which in underdeveloped countries are usually less justified than elsewhere. M. Bordaz therefore recommends the creation of an institution capable of answering Soviet activity in kind (p. 236). He envisions an international agency with no military objectives and endowed with annual appropriations equivalent to the total amount of Soviet aid, or 500 million dollars. It would grant loans under the same conditions as the USSR, without making such aid contingent on the private nature of the beneficiary enterprises and provide for repayment in raw materials sold at steady prices.

IN HIS STUDY, *Le Pouvoir soviétique,* Henri Chambre —probably the most distinguished French specialist in Soviet affairs [3]—presents a compact but complete manual of Soviet institutions. If he begins with an analysis of the Communist Party, it is because the Soviet constitution is not normative in nature: "It describes a transitory state of affairs and is modified as the situation changes" (p. 3). Professor Chambre analyses the institutional mechanisms of the USSR with the detachment of an entomologist, pointing out at every turn discrepancies between official texts and actual practice, particularly with reference to the concepts of "democratic centralism" (p. 10), and the "sovereignty" of the Soviet federated republics (p. 44).

In his conclusion, however, Chambre advances a personal judgment on the nature of Soviet power, which in his opinion is characterized by the primacy of fact over law, a primacy that is evident in the theory of the state, the nature of the constitution, in jurisprudence and in other spheres of Soviet life. The exercise of power in the USSR is rooted in a totalitarian ideology that presumes to be capable of controlling the course of history. As a result of the Communist Party's "monopoly of political wisdom," "arbitrary action is a guiding principle" of the Soviet regime (p. 164), which in turn rules out the possibility that the Soviet system might gravitate towards the type of classic democracy developed in the West. If we desire to coexist peacefully with such a regime—and the danger of nuclear destruction alone dictates such a course—we had better judge it lucidly and realistically. Henri Chambre's little book is a most welcome contribution to this endeavor.

[2] *Cf.* the report prepared by a group of French economists, "Les méthodes soviétique actuelles de planification," *Cahiers* de l'Institut de Science Economique Appliquée, Paris, 1959.

[3] *Cf.* his book, *Le Marxisme en Union soviétique,* Le Seuil, Paris, 1955.

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The Fate of Soviet Nationalities

The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities,
by Robert Conquest.
Macmillan, London, and
St. Martin's Press, New York, 1960.

Soviet Policy towards the Baltic States, 1918-1940,
by Albert N. Tarulis.
Notre Dame University Press,
Notre Dame, Indiana, 1959.

Panturkism and Islam in Russia,
by Serge A. Zenkovsky.
Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1960.

The Union Republics in Soviet Diplomacy,
by Vernon V. Aspaturian.
Droz, Geneva; Minard, Paris; 1960.

The Russian Communist Party and the Sovietization of the Ukraine,
by Jurij Borys.
Stockholm, 1960.

L'Ukraine Soviétique dans les Relations Internationales, 1918-1923,
by Vasyl Markus.
Les Editions Internationales, Paris, 1959.

The Captive Nations, Nationalism of the Non-Russian Nations in the Soviet Union,
by Roman Smal Stocki.
Bookman Associates, New York, 1960.

Reviewed by Walter Kolarz

CONSIDERING THE LARGE volume of literature about the USSR, it is curious that the Soviet treatment of national minorities has received so little attention. Specialists on Soviet affairs have generally tended to concentrate their attention on matters of ideology and the functioning of the Soviet system as a whole rather than on localized aspects such as the treatment of the different ethnic groups within the USSR. Furthermore, the difficulties of traveling in the non-Russian areas of the Soviet Union have, of course, entirely ruled out on-the-spot observation and ethnographic field studies by any but Communist scholars.

In this light, the appearance of the books reviewed here is a highly welcome development. All of them deal with one aspect or another of the problems that have arisen from the complicated multi-national structure of the Soviet state and of the policies which the regime has pursued in dealing with them. Some of the books, especially Mr. Conquest's study, provide revealing glimpses of the reality behind the facade of Soviet propaganda slogans proclaiming the friendship of peoples, "proletarian internationalism," and the "monolithic unity of the Soviet Union."

Mr. Conquest has written the only full and scholarly analysis of what was undoubtedly the darkest chapter in the annals of Soviet nationality policy—the mass deportations of seven ethnic minority groups during the reign of Stalin. In order to produce this pioneering work, the author collected and analyzed all the available official and unofficial source materials and has done a masterly job in penetrating the curtain of official silence which enshrouded the deported groups from 1944 until their so-called "rehabilitation" in 1955. Moreover, his great literary gifts have enabled him to transform the dry, cold evidence gleaned from documents into a moving and highly readable narrative which yet retains its character as a work of serious scholarship. If a study of this sort can be said to have any heroes, they would unquestionably be the small mountain peoples of the Caucasus, in whose fight for survival, sufferings, and—in a sense—ultimate triumph the author shows particular interest.

A mere factual account of the deportations might have left the door open to their being mistaken by some as a temporary, almost incidental deviation from the

Mr. Kolarz, a noted authority on nationality problems in the USSR, is the author of Russia and her Colonies, The Peoples of the Soviet Far East *(Philip, London, and Praeger, New York, 1952 and 1954 respectively) and other works.*

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"correct" path of Leninist nationalities policy caused by the whim of one man—Stalin. It is fortunate, therefore, that Mr. Conquest goes beyond a simple narration of the facts to argue—in very convicing fashion—the thesis that Soviet acts of genocide did not result solely from the tyrannical, ruthless personality of Stalin, but were in fact related to some of the teachings of Marx, Engels and Lenin. This, of course, does not mean that Marx and Engels were as devoid of humanism as Stalin, or that their ideas about nationalism and the "historic rights" of ethnic groups were such as to lead inevitably to the kind of ruthless measures that Stalin was to take against the Chechens, the Ingush, and other national minorities. The fact remains, however, that both Marx and Engels looked upon the different nationalities from a utilitarian point of view—that is, from the standpoint of their role in the "historical process". As Mr. Conquest reminds us (p. 104), they regarded the Germans and Poles as "progressive," while the Czechs and southern Slavs, on the other hand, were considered "reactionary" and hence undeserving of sympathy. Thus, in regarding the Chechens, Ingush and Kalmucks as reactionary nations, Stalin took a view that was based on the utilitarian approach of the founders of "scientific socialism." Nor did Stalin's deportation of entire ethnic groups lack foundation in the teachings of Lenin, who had stated most emphatically that the interests of the socialist republic must take precedence over the right of any national minority to self-determination. Was not Stalin simply abiding by this Leninist principle when he violated the rights of individual ethnic groups in the greater interests of socialism *as he saw them?*

In Mr. Conquest's view, the deportation of nationalities in the USSR cannot yet be considered an altogether closed chapter. He points out in the first place that the steps taken by the post-Stalin leadership to "rehabilitate" and resettle the deported nationalities have been highly "selective", and that the Crimean Tartars and Volga Germans—representing 43 percent of the deportees—still remain in exile (p. 170). Even more important is the possibility that the same thing could happen again. If at any future time the aspirations of an ethnic group in the USSR were to come into conflict with the goals and ambitions of the Soviet leadership, it is not at all inconceivable that the leadership would feel itself impelled to resort once again to the weapon of genocide. And Mr. Conquest warns that the impulsion would be especially great if the ethnic group concerned happened to live in a strategic area (p. 193).

Dr. Albert N. Tarulis' study, while addressing itself to a different set of nationality problems—the Soviet absorption of the Baltic nations in 1940—nevertheless bears on the same fundamental issue: namely, Communist contempt for the right of national self-determination. Moreover, because the Soviet seizure of the Baltic states had antecedents dating back to Lenin's time, Dr. Tarulis is able to show concretely the close kinship between Leninist and Stalinist attitudes on the nationalities question.

The conquest of the small countries on the eastern shore of the Baltic was a major Soviet objective from the very birth of the Bolshevik regime. Under Lenin, their subjugation was advocated in the name of world revolution, and the actual attempt to achieve it aborted because the Bolsheviks lacked sufficient military forces and employed a brand of political warfare that was too clumsy and too brutally honest to succeed. On the other hand, when Stalin successfully carried out the second Soviet assault on the independence of the Baltic states after twenty years of "peaceful coexistence," he did so in the name of Soviet national security, and his more effective methods reflected the lessons of Lenin's earlier failure to transform the Baltic into a Soviet lake.

As Dr. Tarulis points out, the 200,000 Soviet troops that overran the Baltic states in mid-June of 1940 were sent not for the avowed purpose of installing Communist dictatorship, but allegedly "to ensure the honest execution" of the mutual assistance pacts which Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia had been pressured into concluding with the USSR. The three countries were given to understand that the Soviet Union had no desire to absorb them and merely aimed at the establishment of a common foreign policy (p. 219)—in short, that they would have something like satellite status but would retain complete internal independence. Thus, at first, the Soviet authorities, despite having full military control, were extremely careful not even to broach the possibility of the incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union as full-fledged constituent republic. To do so, they feared, might lead to acts of revolt which would prejudice their plan to create a legend of the "voluntary union" of the Baltic states with the USSR.

The key to the Soviet plan was the holding of new parliamentary elections. In the propaganda campaign preceding the elections, the Soviet authorities carefully saw to it that no mention was made of the issue of union. Once the elections had been held, however, the Communist press promptly transformed them *ex post facto* into a "plebiscite" and claimed that every vote cast for the Soviet-style single list of candidates was a vote for union with the USSR. The only maneuver that still was needed to formalize the "voluntary union" was a unanimous vote by the newly-elected "People's Diets"

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of the three countries. Dr. Tarulis relates in some detail how it was done in Lithuania. The Lithuanian People's Diet passed the resolution surrendering the country's independence by a simple show of hands, while as many as fifty Soviet tanks stood on guard outside the Diet building and many Red Army soldiers and plainclothes police surveilled the proceedings inside (p. 240).

OF THE BOOKS under review, Mr. Zenkovsky's scholarly study centered on the Turkic and other Moslem peoples absorbed by the Tsarist empire might appear to have the least to offer those specifically interested in Soviet nationality policy, especially its more contemporary phases. But despite the fact that the author deals primarily with the pre-Soviet period, bringing his study to a close with the year 1920, it is a mistake to assume that the book has slight relevance to the Soviet handling of national minorities. For it was actually in the first few years of Communist rule that the foundations and future course of Soviet nationality policy with respect to the various Moslem peoples of the USSR were laid. Mr. Zenkovsky does cover the decisive developments of this period, and his study not only relates how the Bolshevik regime crushed the national emancipation movements among the Moslem nationalities, but also sheds light on certain factors which contributed to Communist success.

The author's account of the suppression of the independent democratic republic of Azerbaijan in 1920 reveals a curiously striking parallel with the final act in the Soviet destruction of the Baltic nations' independence twenty years later, as described in Dr. Tarulis' book. Summoned for a final session on April 27, 1920, the Azerbaijan parliament found itself surrounded by Soviet troops and had no choice but to vote for the dissolution of the national government and the transfer of power to the Communists (p. 266).

Mr. Zenkovsky's analysis of the factors which aided the Communists in thwarting the national aspirations of the Moslem peoples after the collapse of Tsarism lends his book a special topical interest in connection with the emergence of a steadily growing number of newly-emancipated but internally heterogeneous states in Africa. The author shows that disunity within the Moslem groups themselves played as big a part in the defeat of their aspirations for independence as did the Communists' display of force. The differences between Tartars and Bashkirs in the Volga-Urals region, the enmity between the "obscurantist Ittihad party and the more left-wing Musavat in Azerbaijan, and similar conflicts in Turkestan between the Bokharan conservative Young Bokhara Party and the Jadids, or Innovators, on the other—all these inner-Moslem tensions contributed to the ultimate victory of Soviet power over Moslem nationalism.

But for the disunity of the Moslems, the Communists undoubtedly would have had a more protracted struggle on their hands and, in some cases, might even have been defeated altogether. In Turkestan, for instance, the Soviet regime was able to consolidate its hold only because the Jadids tragically misunderstood the nature of the 1917 revolution and of communism, and thought the Communists could be used to further their own anti-colonialist, national-revolutionary aims—a mistake which was to be repeated by many another nationalist movement in Asia and, more recently, in Latin America and Africa.

In what later became Soviet Central Asia, communism was an alien European movement. According to Mr. Zenkovsky, there were in June 1918 only about 50 Moslem Communists in the whole city of Tashkent, with half a million inhabitants (p. 240). Under such circumstances, the Communists' only hope lay in a coalition with the left-wing nationalists. The Jadids accepted and were taken into the party, hoping to transform it into an instrument of Turkic nationalism. Instead, as the author puts it, Moscow "tamed" them (p. 250). This was accomplished through the establishment of a Turkestan Commission composed entirely of non-Moslems appointed by the Soviet government and the Russian Communist Party. Ya. Peters, an official of the Cheka, played a prominent role on the commission, and his familiarity with conspiratorial methods was largely instrumental in "unmasking" the Jadids' nationalist aspirations (p. 248). The Communists then turned against their allies. Zenkovsky is rather vague about the extent of the purge to which the Jadids and the Young Bokhara movement fell victim, but a clue is provided in Communist statistics showing that in the Emirate of Bokhara, where the Young Bokhara movement had entered into a similar merger with the Communists, almost 90 percent of the party membership was not "re-registered." Even so, the Turkic national revolutionaries, continuing to pose as Communists, kept up their struggle inside the party until they were finally crushed in the Great Purge of 1937.

The immediate issue in the fight between Moscow and the Turkic nationalists was whether ruling power in Soviet Central Asia should be wielded by a subordinate Turkestan branch of the Russian Communist Party, as desired by Moscow, or by a separate Turkic Communist Party. As Mr. Zenkovsky relates, a similar issue arose in European Russia where the Bolsheviks, shortly before the October Revolution (June 1917), yielded to demands from the Tartar Moslem minority and author-

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ized the formation of an "All-Russian Party of Moslem Communists" (p. 185). After taking power, however, the Bolshevik regime in November 1918 withdrew this concession and demoted the separate Moslem organization to a mere "Central Bureau of Moslem Organizations of the RCP (B)", watered down a few months later to "Central Bureau of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East" (p. 290).

THE INFANT SOVIET REGIME faced a much more crucial "national communist" problem in the Ukraine. The fight of the Ukrainian Communists, especially the Borotbists, for national autonomy *vis-à-vis* Moscow—frequently mentioned in recent years as a precedent for contemporary Yugoslav national communism—was previously examined in Ivan Majstrenko's *Borotbism, a Chapter in the History of Ukrainian Communism* (Research Program on the USSR, New York, 1954). It is now dealt with again in Mr. Borys' study, which is a valuable compilation of source materials on the Ukrainian problem at the beginning of the Soviet era.

The evidence offered by Mr. Borys makes it clear that the Borotbists pursued the same tactical objective as did the Jadids in Turkestan, namely to influence the Communist Party from within and eventually to take over the leadership of an autonomous Ukrainian Communist organization (p. 261). However, the Borotbists' merger with the Bolshevik party was advantageous only to the latter, which thus acquired a considerable number of badly needed Ukrainian-speaking functionaries. As the Bolsheviks tightened their grip on the Ukraine, a purge of the Borotbists began, and the vast majority of them were expelled for "nationalist survivals" (p. 260).

Mr. Aspaturian's study deals with a particular aspect of the nationalities problem in the USSR—namely, the extent to which the national interests of the various union republics effectively influence Soviet external policies. The author convincingly refutes the widespread tendency to equate Soviet Communist policies, *a priori*, with purely Russian national interests, by showing that Moscow has repeatedly championed the interests of the Ukrainians, Belorussians, Armenians, Georgians and other nationalities in its attempts to extend the territorial limits of the USSR. He also cites, as his main supporting evidence, the Soviet constitutional amendments of February 1, 1944, which envisaged the establishment by the sixteen then existing union republics of their own foreign affairs and defense ministries. The author, not without reason, regards these "skeletal institutions" as opening up interesting perspectives. He speculates that they could be rapidly expanded not only at the whim of Moscow, but also if, at any future stage, a crisis should occur in relations between the central government and the major non-Russian nationalities. However, an expansion of the diplomatic autonomy of the union republics might have results not at all favorable to Moscow, contrary to what Mr. Aspaturian seems to think (p. 213). It is altogether conceivable that at least some of the non-Russian union republics might then develop still greater aspirations—aspirations to real independence, real foreign ministries, and genuinely independent diplomatic relations with foreign countries.

At the present time, the foreign offices of the union republics are a mere farce, and the defense ministries do not exist even in name. Only the foreign ministries of the Ukrainian and Belorussian republics have any real organization: each has three departments, in charge of political affairs, protocol and consular matters, and the press (p. 169). These departments are not overburdened with work, although Asparaturian believes that the protocol and consular departments may have jurisdiction over "special representatives" abroad, *i.e.*, Ukrainian and Belorussian officials attached to Soviet embassies. Such "special representatives" used to exist in the early years of Soviet rule as a concession to local nationalism, and the practice has possibly been revived in the post-Stalin period. In the 1920's, the Ukrainian Communists attached considerable importance to the institution, but Moscow viewed it with great misgivings, and it was soon discontinued.

The "special representatives" are also mentioned by Vasyl Markus in his able and systematic study of the "withering away" of the legal and diplomatic sovereignty of the Ukraine in the 1920's. By 1930, he says, all Ukrainian "special representatives" had disappeared from the Soviet diplomatic service, most of them having been purged for various deviations—Trotskyism, "bourgeois nationalism", and "Shumskyism" (p. 248).

Unlike the other books included in this survey, the small volume by the Ukrainian writer-in-exile Roman Smal Stocki does not pretend to be a dispassionate and detailed study of some aspect of the Soviet nationalities problem. Instead, he sets out to describe and denounce, in the space of less than 80 pages, all the oppressive aspects of the Soviet handling of national minorities in general. His book is an outcry of indignation written in a fighting spirit. Because of this, the author's formulations unfortunately express an anti-Russian bias which at times tends to obscure his staunch opposition to communism. Even with these shortcomings, however, the book does not deserve to be dismissed lightly, for it voices genuine, deeply-felt grievances and frustrations the existence of which among the "captive" nationalities under Soviet rule is perhaps too often forgotten.

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Remembrance of Things Past

BY FAR THE MOST interesting drama staged in Leningrad in the last two years is Aleksander Volodin's *Piat Vecherov* (Five Evenings). Volodin is also the author of the currently popular play *The Factory Girl,* but by comparison the latter is conventional Soviet theatrical fare. *Piat Vecherov* is being presented at the Gorky Theater by an excellent troupe of actors under the talented direction of G. A. Tovstonogov, the most daring of Leningrad's theatrical directors. The perfect smoothness of the production is an illustration, if any is needed, of the advantages of repertory theater: the present writer saw the troupe do half a dozen plays, and no matter how indifferent the content of the particular work, the performances maintained such a high level of excellence as to leave the theater-goer deeply impressed.

The content of *Piat Vecherov,* however, is by no means indifferent. It raises a number of touchy questions about Soviet life with an outspokenness which is rare for the Soviet theater. Yet the most interesting thing about it is what it deliberately leaves unsaid: *Piat Vecherov* is a play with a secret.

The action, set in Leningrad in the recent past, covers the space of five evenings, whence the play's name. It is the story of Ilin, a man in middle years, who has been away from Leningrad since the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. He returns to his native city in dread that the girl he left behind and still loves will be embittered and unresponsive to his feelings. A scene dramatizing his surprise visit to the woman, whom he had not written since the end of the war, establishes her character. Tamara, we realize, has not ceased to love Ilin. She has never married, and has sought to numb the pain of middle-aged loneliness by devoting herself to her work as a foreman at a Leningrad factory and to party activities: she is, as she tells Ilin, the shop "agitator for all questions." That Tamara possesses the defensive pride of the very lonely and the very vulnerable becomes apparent as she describes her devotion to her work in a manner suggesting it is the fulfillment of all her desires. Ilin in turn pretends that life has not been bad to him: he has reached the position, he tells Tamara, of Chief Engineer at one of the largest chemical complexes in the Soviet Union.

Both soon discover, however, that they still love and need each other; they spend a few happy days together, and all seems to be going well—until Ilin suddenly announces that his work bores him and that he wants Tamara to go off with him somewhere to the North, where he intends to take a job as a truck driver. Tamara, beyond the age of romantic enthusiasm, does not immediately agree to Ilin's proposal. She cannot understand why a man should deliberately choose to work at something less than he is fitted for. Their conversation ends with that; and then, as abruptly as he had reappeared in Tamara's life, Ilin vanishes. Tamara's frantic search for him leads her to a friend of Ilin's from whom she finds out the truth: Ilin is not an engineer at all, he never graduated from the institute, and he actually *has* been working since the end of the war as a truck driver in the far north. In a later scene with his friend Ilin explains that he lied to Tamara because she had always considered him a man of uncommon ability—"some kind of Mendeleev"—and he couldn't bear to disenchant her. He felt that Tamara's refusal to accompany him to the north meant she could not regard him as worthy. The plays ends happily, however. Ilin realizes that he has surrendered to false pride and returns to Tamara. Just before the final curtain Ilin, in the manner of the hero who has achieved self-awareness, declares:

I consider myself a useful member of society, and, by the way, more useful than all of you taken together. Just you try to drive a Studebaker in the *taiga.* You behind the wheel, and against you—all the elements. . . . So, friends, just keep it in mind; for the sake of your satisfaction I'm not going to pretend to be any better than I am in reality. A man must always be himself. . . . . .

THIS, IN BARE OUTLINE is the plot of *Piat Vecherov.* It is not, to say the least, very scintillating, and if this were all there were to the play we could dismiss it as simply another hollow effort by a Soviet playwright to celebrate the dignity of the simple working man. But there is more to the story.

First of all, there are certain features of Ilin's character which simply do not jibe with his behavior as described above and which render his actions and motives implausible in the extreme. Ilin is a character of large dramatic stature. One feels this not only from the way he is played, but

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from the lines he is given. He is, for example, the conscience of Tamara's young nephew, Slava, full of good advice to him on how to conduct himself with tenderness in a youthful love affair and towards his unhappy aunt. He is, furthermore, a man of obvious intellect whose talents, we are given to understand, have always been recognized by those around him ("you don't know what a man I was before and what wonderful things people predicted for me") and whose insight into the other characters of the play elevates him above them. There is a scene in which he encourages Slava to be a more serious student at the engineering institute that Ilin himself formerly attended:

Chemistry, my boy, is the most abstract, the most logical and at the same time the most practical of the sciences. But for a man who is indifferent—chemistry is ruin. You have to love the odor of ammonia, of hydrogen sulphide, the devil take it! A real chemist appears in the laboratory in his best suit. In his hands alkalis don't splash, acids don't burn through material. . . .

It is with lines like these that Ilin expresses what lyricism there is in the drama.

What is troublesome is that as the characterization of Ilin unfolds, one finds it difficult to understand how such a man could be subject to the petty vanity that compelled him to lie to Tamara. If it had fallen to the lot of a man like Ilin to have been a truck driver, one feels that it could not have happened without his complicity or choice, and that consequently he would in no way regard himself as diminished by it. The dramatic characterization of Ilin fails as a result of this essential implausibility, and one wonders how Volodin, who is an accomplished dramatist and very highly regarded by independent-minded Russian writers, could have allowed himself so elementary a blunder in the portrayal of his main protagonist.

ONE ALSO wants to know *why* a man of such abilities as Ilin's failed to fulfill his promise in life. The play attempts to give an explanation, but it is not very satisfactory. Ilin describes himself as what the Russians call a *neudachnik*—that is, a man whose life, through personal failure or other circumstances, is characterized by ill-fortune. A recurrent motif in the play is Ilin's sad reverie about the unfulfilled promise of his youth: this is the lyrical theme of the play and the key of Ilin's character. At one point Ilin complains to Tamara, who tells him that he is not yet old and that everything in life is still before him: "Everything is before me. When I was 17 years old everything was before me, and now everything is before me." He repeats this lament in several other scenes in the play, and in one scene with Timofeev he says:

I remember I was wounded—I'm being jolted in the battalion ambulance and I press myself up against the side. A shell fragment got me in the lung. I feel: bend over just a bit and blood will come pouring through your throat. Well, I think, you haven't long to live; it's the grave for you. And there was only one thought on my mind: if I were only to be permitted to live one more year. An enormous year. A million endless minutes. What I wouldn't manage to do in that year! I'd work somewhere in a laboratory 16, 20 hours a day. The devil knows, maybe I'd be able to accomplish something worthwhile.

The only answer as to why Ilin did not become the chemist he so passionately wished to be is provided by his friend Timofeev, in describing to Tamara Ilin's life since the war. According to Timofeev, Ilin simply did not possess the will and stamina to complete his education and make something of himself: ". . . he remembered that he had certain inclinations for sport, won some kind of medal, left several teeth in the ring, then lost his enthusiasm. Then he volunteered for somewhere in the North." This explanation, of course, is utterly unconvincing in the light of Ilin's character as otherwise portrayed. Moreover, if this were the simple solution to the riddle of Ilin's character, *Piat Vecherov* itself would be no more than a Chekhovian drama—and a very weak one at that—of a man betrayed in life by his own personal failures. As such, it would lack dramatic weight or point. Yet the paradox is that poignancy is *precisely* what it does possess for Soviet audiences: *Piat Vecherov* is the one Soviet play that I was urged to see from the very beginning of my stay in Leningrad.

MY CURIOSITY AROUSED, I questioned my friends and acquaintances as to what made this play so special. The reply was always the same: "You see it first and then we'll talk about it." As it turned out, however, the play's "secret" was revealed to me before I saw it. One evening a friend who knew I was about to see the play simply told me that Ilin represents one of the untold numbers of Soviet citizens who were unjustly exiled after the war and rehabilitated after Stalin's death; he did not "volunteer for somewhere in the North"—he was a forced laborer.

This is no secret to Russian audiences, but if I had not been told I am not sure that I would have penetrated Ilin's disguise solely with the aid of the hints contained in the play itself. However, once the mystery of Ilin's past is disclosed a number of questions become clarified. Ilin's laments about the unfulfilled promise of his youth are not the recriminations of a latter-day Chekhovian *neudachnik:* they acquire their special force and pathos because they are the words of a man whose life has been broken not by himself, but by those above him. It does not take much to surmise what the original text of the play must have been like—that is, before it was modified to suit the censor. Nor does it require much imagination to guess why after the war Ilin stopped writing to Tamara, who is portrayed as an officious party activist and only

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halfway through the play becomes human, and why he did not wish to tell her where he worked. It is to the unwritten and unacted text of *Piat Vecherov* that Soviet audiences respond, and only this explains why they continue to see it and be moved by it.

Yet one question still remains: how did the Soviet audiences come to know about Ilin's disguised past? I don't think that they could learn it, as I did, from literary gossip. The "secret" was too well known, even among those who could not possibly be privy to this kind of gossip. The answer is that the play itself contains a number of hints, most of them broad enough to be understood by people already accustomed to "reading between the lines." For example, Ilin tells one character that he stopped writing to Tamara because he "didn't satisfy higher ideals"—something he repeats to Slava in different words: "We wrote to one another all through the war. Then, because of certain circumstances, I stopped writing." Then there is a conversation between Ilin and Slava, in which he tells the latter that he had been expelled from the institute for "frankness." These words are vague enough to communicate intended messages. But above all—it was explained to me—it is a little song sung by Ilin to Tamara near the start of the play, which Russians associate with exile, and which gives the secret away:

Darling one of mine	**Darling one of mine,**
Take me with you;	**I would take you with me,**
There, in that distant land	**There, in that distant land**
You will call me your wife.	**My wife is waiting for me.**

It is hardly necessary at this point to observe that *Five Evenings* provides a neat illustration of how censorship, or the inability of Soviet authors to say certain things, unwittingly produces mischievous esthetic results. The one glaring fault in an otherwise well-constructed and well-acted play is the inconsistency in the characterization of Ilin and the consequent implausibility of his actions. The *Piat Vecherov* that has been emasculated by censorship and is now being presented at the Gorky Theater is dramatically ineffectual, confused and with little—if any—substance; the *Piat Vecherov* that has its immaterial existence somewhere beyond the reach of the censor—somewhere in the bitter remembrances of the recent past—continues to draw Soviet audiences, to enthrall and excite them.

Burton Rubin

(Mr. Rubin, who teaches Russian at Amherst College, Amherst, Mass., spent the academic year 1959-60 as an exchange student at Leningrad University. His field is Soviet literature.)

Correspondence

EDITOR'S NOTE: Readers are welcome to send communications dealing with matters discussed in *Problems of Communism.* Comments should be addressed to the Editors, *Problems of Communism,* U.S. Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Washington 25, D. C.

AN AUTHOR'S PROTEST

TO THE EDITORS: Belatedly, and on behalf of the four authors of *Protracted Conflict,* I would like to comment on the review of our book which Professor Alfred Meyer wrote for the July-August 1960 issue of your publication. The general tenor of the review was one of undisguised hostility. The reviewer not only criticized severely the substance of our study in highly emotional tones, but he also attributed to it views which are not contained in it.

Our book is a study of Communist strategy. It contains an analysis of the operational code which, so far as we can judge, the Communist leadership has followed since first coming to power in Russia in 1917. It has long been our conviction that the intricacies of Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist-Khrushchevist-Maoist dogmatic theology have received a sufficient amount of attention from American scholars, not excluding Professor Meyer himself. Indeed, our own group (*i.e.,* the Foreign Policy Research Institute at the University of Pennsylvania) has produced several studies on that subject. But we felt that communism as a method of carrying on international conflict had been generally ignored in scholarly literature, except by a few pioneers in the field such as Nathan Leites, Stefan T. Possony and Philip Selznick. We chose, therefore, to focus upon communism as a strategic method rather than as a doctrinal ideology. For this, apparently, we incurred the wrath of Professor Meyer.

Since our book purports to be an examination of Communist strategy, it is somewhat regrettable that you did not ask a strategic analyst to review it . . . A strategist, most likely, would not have been as arch-sensitive as a

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student of Soviet ideology to our effort to explain Soviet behavior without constant exegetical reference to the sacred Communist texts. We would be the first to admit that a great deal has been learned about Communist ideology. At the same time, we think that there may be some value to be derived from an observation of the way Communist leaderships have *actually* behaved in history, irrespective of how they solemnly declare they *ought to behave.*

It is not at all true, as your reviewer charged, that the authors of *Protracted Conflict* "redefine communism so as to strip it of all ideological meaning" and convert it into "an operational code having nothing to do with Marx or Lenin, but only with 'conflict management'." This statement is not only false; it is senseless. Certainly, Lenin was one of the greatest conflict managers of them all, and his guiding spirit is still a factor in the direction of the international Communist movement. Conflict management, at least since Lenin's time, has been embedded in the Communist ideology and in the Communist organizational system. Indeed, it is the permeation of communism with Leninist modes of thought which makes us just slightly suspicious of the policy shifts, reversals, schisms, rifts and "internal transformations" of the Communist system which some dissectors of ideology have professed to discern in recent decades. Frankly, we are moderately skeptical of the squabbles among the "Titoists," "Stalinists," "Khrushchevists," "Gomulkaists," and "Maoists." If, in using the term "Communists" somewhat loosely to apply to practically all Communists indiscriminately, we scandalize Professor Meyer (as we seem to have done), *nous regrettons.* But as scholars who have been engaged for several years in an analysis of international strategic affairs, we have committed ourselves to the conclusion that the operations of the Communist leaders in *all* the Communist bloc states are internationally coordinated for the pursuit of absolute power and the eventual triumph of the Communist cause. (*Cf.* the December 1960 communique from Moscow.) Professor Meyer, apparently infatuated with the concept of pluralism within the Communist sphere, cavils at our "naive interpretation." He accuses Professor Morgenstern, too, of sharing with me and my associates the "simplistic notion" that communism is "essentially a conspiracy to rule the world." . . .

In his review, Professor Meyer shows himself incapable of appreciating the subtle distinctions over which we labored for nearly three years in writing *Protracted Conflict.* He does not seem able, for example, to grasp the difference between causing or originating tensions on the one hand and exploiting or aggravating already existing tensions on the other. Here is what we wrote:

By thus playing up divergences of opinion within the West, the Soviets seek to rend the moral solidarity of the Western alliance. . . . Stalin, in his political testament, reminded Communists everywhere that there were still abundant opportunities for producing divisions within the capitalist West. . . . Indeed, since World War II, the Communist have missed few opportunities to promote conflicts in order to heighten inter-Allied tensions. They have spurred on the forces of the "systemic revolution" wherever they operate against the West. Although every revolutionary conflict contains inherently the seeds of Western discord, the Allies have not been able to agree upon a common approach to the problems of the systemic revolution. The United States, time and again, has been pushed by Communist strategy into the uncomfortable position of "arbiter" between the aspirations of emergent nations, and the strategic, political and commercial interests of the colonial and ex-colonial powers of Western Europe. (pp. 98-100) . . .

We also wrote that "the Russian Communists did not create this 'revolutionary situation' in Asia and Africa; that situation had been taking shape for a long time. The Communists, however, were quick to exploit it and 'to push what was falling'." (p. 11)

To our minds, such passages as these represent a reasoned, measured estimate of the international scene during the last decade. But now listen to Professor Meyer's summation of our views: "They [the Communists] are blamed for all the dissent and dissatisfaction rife within the Western camp; for all the dilemmas and contradictions of US foreign policy . . . and for the anti-Western sentiments of underdeveloped nations in Asia and Africa." This is typical of the manner in which the reviewer distorted our meaning in paragraph after paragraph.

Nowhere was Professor Meyer more unfair that in his interpretation of our views regarding the underdeveloped areas. We acknowledged the importance of these areas in the struggle between the two systems (p. 82). But, as we pointed out, "the Communists seek to persuade the West that they constitute the one and only arena of conflict," while the Achilles' heel of the Communist domain—Eastern Europe—is supposed to remain "out of bounds" for waging protracted conflict. It is categorically untrue that (in the reviewer's words) "the authors insist that it would be folly to meet the Communists on this battleground," or that "Asia and Africa do not count," or that the authors "would like the Western powers to abandon Asia and Africa." These statements are simply incredible.

We are convinced that the "current phase of the protracted conflict will not be settled by the battle for the uncommitted areas, however vital the outcome of this battle may subsequently become." There is no question that we must try to hold the underdeveloped areas within the free world, for which purpose we need vigorous political, psychological, economic and military programs. But we should not delude ourselves into believing that those regions, where we can do no more than conduct a holding operation, must constitute the exclusive arena for our strategic encounter with communism. We can lose the protracted conflict in the underdeveloped areas; but we cannot decisively win it there if we apply no pressure elsewhere. We shall require initiatives directed against the Communist system itself, especially in Eastern Europe. That is all we were trying to say.

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According to Professor Meyer, we portray communism as "the satanic power of the 20th century, a conspiracy guided by diabolic intelligence . . ." (The words are his, not ours.) "Yet," he hastens to add, "the strategic devices it employs turn out to be no more than common-sense-strategy. . . . In fact, most of the devices attributed to communism are practiced by every sensible politician and general." These juxtaposed remarks were, I take it, calculated to crush us once and for all. But had the reviewer read the book carefully, he would have come across this passage in Chapter 3: "Not a single operational principle of Communist strategy, looked at separately from the others, would deserve to be ranked as anything more than a common-sense proposition. One need not ascribe diabolical cunning to men who, in a contest for power, adapt their policies to the simple dictates of common sense." (p. 40)

Since both we and Professor Meyer seem agreed on at least this one point—*viz.,* that the book is simply brimming with common sense—we are quite at a loss to know why he adopted such a shrill tone of unrelenting animosity. The review abounds with such terms as "fanciful," "fantastic," "misleading," "arbitrary," "dangerous," "morbid fascination," "political hysteria" and so on. There is not a single friendly adjective in the whole piece. Nor is there a strain of reasoned argumentation—nothing but innuendo, out-of-context quotation, and a rather unsophisticated brand of literary ridicule. This is not the language of calm, academic discourse, but rather the polemic of someone who seems under a peculiar compulsion to lash out against a work which *a priori* he does not like but which he cannot dissect intellectually either because it is too subtle for him, or too comprehensive, or just too filled with common sense.

My associates and I welcome honest criticism. I believe that a publication such as yours has a responsibility to provide its readership with incisive criticism of a work that falls particularly within that subject-area which *Problems of Communism* is dedicated to enlighten. Professor Meyer did not address himself seriously to the major, distinctive concepts in our study. While undertaking a book about strategy, he assiduously avoided discussing virtually every main strategic idea.

It is beside the point, I suppose, to mention that Dean Acheson called *Protracted Conflict* "excellent . . . wise . . . and sobering;" or that Bertram Wolfe referred to it as "the best that has been written, indeed the first completely adequate book, on the nature of the war which the Communist Empire is waging;" or that C. L. Sulzberger termed it "remarkable . . . penetrating . . . brilliant . . . profound;" or that many other academics, government officials and publicists, including Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Dr. Paul Linebarger, Senator Stuart Symington, Governor Nelson Rockefeller, Admiral Arthur Radford, and Henry Hazlitt, have endorsed the book in the warmest terms. There is hardly any need to appeal to the authority of experienced leaders and analysts when simple logic will suffice to expose a superficial job.

ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPÉ
Foreign Policy Research Institute,
University of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia, Pa.

MR. MEYER REPLIES: While I share the conviction of Professor Strausz-Hupé and his associates that the position of the US in world affairs has deteriorated since World War II, I disagree with them over the cause of this shift in power and influence. By implication, they attribute it to the skill of the Communists (and to the US' lack of skill) in "conflict management." I would attribute it to what the authors call the "systemic revolution." While they believe that the world revolution of our time is inevitably promoted and/or exploited by the Communists, I should maintain, at the risk of excessive abstraction, that it would go on and present us with grave problems, even if there were no such phenomenon as communism.

To give an example, let us take the passage from pp. 98-100 quoted in Professor Strausz-Hupé's letter. After pointing out that the Communists have missed few opportunities to promote conflicts, and that they have spurred on the forces of the systemic revolution, he and his collaborators write: "Although every revolutionary conflict contains inherently the seeds of Western discord, the Allies have not been able to agree . . . ," *etc.* The inherent assumption seems to be that, just as the Communists can manage the world conflict in Machiavellian fashion, so by simple determination their opponents might be able to do the same, inasmuch as in the final analysis there is only one major difficulty we encounter everywhere —namely, communism. Yet in fact the problems faced by the democratic powers are far more complicated; and if the word "Because" would be substituted for the first word in the above-quoted sentence, the relationship between communism and the "systemic revolution" would be rendered more properly and more accurately.

While this is obviously not the place to discuss the methodology of social science and its connection with political, social and psychological conditions, I am convinced that—due to what I consider their methodological inadequacy—the authors' diagnosis of Western difficulties and problems is false. I am strengthened in this belief by disagreement with them on numerous details of argument and findings. For instance, describing Communist practice in terms of timeless Machiavellian principles contributes nothing to an understanding of world affairs because in actual fact communism has used varieties of strategic devices which must be described in much more detail, and within the context of changing situations, changing goals, and changing ideological principles. My point thus is not that the authors of *Protracted Conflict* have neglected Communist theory, but that their book is

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not a very helpful description of actual Communist behavior.

At the same time, it is curious that even though Professor Strausz-Hupé and his collaborators profess to study Communist behavior rather than doctrine, they refer to the latter whenever it buttresses their views. Thus, while Titoism, Maoism, and other divergent currents of thought are dismissed as public relations devices to deceive the West, the December 1960 communique from Moscow is quoted in Professor Strausz-Hupé's letter as an indication that the Communist bloc is internally coordinated for the pursuit of absolute power. With this kind of evidence, the conspiratorial theory can always be proven. But the fact is that the Moscow declaration conceals as much disagreement and, if you wish pluralism, as the platforms of many a Western political party.

My statement about the authors' disregard of underdeveloped areas may have been exaggerated. Certainly they did not say literally that Asia and Africa "do not count." Yet they warn insistently and repeatedly against being trapped in this area of conflict, and on page 132 they virtually concede these countries to the Communist bloc. In view of this, there is little doubt in my mind that I have faithfully rendered the meaning of their book.

If the tone of my review has been sharp, it is only an echo of the shrillness with which Professor Stausz-Hupé and his associates have presented their views. Furthermore, it reflects my alarm over the policy implications of what I consider their false diagnosis.

TO THE EDITORS: I was quite surprised to note the tone and content of the two recent reactions to Alfred G. Meyer's review of *Protracted Conflict* (November-December, 1960). Apparently Messrs. Niemeyer and Bouscaren are distressed that the American scholarly community may entertain more than one interpretation of Soviet foreign policy. Personally, I find this a rather happy development especially inasmuch as the Strausz-Hupé interpretation seems to be the more dominant one these days.

Certainly it is difficult to argue with the authors of *Protracted Conflict* when they urge the US to engage the USSR in political warfare, and to realize that it is a multidimensional struggle. But they seem to take so apocalyptic a view of this conflict that they can foresee no result other than a struggle to the death with this monolithic super-power. Perhaps a more useful approach would be to recognize the struggle and then attempt to engage in it so that the democratic powers can move toward a win-win outcome rather than a sudden-death outcome. It seems to me that Professor Meyer is quite right in terming the Strausz-Hupé interpretation "naive and simplistic." Not only is there some possibility of change in Soviet goals and strategies, but it would be irresponsible to neglect any opportunity to hasten those modifications. Moreover, a declaration of permanent hostility seems to be one of the least promising avenues.

Let me urge an attitude of sophisticated uncertainty toward the Kremlin, and an attempt to develop such policies as can cope with a variety of Soviet strategies. Surely there is as much danger in the inevitable showdown posture as in the one of perpetual peace.

J. DAVID SINGER
Consultant in International Relations,
Naval War College,
Newport, Rhode Island.

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